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Abstract 
 
Internationally oversight and accountability are regarded as two sides of the 
same coin, which are essential in ensuring that the electorate receives public 
value through service delivery and good governance. The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa obliges Parliament to ensure that mechanisms are in 
place for the executive to account in Parliament and Parliament to be able to 
maintain oversight on the executive’s actions and/ or lack of action. 
 
The main aim of this study is to evaluate whether the oversight and 
accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa are effective and if members of Parliament understand their role, 
function and mandate in overseeing the executive, thus holding the executive 
accountable for its actions and/ or lack of action. 
 
Once the research problem and the rationale of the study are provided, an 
overview of the research design and methodology is given. The study proceeds 
to discuss the theoretical context on oversight and accountability and conveys 
the state of oversight and accountability in a number of selected international 
Parliaments to provide a limited international perspective on oversight and 
accountability. The study proceeds to explore the application of oversight and 
accountability within the South African context with the main focus being on the 
South African model of oversight and accountability, policy framework for 
oversight and accountability, and the mechanisms for conducting oversight and 
accountability employed by the fourth Parliament. 
 
The study then provides an in-depth discussion on the research design and 
methodology to given an understanding of the hypothesis, conceptualisation 
and key variables. The discussion also includes issues of measurement, 
sampling methods and the research methodology that discusses the data 
collection methods, data capturing and data analysis. It concludes by 
considering the limitations of the study. 
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In order to provide evidence to support or disprove the hypothesis, an 
investigation was conducted on the mechanisms employed by the fourth 
Parliament in exercising its Constitutional mandate to oversee the executive 
and hold it to account. Two semi-structured questionnaires were administered 
to members of Parliament and managers that dealt with oversight and 
accountability during the fourth Parliament and the responses were processed 
by means of content analysis, consisting of tabulating the occurrences of 
content units by characterising the meaning in a given body of discourse in a 
systematic and quantitative fashion. From the findings, it is clear that challenges 
regarding how the mandate of oversight and accountability is implemented 
should be addressed and the results of Parliament’s efforts to oversee the 
executive need to be supported with stronger systems to ensure effective 
oversight and accountability. Although the negative factors outweigh the 
positive factors, some positive factors are identified. 
 
Generally, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the policy base 
that informs the institutional processes and programmes on oversight and 
accountability. In terms of the Parliamentary mandate to oversee the executive 
members of Parliament understand the mandate and are supported with a 
budget in each financial year to oversee the executive. The programme of the 
fourth Parliament is not aligned to the established time frames for certain 
processes of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 
no 9 of 2009. Members of Parliament enjoy immunity from prosecution and 
detention when in the chamber when it comes to issues of conduct. 
 
The fourth Parliament Constitutionally understood legislative, policy and 
strategic framework matters, but there is no policy in place as an integral aspect 
of Parliament’s strategic plan in relation to oversight and accountability, which 
reflects gaps in business planning and specific implementation activities. The 
institution lacks an administrative unit to carry out oversight and accountability 
implementation plans. 
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No institutional arrangements for the oversight of state institutions such as the 
South African Reserve Bank exist. There are no processes and guidelines for 
interaction and engagement of members of Parliament with ministers on issues 
of public concern. Parliament does not have electronic or manual systems in 
place for oversight and accountability. There is no database management 
system and tracking system, e.g. for resolution tracking. 
 
Parliamentary debates, including questions and replies by the executive, are 
identified as of poor standard. With regard to petitions, there are no formal 
regulations in place to formally process submitted petitions and no standardised 
processes to submit petitions. The role of committees is important in 
Parliamentary oversight, but the findings indicate that the quality of reports that 
are produced by committees is of concern and contributes negatively to 
effective oversight of the executive. The quality of contributions in the 
preparation of the national budget is good and important. Parliament does not 
give enough value to the reports of Chapter 9 institutions and the time allocated 
for engagement with the institutions is not adequate. The role of the opposition 
to hold the executive accountable is not exclusive. The findings reveal that the 
electoral system hinders effective oversight. In addition, there are challenges in 
the implementation of an effective monitoring and evaluation system. The 
analysis of the findings and the main challenges identified provides sufficient 
evidence for the hypothesis of the study, namely that the oversight and 
accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament were ineffective 
and that members of Parliament did not understand their role, function and 
mandate in overseeing the executive and thus fails in holding the executive 
accountable for its actions and/ or lack of action. 
 
The study concluded by providing a number of recommendations for 
addressing the challenges emanating from the analysis of the findings in order 
to enhance oversight and accountability. Only once the recommendations are 
implemented, it will be possible for the mechanisms employed by Parliament to 
generate effective oversight and thus ensure executive accountability. 
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Opsomming 
 
Internasionaal word toesig en aanspreeklikheid beskou as twee kante van 
dieselfde munt wat noodsaaklik is om te verseker dat die kiesers openbare 
waarde ontvang deur dienslewering en goeie bestuur. Die Grondwet van die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika verplig die Parlement om meganismes in plek te stel 
vir die uitvoerende gesag om verantwoording in die Parlement te doen en om 
die Parlement in staat stel om toesig oor die optrede van die uitvoerende gesag 
en/of die gebrek aan optrede te handhaaf. 
 
Die hoofdoel van hierdie studie was om te evalueer of die toesig- en 
aanspreeklikheids meganismes wat deur die vierde Parlement van die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika  gebruik word, doeltreffend is en of lede van die 
Parlement hul rol, funksie en mandaat in die toesig oor die uitvoerende gesag 
verstaan en dus so die uitvoerende gesag aanspreeklik hou vir hul optrede 
en/of gebrek aan optrede. 
 
Sodra die navorsings probleem en die rasionaal van die studie uiteengesit is, 
volg daar ‘n opsomming  van die navorsingontwerp en -metode. Die studie 
bespreek hiernaas die teoretiese konteks van toesig en aanspreeklikheid en 
gee die toestand van toesig en aanspreeklikheid in 'n aantal geselekteerde 
internasionale Parlemente weer om 'n beperkte internasionale perspektief op 
toesig en aanspreeklikheid te verskaf. Die studie verskaf dan 'n diepgaande 
bespreking van die navorsingsontwerp en - metodologie en 'n begrip van die 
hipotese, konseptualisering en sleutelveranderlikes. Die bespreking sluit verder 
kwessies van meting, steekproefnemingsmetodes en die 
navorsingsmetodologie met betrekking tot die data-insamelingsmetodes, 
datavaslegging en data –analise in. Dit sluit af met ‘n beskouing van die studie 
se die beperkinge. 
 
Die studie gaan voort deur die toepassing van toesig en aanspreeklikheid in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse konteks met die hooffokus op die Suid-Afrikaanse model van 
toesig en aanspreeklikheid, beleidsraamwerk vir toesig en aanspreeklikheid, en 
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die meganismes vir die uitvoering van toesig en aanspreeklikheid in diens van 
die vierde Parlement te verken . 
 
Ten einde die hipotese te ondersteun of weer te lê, is n ondersoek onderneem 
na die meganismes wat deur die vierde Parlement ingespan word in die 
uitoefening van sy grondwetlike mandaat om toesig oor die uitvoerende gesag 
te hou en dit aanspreeklik te hou. Twee semi-gestruktureerde vraelyste is 
afgeneem by Lede van die Parlement en Bestuurders wat toesig en 
aanspreeklikheid in die vierde Parlement handhaaf. Die antwoorde is deur 
middel van inhoud-analise getabuleer wat behels het dat die kere wat die 
inhound-eenhede voorkom, verwerk is deur hul betekenis te tipeer binne ‘n 
gegewe diskoerskonteks volgens ‘n sistematiese en kwantitatiewe styl. Deur 
die bevindinge te beskou, is dit duidelik dat die uitdagings aangaande hoe die 
mandaat van toesig en aanspreeklikheid geïmplementeer word, aangespreek 
moet word en dat die resultate van die Parlement se pogings om toesig oor die 
uitvoerende gesag te hou met behulp van sterker stelsels ondersteun moet 
word om effektiewe toesig en aanspreeklikheid te verseker. Selfs al oorskadu 
die negatiewe faktore die positiewe faktore, is ’n paar positiewe faktore 
geïdentifiseer. 
 
Oor die algemeen is die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika die 
beleidbasis van die institusionele prosesse en programme aangaande toesig 
en aanspreeklikheid. Lede van die Parlement moet die Parlementêre mandaat 
om toesig te hou verstaan en ondersteun word met 'n begroting in elke 
boekjaar. Die program van die vierde Parlement is nie in lyn met die gevestigde 
tydraamwerke vir sekere prosesse van die Geldwetsontwerpe 
Wysigingsproses en Verwante Aangeleenthede Wet. Lede van die Parlement 
geniet immuniteit teen vervolging en aanhouding wat betref hule gedrag 
wanneer die huis sit. 
 
Die vierde Parlement verstaan die Grondwet, wetgewende beleid en 
strategiese raamwerk, maar daar is geen beleid in plek wat deel vorm van die 
Parlement se strategiese beplanning in verband met toesig en aanspreeklikheid 
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wat gapings weerspieël  in sakebeplanning en implementering van spesifieke 
aktiwiteite nie. Die instelling het nie ’n administratiewe eenheid wat 
implementeringsplanne vir toesig en aanspreeklikheid kan uitvoer nie. 
 
Geen institusionele reëlings vir die toesig van staatsinstellings soos die 
Reserwebank bestaan nie. Daar is geen prosesse en riglyne vir interaksie en 
betrokkenheid tussen Lede van die Parlement en Ministers oor kwessies van 
openbare belang nie. Die Parlement het nie elektroniese stelsels of stelsels wat 
met die hand werk in plek vir toesig en aanspreeklikheid nie. Daar bestaan tans 
nie ’n databasis-bestuurstelsel en ’n naspoorstelsel vir byvoorbeeld die naspoor 
van oplossings nie.  
 
Debatte, insluitend vrae en antwoorde deur die uitvoerende gesag, word 
geïdentifiseer as van swak standaard. Met betrekking tot petisies, is daar geen 
formele regulasies in plek waarvolgens ingediende petisies geprosesseer kan 
word nie en daar is ook geen gestandaardiseerde prosesse om petisies formeel 
in te dien nie. Die rol van komitees is belangrik in Parlementêre oorsig, maar 
die bevindinge dui daarop dat die gehalte van die verslae wat deur komitees 
gelewer word kommer wek en ’n negatiewe uitwerking op die doeltreffende 
toesig van die uitvoerende gesag het. 
 
Die gehalte van die bydraes in die voorbereiding van die nasionale begroting 
en is goed en belangrik. Parlement gee nie voldoende aandag en waarde aan 
die tyd toegeken vir afsprake   aan die instellings van verslae van hoofstuk nege 
instellings. Die rol van die opposisie om uitvoerende gesag aanspreeklik te houi 
snie eksklusief nie. Die bevinding dui daarop aan dat die kiesstelsel verhinder 
doeltreffende toesig. Daarbenewens is daar uitdagings om 'n doeltreffende 
monitering en evaluering stelsel te implementeer. Die rol van die opposisie om 
die uitvoerende gesag aanspreeklik te houi is nie eksklusief nie. Die bevindinge 
dui daarop dat die kiesstelsel doeltreffende toesig verhinder. Verder is daar 
uitdagings met betrekking to die implemenering van ‘n doeltreffende 
kontrolering- en evalueringstelsel.  
Die ontleding van die bevindinge en die belangrikste uitdagings wat 
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geïdentifiseer is, verskaf voldoende bewyse vir die hipotese van die studie, 
naamlik dat die toesig- en aanspreeklikheidsmeganismes in diens van die 
vierde Parlement ondoeltreffend was en dat Lede van die Parlement hul rol, 
funksie en mandaat van toesig oor die uitvoerende gesag nie verstaan het nie 
en dus daarin faal om die uitvoerende gesag aanspreeklik te hou vir sy optrede 
en/of gebrek aan optrede. 
 
Die studie sluit af met ’n aantal aanbevelings met betrekking tot die uitdagings 
wat voortspruit uit die ontleding van die bevindinge om toesig en 
aanspreeklikheid te verbeter. Slegs wanneer aanbevelings geïmplementeer 
word, sal dit moontlik wees vir die meganismes wat deur die Parlement 
ingespan word om effektiewe toesig en dus uitvoerende aanspreeklikheid te 
verseker. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This first chapter serves as a project plan, which gives guidance in identifying 
the research statement to be addressed through the various stages until the 
conclusion stage of the study. The rationale of the study, its aims and objectives 
are covered in this chapter. The chapter explains the reasons for studying, the 
relevance of the selected topic, and the research questions that are asked in 
order to cover the topic fairly. An overview of the research design and 
methodology is also provided. Finally, the chapter concludes with an outline of 
the thesis by giving a research sequence. 
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
The research problem arises from the fact that the members of the executive 
are appointed by the President from members of Parliament (MP) and the norm 
is that the ruling party appoints from its own ranks in Parliament. The following 
question arises as to whether it is possible to ensure acceptable oversight 
where the same members of the majority party in Parliament are expected to 
hold their counterparts to account and oversee their actions without damaging 
the political party name to which they all belong? The problem being researched 
is not the difficulty of effective parliamentary oversight in a Parliament with 
strong majority party representation and to a certain extent domination. 
 
According to Daniel and Silkstone (2007:2) “the relationship of overseeing and 
accounting by the respective parties is potentially fraught with difficulty. This is 
especially so in a political system, such as in South Africa, where there are 
close links between the executive and legislature for example, the executive is 
not only chosen from the legislature but is also primarily from the leadership of 
the majority party. In addition, as is the case in many other parts of the world, 
South Africa has a strong party-based system. While a strong party system is 
an important democratic tool, this can hamper effective oversight, as members 
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of the legislature may be reluctant to call to account a government that is made 
up prominently by leaders of their party”.  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) (hereafter the 
Constitution) establishes state institutions supporting constitutional democracy, 
commonly referred to as Chapter 9 Institutions. These institutions are 
independent, and subject only to the Constitution and law, and are expected to 
be impartial, exercise their power and perform their functions without fear, 
favour or prejudice according to section 181(2). The Chapter 9 Institutions have 
powers to exercise oversight over the executive and other organs of state. The 
Chapter 9 Institutions must account for their budget spending to the National 
Assembly (NA), which is a house of Parliament and report to the NA on their 
activities and performance at least once a year. They have to account to the 
same institution that is perceived not to have strong mechanisms in place to 
enforce their recommendations.       
  
Accountability can be measured against objectives put in place for example by 
the Public Finance Management Act of 1999 (Republic of South Africa, 1999) 
and general statutes. The reality is that very few measurable objectives can be 
found in legislation regarding the oversight responsibility. The scarcity of such 
measurable objectives makes the oversight function difficult. According to 
Nijzink (2002:87) “despite the constitutional imperatives, South African 
legislatures have not been particularly active as overseers of government 
action”. One of the problems that Nijzink raises is that there is little agreement 
among members as to what oversight means in practice and how it should be 
carried out (Nijzink, 2002:88). 
 
Due to political party “closeness” of the majority of members of Parliament and 
the executive, the role of holding the executive to account has been left mainly 
to be the role of the opposition in the legislature. According to Nijzink (2002:88) 
“procedures are generally designed to enable the legislatures to fulfil their law-
making responsibility effectively and MPs and MPLs understand this 
responsibility. But procedures for holding the government accountable are less 
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well established and the interviews conducted for the legislative Landscape 
Study suggested that politicians have a much poorer understanding of oversight 
than of their law making-making responsibility”.  
 
1.2  Rationale of the Study 
 
The rationale of the study is discussed by indicating the aims and objectives of 
the study and immediately through a discussion on the reason and relevance 
of the selected topic, in evaluating oversight and accountability by the fourth 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
1.2.1 Aims and objectives of the study 
 
The study seeks to evaluate the current situation pertaining to oversight and 
accountability in order to contribute to the body of knowledge in order to 
broaden the understanding of the implications of oversight and accountability. 
Furthermore, the study’s aims and objectives are to provide an overview of the 
concepts of oversight and accountability.  
  
The study aims to evaluate the integrity of public governance through oversight 
and accountability mechanisms in order to find out if they can be used to 
safeguard government against corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and other 
forms of inappropriate behaviour. The study also aims to evaluate the process 
through which the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa monitors 
responses to Parliamentary recommendations emanating from its own reports. 
In addition, the study aims to evaluate to what extent party-political affiliation 
and responsibility to defend the party that a member of Parliament belongs to 
led to a situation where there was a lack of robust debates and questions in 
Parliament as mechanisms for the institution to conduct genuine oversight and 
ensure accountability by the executive. According to Ahmed (2011:70) “one of 
the basic factors affecting oversight or its effectiveness is a strong party based 
system”.  
The study accordingly seeks to: 
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 Define and discuss the importance of oversight and accountability. 
 Outline the current oversight and accountability mechanisms. 
 Question whether the oversight and accountability mechanisms put in place 
by the fourth Parliament were successful to oversee and hold the executive 
accountable. 
 Evaluate the extent to which the MP’s understood their responsibility, role 
and mandate when it comes to oversight and accountability in the fourth 
Parliament by administering a questionnaire that evaluate their 
understanding of the different aspects pertaining to oversight and 
accountability. 
 Evaluate the degree of effectiveness of oversight and accountability during 
the fourth Parliament. 
 Investigate the degree to which the fourth Parliament effectively performed 
and upheld its constitutional mandate to oversee and ensure accountability 
by the executive. 
 
1.2.2 Reason and relevance of the selected topic 
 
In its findings, the research tries to establish the extent of Parliamentary 
oversight towards ensuring constitutionalism and government accountability 
under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The practice of the fourth 
Parliament regarding oversight and accountability is evaluated against the 
guidelines set out in the Constitution. In instances where some gaps and flaws 
are noticed or identified, the findings are hope to assist those who are primarily 
in charge, to resolve or improve the gaps identified in order for the following 
Parliaments to align their strategies and planning so they can fulfil their 
constitutional mandate. 
 
The findings will help the MPs to understand the importance of Parliamentary 
oversight and accountability of the executive and instil a culture of taking these 
constitutional mandates seriously. The study will also contribute to the body of 
knowledge about whether the existing mechanisms and practices of 
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Parliamentary oversight in South Africa are effective in ensuring constitutional 
adherence and moreover meaningful executive accountability. 
 
Furthermore, the study contributes in articulating the factors that affect the 
oversight mandate of Parliament and it could be used as a guide to the MPs of 
future Parliaments on how they should play their role of Parliamentary 
oversight. In addition, the study assists the general public and scholars to 
understand the conspicuous issues of oversight and accountability and their 
nexus with constitutionalism. The vision of the fourth Parliament was “To build 
an effective people’s Parliament that is responsive to the needs of the people 
and that is driven by the ideal of realising a better quality of life for all the people 
of South Africa” (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2010) ( hereafter 
referred to as Parliament). It is therefore important that Parliament focus on 
oversight and accountability of the executive to ensure the needs of people are 
met. 
 
1.3  Research questions 
 
Influenced by the research problem stated above, the primary research 
question of the study is as follows: 
 
 Did the oversight and accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth 
Parliament achieve its constitutional mandate to oversee and hold the 
executive accountable? 
 
The secondary research questions are: 
 
 To what extent has the fourth Parliament ensured effective oversight and 
accountability through its constitutional mandate of oversight? 
 What mechanisms are available for Parliamentary oversight in the NA and 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP)? 
 How significant was effective oversight in ensuring proper accountability by 
the executive during the fourth Parliament? 
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1.4  Overview of research design and methodology 
 
These following subsections give an indication as to the approach used in 
conducting the study, because the approaches used can vary considerably in 
a scientific enquiry. The overview of the research design and methodology put’s 
in place the procedure for conducting the study.  
 
1.4.1 Research design 
 
The study used a quantitative research design. Its investigation is evaluation 
research that seeks to question whether the oversight and accountability 
mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament achieved its constitutional 
mandate to oversee and hold the executive accountable. The research design 
can be classified an empirical, employing hybrid, numerical and textual data 
with medium control (Mouton, 2012:158). The reason for choosing this research 
design is that it will help in assessing whether the oversight and accountability 
mechanisms were properly implemented by the fourth Parliament by providing 
accurate evidence.  
 
1.4.2 Research methodology 
 
The research methodology followed was to utilise a semi-structured 
questionnaire, which was distributed to the members of Parliament (Annexure 
1) and managers responsible for oversight and accountability in Parliament 
(Annexure 2) in the fourth Parliament. These are chosen because of their 
strategic knowledge and experience with oversight and accountability. A 
probability sample in the form of a simple random sampling technique was 
utilised for data collection, where subjects were systematically selected from 
the population. The goal was to select a representative sample. Furthermore, 
data was collected on theory, background, and concepts related to oversight 
and accountability that were based on the literature sources reviewed. The 
questionnaires aimed to determine the state of oversight and accountability in 
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the fourth Parliament and to identify the challenges experienced during this 
Parliament. 
 
The unit of analysis in this research is the fourth Parliament, MP’s and the 
managers that were responsible for managing issues that dealt with oversight 
and accountability in the fourth Parliament. The questionnaire was distributed 
electronically and aimed to acquire data that could shed light on the state of 
oversight and accountability in the fourth Parliament.  
 
1.5  Research report sequence 
 
In Chapter 1, the research topic is introduced; a background and an overview 
of the study are provided in order to outline how the research will be executed. 
This chapter touches on the aims and objectives of the study, the reason for 
the study, and the relevance of the study. The specific primary research 
question and secondary questions are expressed and an overview of the 
research design and methodology is given. 
 
Chapter 2 of the study takes a closer look at the literature related to the research 
topic. The key concepts related to the topic are defined. These include 
accountability and oversight. An in-depth theoretical background and rationale 
for oversight and accountability is given, with the focus on both local and 
international literature in order to provide a solid theoretical premise for the 
study. An international context relating to oversight and accountability is 
provided by considering selected international Parliaments. Chapter 3 focuses 
on the composition and mandates of the Parliament of the Republic of South 
African. Institutional and legislative context of oversight and accountability in 
South Africa. The South African model of oversight and accountability, the 
legislative and policy framework for oversight and accountability, and an 
overview of general implementation strategies are discussed.  
 
Chapter 4 explains the research design and methodology in detail, while 
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Chapter 5 presents the findings from the investigative study into how the 
constitutional mandate of oversight and accountability was handled by the 
fourth Parliament based on the questionnaires (Annexure 1) and (Annexure 2) 
feedback received. In processing the data, the focus was on evaluating the 
effectiveness of oversight and accountability mechanisms and implementation 
strategies in the fourth Parliament. Through the findings presented, challenges 
experienced and possible gaps are exposed. 
 
Chapter 6 outlines the research findings and give an overview of the main 
conclusions of the study by means of summarising and discussing the 
significant findings in the context of the stated research problem, literature 
review conducted, and stated methodology. Finally, recommendations are 
provided in order to improve the standard and effectiveness on oversight and 
accountability. This last chapter can be said to have as its main purpose the 
provision of a general conclusion and recommendations that seek to make 
Parliament employ effective Parliamentary oversight and accountability by the 
executive to ensure sound constitutional oversight and accountability. 
 
1.6 Summary and deductions 
 
This chapter introduces the research problem, rationale and objectives of the 
study, reason and relevance of the selected topic and the research questions 
(primary and secondary) influenced by the research problem in order to 
evaluate how the constitutional mandate of oversight and accountability was 
applied by the fourth Parliament. An overview of the research design and 
methodology is provided as to assist with the evaluation research that seeks to 
question whether the oversight and accountability mechanisms employed by 
the fourth Parliament achieved its constitutional mandate to oversee and hold 
the executive accountable. The research approach employed by the study is 
the quantitative approach. A simplified research report sequence is provided for 
easy logical following through the various attempts to solve the research 
problem.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 9 
 
 
CHARPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON 
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the main concepts of oversight and accountability are defined 
and investigated in order to provide a basis for conducting the rest of the study. 
The theoretical context of oversight and accountability as essential elements of 
democracy and representativity is discussed. The rationale underlying this 
chapter touches on aspects such as the functions, characteristics, benefits and 
challenges of oversight and accountability.  
 
An international perspective on oversight and accountability in developed and 
developing nations are studied as secondary data in order to help the 
researcher understand the best practices employed across the globe. The 
research considers a number of publications which include related journals, 
Parliament annual reports, and textbooks. As the study intends to strengthen 
democracy by promoting oversight and accountability as mandated by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, it becomes important to discuss 
democracy as the major contributor to greater legitimacy of oversight and 
accountability before continuing. 
 
2.2  Oversight and accountability and related concepts 
 
This chapter starts with a definition of democracy and gives a description of the 
various types of democracy. The concept of oversight and that of accountability 
gets a comprehensive definition and description in order to illustrate the 
relationship between the two concepts. Once that is achieved, the rationale for 
oversight and accountability is discussed. Literature on the composition and 
mandates of Parliament as an institution to implement oversight and 
accountability is further considered. In addition, literature on the state of 
oversight and accountability in other international Parliaments forms part of the 
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literature reviewed as a way of determining better practices and common 
challenges. 
 
2.2.1 Democracy 
 
Definition 
The general definition of democracy is that it is the government of the people 
by the people. Ranney (1971:76 as cited in Brynard, 1996:53) defines 
democracy as “a form of government organised in accordance with the 
principles of popular sovereignty, political equality, popular consultation, and 
majority rule”. For democracy to function the people (citizens) should be at the 
‘centre’ of what and how the government conducts itself. The definition by 
Ranney could also be interpreted to mean that popular consultation in a 
democracy should also be afforded to the citizens using such institutions as 
Parliament by means of clear and achievable public participation programmes. 
 
Types of democracy 
(a) Direct democracy-According to Calland (1999:61) “The theory of direct 
democracy is based on the premise that ‘the people’ assemble and every 
citizen is directly involved in every government decision”. From Calland 
definition it can be argued that direct democracy is characterised by 
referendums or elections. Because of the large size of populations in today’s 
world opportunities for true direct democracy are limited. 
 
(b) Participatory democracy-Calland (1999:62) indicates that “it is important not 
to underestimate the growing crisis in other pluralist; liberal democracies 
throughout the past century when declining voting levels, lack of real political 
choice, rise of shadow security governments and decay in popular trust in 
the electoral process have prompted the need for renewing public 
participation. Public participation process strengthens institutions of 
representative democracy, democratising those institutions”. This view is 
important because even though the Constitution (section 42(3) and 55(2) 
emphasises the need for mechanisms to ensure that all Executive organs 
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of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to the NA. 
The need for these mechanisms also arise as they are required to maintain 
oversight on the exercise of the executive. The rationale is that the political 
environment should promote such a mechanism through the elected 
representatives on the behalf of the citizens of the country. 
 
(c) Representative (or parliamentary) democracy-According to Calland 
(1999:62) representative democracy assumes that elected representatives 
must represent the views of the people – the electorate – and 
“representation is defined as a limited mandate where the representative is 
empowered to speak or vote, reflecting the view of the constituency”. This 
is the basis and rationale for this study, as the representatives in the 
legislature represent the views of the people on how the executive should 
conduct itself and what developmental policies should be implemented to 
better the lives of the citizens who are also the electorate. 
 
2.2.2 Oversight 
 
Definition 
According to Yamamoto (2007:9) on his comparative study of 88 national 
legislatures in 2003, Parliamentary oversight is “the review, monitoring and 
supervision of the Executive government, but also of all public agencies”. 
Barkan et al. (2003:1) in turn argue that a legislature is effective only if it takes 
on a “watchdog” role over the executive. In simple language, oversight is mainly 
an activity of Parliament, requiring it to keep an eye on the activities of the 
executive and holding the executive to account (which will be later discussed) 
on behalf of the represented people. According to Oliver (1994:130) cited by 
Corder Hugh, Jagwenth Saras, Soltau Jred (1999:8) “Parliament oversight 
primarily represents the power of the representative body to affect and have 
control over the executive and other institutions as applicable”.  
 
Oversight includes financial scrutiny and watching the overall activities of the 
executive in policy implementation, proper and effective execution including 
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how the law is enforced as per the specific intentions and requirements of the 
Parliament and constitutional objectives. This is confirmed by Madue 
(2012:433) when He indicates that in almost every country, governance and 
oversight functions by legislatures are predicated by the provision of the 
Constitution. 
 
According to Shija (2012:5)“in the Westminster Model of Parliament 
democracy, legislatures have been bestowed with the power and authority to 
constantly and judiciously check how and why the authorities in government 
handle national resources in relation to the welfare of the population”. South 
Africa’s constitution-makers were well aware of the difficulties of holding the 
executive to account in parliamentary system. For this reason, the Constitution 
spells out the oversight role of South Africa’s legislatures very clearly (Nijzink, 
2002:87). 
 
It is worth noting that, according to Parliament (2009) on the report of 
independent panel on assessment of Parliament “in any Parliamentary system, 
oversight can only be effective if Parliament asserts its independence and 
embraces the authority conferred on it by the Constitution.There are various 
mechanisms which Parliament may use to hold the executive to account, but it 
is the integrity, independence and authority with which these mechanisms are 
applied that will ultimately determine the extent to which oversight contributes 
to improved governance”. For effective oversight to take place and be realised, 
a common understanding of what oversight is becomes important among the 
MPs guided by the constitutional obligations. This will also ensure that 
accountability (to be discussed below) is realised and thus leading to good 
governance by the executive. 
 
From the above discussion on oversight, one can agree with Mansura (2012:3) 
when he argues that “the typical definition of oversight is supervision, watchful 
care, management or control in the parliamentary sense”. The watchful eye 
function over the executive activities includes also its state parastatals and 
agencies. The primary role of Parliamentary oversight leads to its ability to hold 
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the executive government accountable for its plans and activities, and monitor 
and evaluate also the implementation level. 
 
According to Ahmed (2011:70) “one of the basic factors affecting oversight or 
its effectiveness is a strong party based system”. The relationship between the 
ruling majority party and the executive government has an impact on the 
oversight process and even more so in a Parliamentary system of government 
than any form of democratic government because in such a system, the fate of 
the two sides is intertwined . The reason is that one stands and falls with the 
other (Ahmed, 2011:70). MPs are always reluctant to demand that the members 
of the executive from their own political party to account, as that can be seen 
as non-comradeship and has the potential of being career-limiting. The use of 
party list to fill seats in Parliament means that MPs of the majority party are 
often in a position where they must exercise oversight over senior members of 
their own party, the same members who may be able to influence the 
composition of the list during the following elections (Parliament, 2009:37). The 
MPs of the majority party can also be seen as turning against their own party 
policies being implemented by the executive. 
 
The above discussion by Ahmed (2011:70) on oversight indicates that for 
effective oversight to be realised, Parliament needs to have technical expertise 
to conduct oversight, which may include such skills as understanding economic 
planning and be able to analyse financial policies and processes. Once 
oversight has taken place, Parliament should be able to process that 
information and act on it regardless of political party influence and dominance. 
It is then clear that effective oversight leads to a proper functioning democracy. 
This is as a result of the oversight activities can lead to an improvement in the 
quality of policies and programmes introduced by the executive. Oversight 
leads to the executive policies and programmes gaining greater legitimacy once 
ratified by Parliament. Legitimacy is achieved because of the participation of 
opposition parties who bring a greater consideration of general public interest 
to the process of oversight than when policy and programme consideration is 
conducted by the same political party with the same outlook (Izah, 2013:5).  
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The success of the oversight role by Parliament, and to some degree its 
effectiveness, can only be realised through the constitutional provisions for 
oversight. Two other major contributors to oversight success and effectiveness 
are MPs personal integrity and competence. MPs that lack integrity and 
competence build a Parliament that can be classified as a rubber stamp 
Parliament in that it simply endorses decisions made elsewhere in the political 
arena. The danger of a rubber stamp legislature is that it is non-transformative, 
as such a legislature finds it difficult, if not impossible, to change the executive 
policy proposals. 
 
Parliament should be administratively efficient and technically competent as an 
institution. It should also be able to provide the necessary information to MPs 
in order for the member to conduct oversight in a particular area of governance.  
This view is supported by Godi (2012:1) “The gradual erosion of legislature’s 
capacity to exercise control over the executive has been ascribed to the 
circumvention of Parliament by the executive. However, the internal capacity 
constraints faced by many legislatures have often been neglected. Minimal 
performance by legislatures in terms of policy analysis and review, budget 
control and initiation and amendment of legislation as well as lack of 
consultation between Parliamentarians and their constituencies have less to do 
with the political environment than the internal capacity of these institutions”. It 
is then important that Parliament should be strengthened by providing the 
necessary capacity and frameworks to provide effective oversight over the 
executive. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Accountability 
 
Definition 
Lastra and Shams (2000:3) define accountability as an obligation owed by one 
person (the accountable) to another (the accountee) according to which the 
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former must give account of, explain and justify his actions or decisions against 
criteria of some kind, and take responsibility for any fault or damage.  
Schedler (1999:17) supports this view by Lastra and Shams (2000:3) and 
define accountability as follows: “A is accountable to B when A is obliged to 
inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to 
suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”. 
 
Schedler (1999:17) definition foregrounds three key aspects of political 
accountability: answerability, justification, and enforcement (Schedler, 1999:14-
15). This definition indicates that the accountable is obliged to provide answers 
in the sense that information must be provided about decisions taken and how 
they were arrived at. According to Butler (2011:2), accountability also requires 
justification. This justification is realised when Parliament demand that Ministers 
and officials account to Parliament by giving reasons for their actions. He 
(Butler, 2011:2) further indicates that accountability implies the subordination of 
the policy process to reason and the creation of a culture of justification among 
policymakers. It can then be said that accountability entails enforcement which 
may involve the administering of sanctions. 
 
In both Lastra and Shams (2000:3) and Schedler (1999:17) definition, it 
becomes obvious that accountability ensures that decisions and actions are 
taken by those responsible for public services in order to ensure that the stated 
and expected objectives are achieved in order to better the lives of ordinary 
citizens. Oversight furthermore entails the scrutiny and examination of the 
conduct of individuals in institutions of authority by means of personal 
accountability. Institutional accountability is employed in order for organizations 
to account for their corporate behaviour or poor performance.  
According to Bovens (2010:948) “accountability and accountable have strong 
positive connotations; they hold the promise of fair and equitable governance”. 
This is evident in Nyathela and Makhado (2012:4) when they indicate that “the 
purpose and functions of accountability are: 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 16 
 
 
 To enhance the integrity of public governance in order to safeguard 
government against corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and other forms 
of inappropriate behaviour. 
 As an institutional arrangement, to effect democratic control. 
 To improve performance which foster institutional learning and service 
delivery. 
 To enable the public to judge the performance of the government by the 
government giving account in public”. 
 
Even though the power and authority to constantly and judiciously check how 
and why the authorities in government handle national resources, “Legislatures 
in the Westminster tradition have proved weak at ensuring that governments 
remain accountable between elections” Nijzink (2002:87). 
 
Nijzink (2002:87) blames this weakness on the majority of the legislature 
tendency to interpret their role as simply sustaining government and supporting 
its initiatives. The end product of this weakness is having MPs who are not able 
to individually hold the government to strictly account for their plans and actions 
for fear of losing their positions on the party list and facing disciplinary action if 
they support a different position from that of the party in the legislature. 
 
For accountability to take place, institutions tasked with oversight should be 
able to function properly and perform their tasks without fear or favour. The key 
elements, namely answerability and enforcement, emerge from the definitions 
of accountability above, even though accountability is an anamorphous 
concept. In the context of South Africa, for example, answerability is the 
obligation on the side of the executive/government (i.e. President/Ministers), 
public entities (Eskom and the SABC), and officials in the public sector (e.g. 
Director-General) to provide information to institutions responsible for oversight 
(Parliament) in an attempt to justify how and why certain decisions were taken 
or not taken. 
 
Types of accountability 
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According to Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2007:1), the types of accountability are 
horizontal accountability and vertical accountability. Stapenhurst and O’Brien 
(2007:1) indicate that “horizontal accountability is the capacity of state 
institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of 
government, or the requirement for agencies to report sideways”. Horizontal 
accountability is the accountability type held by accountability institutions, such 
as Parliament, with autonomous powers to question and “punish” improper 
behaviour and action from elected and appointed public officials. 
 
Vertical accountability in turn is the means through which citizens, mass media, 
and civil society seek to enforce standards of good performance on officials 
(Stapenhurst and O’Brien, 2007:2). Civil society and mass media usually seek 
the attention and support of the politicians in Parliament when they notice 
inappropriate behaviour and or action by government officials. They understand 
that since they do not have authority over the public officials, they can lobby 
constitutionally mandated institutions to exercise oversight and thus expect the 
government and its agencies to account or face sanctioning where it’s 
appropriate. 
 
The focus of this study is mainly on political accountability that was exerted by 
Parliament in the fourth Parliament, as mandated by the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa. Political accountability by the executive to Parliament 
as a political institution is different to legal accountability by the executive, which 
is exerted by the judiciary by holding the executive legally accountable. 
Secondary autonomous institutions of accountability such as the Public 
Protector, Human Rights Commission and Auditor-General are some of 
institutions provided by the South African Constitution designed to be 
independent of the executive in their reporting to Parliament to ensure that the 
government accounts for their actions and/or lack of action and thus promote 
the notion of responsible government. 
 
Parliament is mandated by the Constitution to act as an agent of accountability 
through its oversight mechanisms. It becomes an agent in that the electorate 
(the principal) elects Legislators to enact laws and oversee government actions 
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on their behalf. The electorate hold the legislators (Parliament) to account at 
election time. Where dissatisfied, voters can recall their elected political party 
and vote for an alternative (Stapenhurst and O’Brien, 2007:2). Parliament 
should be the key institution of accountability - not only in its own right, but also 
as the institution to which many autonomous accountability institutions report 
(Chapter 9 Institutions). Parliament is then the main vehicle through which 
political accountability is exercised. 
     
2.3 Theoretical background and rationale for oversight and accountability 
 
The definitions of concepts indicate that oversight and accountability are closely 
linked to democracy and more specifically to parliamentary democracy, which 
was discussed on subsection 2.2.1. The link can be drawn from the fact that 
the public representatives in Parliament are empowered to speak or vote, 
reflecting the views of their constituencies. It is then through this empowerment 
that they draw their power to conduct oversight and are thus able hold the 
executive accountable (supported and guided by the Constitution). 
 
Schacter (2000:1) concur with the view stated above by indicating that “society 
concedes wide powers to the executive authorities in the government of the 
day: to tax, to spend and make and enforce policies and laws for which in return 
they expect accountability”. 
 
2.3.1 Theoretical foundation to oversight and accountability 
 
To discuss the theoretical background of oversight and accountability fully, it is 
inevitable that the parentage of democracy and the role of oversight and 
accountability in the early democratic societies should be traced. According to 
Rejai (as cited in Clapper,1996:52) the word “democracy” originally referred to 
the type of government in which power to rule was vested in the people and it 
refers to the governmental system of the city states of Athens during the time 
of Pericles. According to Ehrenberg (1950:515) in turn states that the Greeks 
were the first political people in the history of humankind, for they were the first 
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to create states purely as communities of citizens in which the administration 
and the making of policy were the right and the duty of these citizens. 
 
The Athenian democracy can be considered as an inspiration for modern 
democratic systems. The study looks at the Athenian democratic Constitution 
in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, with the hope of giving the theoretical 
foundation of oversight and accountability with the aim of facilitating a 
comparison of that democratic system with the democratic system established 
by the South African Constitution on oversight and accountability. 
 
According to Rothchild (2007:4) “the Athenian democracy is the world’s oldest 
well documented democratic polity, and as such has served as an inspiration, 
and cautionary tale, for designers of all subsequent democracies”. The focus is 
principally on what is usually called the classical period in Athenian history.  
Rothchild (2007:4) further states that “this period runs from 490 BCE, the year 
of the first Persian invasion of Greece, until 323 BCE, when Alexander the Great 
died. The Athenian map below shows the Athenian empire in 431BCE. 
 
Source: Rothchild, 2007:6) 
Figure 2.1: The Athenian empire in 431BCE 
 
The most striking features of the Athenian democracy were that most public 
officials were selected by lot, most could serve a single one-year term or two 
such terms non-consecutively Rothchild (2007:13). Final legislative authority 
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lay with a body consisting of the entire citizen population, rather than a 
representative body Rothchild (2007:13). It can then be said that the Athenian 
democracy, in its structure, institutions and procedures, was radically different 
from our own system of representative democracy. 
When comparing the South African democracy and that of the Athenian 
democracy, it becomes evident that both systems intended to vest the ultimate 
power in the hands of the citizens, to hinder overreaching by public officials and 
subversion of the democracy, to implement the rule of law, and to create a 
stable constitutional structure. According to Rothchild (2007:33) “a perennial 
difficulty for democratic constitutions is the need to assign public officials 
sufficient power to accomplish the objectives of government, while in the same 
time preventing them from exceeding their assigned powers in a way that would 
detrimentally affect the liberties of the people”. 
 
The South African Constitution employs structural devices designed to prevent 
overreaching by the executive and theses structural devices including oversight 
and accountability, protection of individual rights by the bills of rights and 
separation of powers. The separation of powers principle refers to democratic 
structural systems of governance in which checks and balances result in the 
imposition of restraints by one arm of state upon another. In South Africa, the 
separation of powers doctrine originates from constitutional principle VI of the 
Constitution of 1993 (also referred to as the interim Constitution), which 
provided that  there shall be separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary with appropriate checks and balances to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness (Constitution, 1993). The final 
Constitution adopted in 1996 had to give effect to this principle. 
 
The Constitution confers on the executive the power to prepare and initiate 
legislation while Parliament is mandated to legislate, including initiating and 
preparing legislation. Similarly, the Constitution empowers the courts to develop 
the common law and customary laws, thus implying law making by the courts 
that are supposed only to interpret and apply the law (Seedat and Naidoo, 
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2015). Parliament contributes to policy evolution which in terms of the 
Constitution is developed and implemented by the executive. 
 
While the Constitution assigns specific powers and functions to the three arms 
of state, it also provides several checks and balances or accountability 
measures to curtail the exercise of that power. Although the Constitution does 
not explicitly refer to the doctrine of separation of powers or checks and 
balances, these are nevertheless built into it from the interim Constitution. The 
separation of powers doctrine is an unexpressed provision that is “implied” in 
or “implicit” to the Constitution. 
 
In line with this, Rothchild (2007:33) states that “the Athenians, having 
experienced the tyranny of the Peisistratids in the late sixth century, and having 
seen their democracy twice subverted (albeit briefly) at the end of the fifth 
century, were likewise concerned to constrain the power of public officials”.  
 
In order to entrench democracy the Athenian democracy put the following 
oversight and accountability measures. 
 
Epikheirotonia 
According to Rothchild (2007:35), at the first (Principal) meeting of the 
assembly each prytany, there was a vote on whether public officials were 
performing their duties well, in a procedure called epikheirotonia (“voting by a 
show of hands”).If the vote went against an official, he was provisionally 
deposed from office, and he would be tried before a jury court. If convicted, he 
would be removed from position, and might be fined, as was Pericles in 430 
BCE. If acquitted, the official would return to his office. 
 
Euthyna 
Euthyna was an examination of a public official that took place after he finished 
his term of office. It was applicable to the council members but not to jurors. 
According to Rothchild (2007:35), the examination consisted of two stages. 
First, there was a review of the official’s handling of public money to uncover 
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crimes such as embezzlement, accepting bribes, or causing loss to the demos 
through neglect. He (Rothchild, 2007:35) further indicates that the examination 
was conducted by ten logistai, who were selected from the citizens by lot. 
 
The second stage of euthyna was aimed at uncovering any sort of misconduct, 
such as neglect of duty or misuse of power. It was conducted by ten euthynoi, 
who were members of the Council, one chosen by lot from each of the ten 
tribes. If the euthynoi thought any charge well founded, they passed it along to 
the appropriate magistrate for trial (Rothchild, 2007:36). 
 
Apophasis 
In the mid-fourth century, the apophasis procedure was introduced to allow the 
Areopagos to investigate possible offenses Rothchild (2007:36). The Assembly 
could refer a matter to the Areopagos for investigation, or the Areopagos could 
launch an investigation on its own initiative. The Areopagos made a report 
(apophasis) of its findings to the assembly, which would decide whether a 
person should be prosecuted. The most well-known example of the use of this 
procedure was in the Harpalos affair, when it led to the trial and conviction of 
the orator Demosthenes for accepting a bribe from the treasurer of Alexander 
the great. 
 
In support of the principles and systems that act as a foundation for democracy, 
as those in the Athenian democracy, Parry and Moyser (1994:44-46) 
differentiate between ‘realist’ theories of democracy that emphasise 
representation, responsible leadership, and elite responsiveness, as the key 
elements of democracy, and theories that see direct participation as the sine 
qua non of democratic practices. 
 
To validate Parry and Moyser (1994:44-46) theories of democracy as they 
define and measure democracy, “The first set of theories point out that the 
degree of direct democracy that was exercised by citizens in the relative small 
assemblies of ancient Athens is no longer possible in large, complex societies”. 
According to Nel and Van Wyk, 2003:55 this direct democracy is exercised “to 
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the extent that ‘realist school’ of thinking about democracy does recognise 
public participation as a feature of democracy, but reduce it to only one 
manifestation, namely voting”. Furthermore, elite models of democracy hold 
that “a vote into office is essentially a political blank cheque for elected 
representatives to proceed as they see fit” (Ballard, 2007:17). 
 
The second set of theories is based on the notion that democracy in its original 
sense of ‘rule by the people’ is hardly achieved without a whole range of 
participatory activities through which the public not only vote for the sake of 
appointing and monitoring representatives, but they become political citizens. 
(Nel and Van Wyk, 2003:56). According to Pitkin as cited in Young (2000:128)  
“In contrast to the elite models, elected representatives are not seen simply as 
trustees who can proceed as they see fit, but also as delegates who have 
mandates from the constituencies to which they are accountable”. 
 
According to Barkan et al (2003:1) a legislature is effective only if it takes on a 
watchdog role over the executive. McGee (2002:9) indicates that being held 
accountable for the exercise of power is a “requirement for democracy”.  The 
scrutiny of executive government and holding it to account for its actions is the 
key function of a legislature, according to Brazier, Flinders & McHugh 
(2005:33). It is then evident that the authors of the South African Constitution 
of 1996 were in agreement with the above mentioned authors, as they included 
constitutional provisions that demand legislatures to put in place mechanisms 
in place that will ensure that the executive and its organs of state are 
accountable to the legislatures.  
 
Murray and Nijzink (2002:89) illustrate that the accountability responsibility of 
the executive stipulated in the South African constitutional framework by an 
“accountability chain” which is based on the constitutional principle that the 
Parliament and legislatures are responsible for executive oversight. It further 
demands that members of the executive also ensure that those accountable to 
them adhere to accountability, e.g. Director Generals of departments or the 
boards of the different parastatals or public entities. 
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Chain of Accountability 
 
 
 
 
    Voters                   Parliament                  Cabinet                   Heads of  
                                                                                                   departments 
 
 
Source: Murray &Nijzink, 2002:89 
Figure: 2.2: Chain of Accountability 
 
According to Hedger and Blick (2008:2) the accountability obligation originates 
from “the practical need to delegate certain tasks to others so as to distribute 
delivery of large and complex workloads”. 
 
2.3.2 Rationale for oversight and accountability 
 
Oversight and accountability are integral parts of democracy. According to 
Creighton (2005:17) “democracy is intended precisely to give the people power 
over choices about the ultimate aims and goals of government action”.  
 
According to Gildenhuys, Fox and Wissink (1991:124) “a situation that 
encourages and/or allows participation in general elections only is, therefore, 
not entirely democratic. In fact public participation in decision-making is an 
imperative for a democratic government”. The public in any democracy should 
be able to participate in their own government by asking robust questions about 
the executive’s actions through their representatives in the legislature. 
 
In Parliament on the 26 March 1999, the former President of the Republic of 
South Africa, Nelson Mandela indicated that  
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“It is in the legislatures that the instruments have been fashioned to 
create a better life for all. It is here that oversight of government has been 
exercised. It is here that our society in all its formation has had an 
opportunity to influence policy and its implementation”. (Parliament, 
2009) 
 
Oversight and accountability are terms that have emerged as universal 
attributes of good governance (Botes, 2011:19). According to Lastra and 
Shams (2000:6) “accountability can either be exercised before/during the 
process of taking decisions/action, or after the decision/action has been taken. 
It is with reference to this fact, the fact of concluding a decision or action, that 
we define accountability as either a priori (ex-ante) or a posteriori (ex -post)”. 
 
Whether accountability is priori (ex-ante) or a posteriori (ex-post), certain 
objectives in overseeing the executive are the bases of ensuring Legislatures 
conduct oversight. According to Madue (2012:435) legislatures conduct 
oversight in order to: 
 
 Ensure transparency and openness of executive activities. Legislatures 
shed light on the operations of government by providing a public arena in 
which the policies and actions of government are debated, scrutinised, and 
subjected to public opinion. 
 Hold the executive branch accountable. Legislative oversight scrutinises 
whether the government’s policies have been implemented and whether 
they are having the desired impact. 
 Provide financial accountability. Legislatures approve and scrutinise 
government spending by highlighting wasteful expenditure within publicly-
funded services. Their aim is to improve the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of government expenditure. 
 Uphold the rule of law. Legislatures should protect the rights of citizens by 
monitoring policies and examining potential abuses of power, arbitrary 
behaviour, and illegal or unconstitutional conduct by government. 
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Even though the objectives are clear, Madue (2012:435) indicate that “there are 
numerous limitations in exercising effective oversight”. The limitations and 
complexities of exercising oversight include, among others, the following: 
 
 Parliamentarians lack the technical expertise to be able to participate in 
economic planning and analysis, and therefore cannot be expected to be 
real players in the financial policy process. 
 Parliaments are too subject to political party dominance that prevents the 
exercise of significant oversight responsibilities on the executive. 
 
Johnson and Nakamura (1999) as cited in Madue (2012:435) argue that “while 
most legislatures have some formal oversight powers, effective oversight is 
difficult to exercise because it requires information about executive branch 
activities, the legislative capacity to process that information, the legislative will 
to act, and the power to back up demands for improvement / access / 
responsiveness. Oversight, even more than law-making, puts the legislature 
into an adversarial relationship with at least some portion of the executive 
branch”.  
 
The mechanisms for oversight that legislatures utilise include questions to the 
Executive, public accounts Committees, interpellations, Auditor-General, 
subpoenas and other court type powers e.g. the ombudsman and investigatory 
and departmental Committees (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004).The mechanisms 
of Parliamentary oversight are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
2.4  The state of oversight and accountability in the selected international 
Parliaments 
 
In evaluating oversight and accountability by the fourth Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa, an international comparison became essential in order 
to understand and bring an international context on oversight and 
accountability. This comparison enables the study to evaluate how the fourth 
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Parliament measures and compares against those international legislatures 
both in developing and developed democracies. The choice of Parliaments was 
based on a desire to sample a number of Parliament from developed and 
developing countries across the globe, some unicameral with one 
Parliamentary assembly and others bicameral with two houses of Parliament. 
 
2.4.1 Governance and Parliamentary accountability in Ireland 
 
According to MacCarthaigh (2012:1) “the National Parliament of Ireland is 
called ‘the Oireachtas’, and it consists of the ‘the President and two Houses [:] 
a House of Representatives called Dảil Ẻireann and a Senate called Ṣeanad 
Ẻireann’. Martin (2010:1) explains that “the political system of the Republic of 
Ireland functions as a representative democracy and Irish government is part 
of this chain of delegation. Citizens vote to elect representatives to Dảil Ẻireann. 
Dᾴil deputies then select the Taoiseach who in turn selects members of the 
cabinet”. 
 
Article 28.4.1 of the Constitution of Ireland according to MacCarthaigh (2012:2), 
states that ‘The Government shall be responsible to Dảil Ẻireann’. This can be 
interpreted as indicating that the members of Dảil Ẻireann have a duty to hold 
the government to account. Gallagher (2010:2) indicates that “by common 
consent, the Irish Parliament is not among the world’s strongest in its capacity 
to control or even constrain the executive”. Gallagher (2010:2) can only be 
understood as saying that the government clearly dominates the Irish 
Parliament, He (Gallagher, 2010:2)   is further supported by Martin (2010:2) 
who says most popular accounts of Irish politics suggest that monitoring of the 
Irish government is weak and that the principals in Irish politics are often 
considered incapable of monitoring the government, with executive-legislative 
relations heavily imbalanced in favour of the executive (Martin 2010:2). 
 
In explain this relation between the executive and Parliament, Martin (2010:11) 
indicates that “clear evidence of the fusion of executive and legislative 
organisation in Ireland is the very high levels of party discipline. It is virtually 
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unheard of for members of the Oireachtas to vote against their party 
leadership”. It can then be said that the results of such party unity will be a 
government that is not accountable to Parliament and that governs as it wishes 
because of the protection that it enjoys within the Parliamentary chamber. 
 
2.4.2 The Botswana Parliament: The President and executive powers 
 
The Constitution of Botswana has failed to put a clear-cut divide between the 
branches of government. It therefore lacks the notion of separation of powers. 
This has incapacitated Parliament in its efforts at keeping the executive arm 
accountable (Bodilenyane 2012:193). 
 
According to Bodilenyane (2012:194) “the role of Parliament is unfeasible 
because there are developments where the Constitution allows the President 
to act in his own deliberate judgement without having to consult anyone, which 
is a potential assault to democracy”. This situation is not conducive for the 
development of democracy. A direct engagement between the Presidency and 
Parliament is always expected when addressing issues that affect the citizenry. 
This is not to occurring in the Republic of Botswana, as the “executive 
Presidency has made the Parliament a toothless dog that cannot 
counterbalance the powers of the President” (Bodilenyane, 2012:194). 
 
 The difficulty for Parliament to oversee the executive and ensure that it 
accounts to Parliament for its actions and decisions is further made difficult by 
the power of patronage wielded by the President on backbench MP’s whom he 
can appoint to cabinet. Bodilenyane (2012:196) when citing Nsereko (2004) 
indicates that this is because of the situation in Botswana where one party 
dominates the legislature.  
 
This situation is very alarming in a democratic state and thus it necessitates 
that even in countries such as South Africa, with a dominating majority rule, the 
oversight and accountability role is constantly checked to determine if it is 
exercised by the legislature in order to make sure that it does not lose its 
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constitutional obligation against the executive. It is evident that the Constitution 
of Botswana is not drafted to deeply promote democracy and create a balance 
of power between the Presidency and the legislature, and to ensure the 
Presidency and his executive cabinet are kept in check by the people through 
the legislature as the representative body of the people. 
 
2.4.3 Oversight and Accountability function of the United Kingdom 
Parliament 
 
According to Kwan (2001:2) the United Kingdom (UK) does not have a 
Constitution set out in any single document but instead, its Constitution is made 
up of statute law, common law and conventions. The three elements which 
makes up the Parliament of the UK are the, the House of Commons, House of 
Lords, and the Sovereign (Monarchy). The House of Commons is made up of 
Members of Parliament each representing an individual constituency. The main 
oversight functions of House of Commons includes the scrutiny of the executive 
policy, debate on major issues of the day and administration, including its 
proposals for expenditure through budget approvals (Kwan 2001:4). The House 
of Commons scrutinises the work of the executive through such mechanisms 
that includes questioning of ministers in the Parliament chamber and through 
the select committee system. 
 
The House of Commons have power to force the executive to resign or seek a 
dissolution following a defeat on a confidence motion. The House of Lords 
consists of Lords spiritual and Lords temporal that are not elected to be 
Members of the House of Lords. According to Kwan (2001:5) “the House of the 
Lords plays an important part in revising legislation and keeping a check on 
government by scrutinising its activities”. 
 
The role of the Monarchy is mainly related to executive powers which do not 
depend on Parliament and is thus not relevant for the purpose of this research 
as they lack powers to scrutinise and oversee the executive. The powers vested 
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in the Monarchy are mainly prerogative powers e.g. power to make treaties, 
declare war and award honours. 
 
According to Kwan (2001:7) one of the major constitutional conventions in the 
UK is that ministers are accountable to Parliament and through Parliament to 
the public. Ministerial responsibility in the UK refers both to minister’s collective 
responsibility for government policy and ministers individual responsibility for 
their own departments (Kwan 2001:7). Interestingly According to Parliament 
(2007:8) “in terms of sections 92(2) and 133(2) of the Constitution, members of 
cabinet and members of the executive council are collectively and individually 
accountable to Parliament and Provincial Legislatures respectively”.  
 
In order to ensure effective oversight of the executive according to May 
(2004:73) both the House of Commons and the House of Lords passed 
resolutions that were later formally incorporated into the ministerial code in 
relation to Parliament: ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be 
held to account, for the policies, decisions and actions of their departments; it 
is of paramount importance that ministers give accurate and truthful information 
to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest opportunity. 
Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament are expected to offer their 
resignation to the Prime Minister. The ministerial code further demands that 
ministers should require civil servants who give evidence before parliamentary 
committees on their behalf and under their direction to be as helpful as possible 
in providing accurate, truthful and full information, in accordance with the duties 
and responsibilities of civil servants as set out in the civil service code. 
 
May (2004:74) indicates that “the resolutions were presented as clarifying the 
roles of ministers in relation to Parliament and not intended to affect or derogate 
from the duties ministers owe to Parliament in their capacity as Members of one 
of the Houses: and imposing on Ministers the additional duty to offer their 
resignation to the Prime Minister will not affect the right of either House to 
proceed against them in a case of alleged contempt, as it might proceed against 
any other Member”.  
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The House of Parliament in the UK has indeed put measures to ensure that the 
executive accounts to Parliament. It is important that even though mechanisms 
are put in place to ensure accountability by the executive, MPs be clear about 
their duty to hold the executive to account. This understanding of the duty to 
hold the executive accountable is based on the belief that changes in the 
attitudes and behaviour of politicians themselves are as important as changes 
in the working of Parliament (Hansard Society 2001:xi) . 
 
 
 
2.4.4 Legislative relations in Poland 
 
A new Polish Constitution was eventually adopted by referendum in 1997.The 
new Constitution further clarified the powers of the President and the 
legislature. Some Presidential powers were weakened (Osiatynski 1997:8). The 
new Constitution introduced a “rationalised” parliamentary-cabinet system in 
Poland. It is the first Constitution of the Third Republic of Poland. The act 
defined the position of the Sejm and the Senate within the parliamentary system 
without using the term “parliament”. The Polish Constitution adopted the 
doctrine of separation of powers, which provided for a balance between the 
Legislative and Executive powers (Poznaj Sejm 2011). 
 
According to the Poznaj Sejm (2011) “another basic function of the Sejm, 
consisting in the Sejm’s ability to establish independently the actual state of 
affairs in matters concerning the council of Ministers and the administration 
subordinated to the Sejm, as well as basic areas of social life, and to compare 
it with what is required by law”. 
 
As part of its powers, the Poznaj Sejm (2011) may demand information on a 
given issue from government member in written or oral form at a sitting of the 
Sejm or a Committee. Measures can be taken such as dismissal of an individual 
from a state post, e.g. a Minister in consequence of a vote of no-confidence. 
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The Poznaj Sejm (2011) indicates that “the Sejm as part of exercising its 
oversight and accountability each year the Sejm debates on the performance 
of the budget act by the government, relying on an opinion by the Supreme 
Chamber of Control, and as a result of its assessment the government is or is 
not granted discharge for its activities”. The Constitution has enhanced 
democracy by enriching the Parliamentary system to make sure that the 
executive accounts and that proper oversight is conducted by the Sejm and 
should be adopted by post-communist states in the endeavour to adopt viable 
democratic arrangements. 
 
 
2.4.5 Parliament and executive relations in Malawi 
 
After three decades of dictatorial one-party rule, Malawi witnessed a dramatic 
transition to a multiparty political system during the 1993-1994 period. This was 
followed by the adoption of a new National Constitution in 1995 (Malawi 
Parliament 2010:7). It is further reported that “Parliament is therefore 
accountable to the people when performing the powers and responsibilities 
entrusted by the Constitution and any Act of Parliament. All legislative powers 
of the Republic are vested in Parliament. According to section 48 91) of the 
Constitution, Parliament is composed of the President as Head of State and the 
NA” (Malawi (2010:7). 
 
Patel and Tostensen (2006:4) amplify the importance of vesting the legislative 
powers to Parliament when they argue that “the Constitutional powers 
conferred upon Parliament define the framework within which it operates. They 
largely determine and delimit the room of manoeuvre that Parliamentarians 
have when facing the executive. As opposed to Parliamentary systems, in the 
Presidential systems the Parliamentary powers do not include influencing 
cabinet formation, censure or dismissal of ministers, or ousting the cabinet by 
means of a vote of no confidence”. The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 
fails to include adequate horizontal accountability mechanisms for checking the 
government (Patel and Tostensen 2006:6). Horizontal mechanisms refer to 
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autonomous institutional mechanisms put in place to check the discharge of 
responsibilities by officials by calling into question and punishing improper 
conduct (Patel and Tostensen 2006:4).It can be concluded that the Presidential 
nature of the political regime in Malawi makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
the Parliament to effectively oversee the executive and ensure accountability 
by the executive cabinet and the President. 
 
2.4.6 Legislative and executive relations in Zambia 
 
The Zambian Parliament is one of the oldest continuously functioning 
legislatures in the Southern African Sub-region. According to the Parliament of 
Zambia (2012:6), citing the Constitution of Zambia article 62, Parliament is a 
composite body consisting of the President and NA. The Parliament of Zambia 
(2012:7) indicates that under a Parliamentary democracy, Parliament oversees 
Government administration and subjects its activities to detailed scrutiny on 
behalf of the electorate. To carry out this important function, Parliament has 
established Parliamentary committees that conduct surveillance on defined 
areas of government administration.  
 
A Parliamentary committee system ensures that the executive is accountable 
to Parliament. Parliamentary committees have been in existence in Zambia as 
far back as the pre-independence era (Zambia Parliament 2012:7). The 
Zambian Parliament as indicated is familiar and experienced at utilising the 
committee system and this has led to an effective use of committees and this 
claim is confirmed by the statement that “The committees have undergone 
growth and procedural changes over the years due to a number of factors such 
as increased government responsibilities and activities. This system brings the 
legislature face to face with bureaucrats, thus increasing the information 
available to Parliament on governmental problems” (Zambia Parliament 
2012:7). Also in South Africa Parliament designate committees to perform the 
oversight mandate and report back to their Houses on matters referred to them, 
the South African Parliament will discussed and evaluated under subsection 
3.3.3.3 in chapter three. In Zambia any citizen or group may petition the 
Parliament to action through the National Assembly on any matter of public 
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interest, prove that it does not fall within the jurisdiction of a court of inquiry, 
tribunal, or commission of inquiry. 
 
The Zambian Parliament has undergone significant reforms since the re-
introduction of multiparty democracy in 1990 and the reforms implemented 
since 2002 under the Parliamentary Reform Programme have seen the 
institution become much more effective in the level of performance of the 
different functional areas with respect to the budget process (Zambia 
Parliament 2012:26). 
 
2.4.7 Democratic accountability in Latin America 
 
The Latin American legislatives being constitutionally compared for legislative 
oversight are those of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and 
Venezuela. According to Lemos (2010:13) “all countries have the summoning 
powers of authorities, some with a very interesting sanctioning mechanism, 
similar to the recall in the parliamentary system-once the presentation is not 
considered satisfactory, the cabinet member or authority can be dismissed”. 
Oversight mechanisms are explicitly mentioned in both the Constitution of 
Argentine and the internal statutes of the House and the Senate (Lemos 
2010:15).The houses have constitutional right to ask for oral or written reports 
and explanations of the executive branch (Lemos 2010:16). 
 
As for the Bolivia state of oversight and accountability, according to Lemons 
(2010:18) “the 2009 Constitution empowers the Plurinational Legislative 
Assembly (PLA) to control and oversee all state agencies and public 
institutions, public enterprises, and any entity that receives resources from the 
state. It can promote investigations through its committee system and can also 
demand questions or summon ministers. Once the minister is summoned and 
does not come to the testimony, he can be censored by two thirds of the body 
and, in that case, has to be dismissed by the President”. The PLA is the only 
chamber with legislative oversight duties in the 2009 Constitution. Neither the 
chamber, nor the Senate has a legislative oversight prerogative whatsoever 
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mentioned, as far as investigation control, interpellation, written or oral 
questions are concerned (Lemos 2010:19). 
 
Regarding the case of Brazil, Lemons (2010:21) indicates that “the 1988 
Constitution is the landmark of legislative oversight in Brazil. Indeed, it specifies 
that the National Congress will have the exclusive prerogative of overseeing 
the executive”. The 1988 Constitution lays out many oversight procedures and 
instruments. The most important for addressing informational asymmetry and 
for the investigation of wrongdoings are the resolutions of enquires, (the 
equivalent to written questions), compulsory testimony by public officials (the 
summoning of authorities), cabinet ministers and top rank officials, which can 
take place in either the committee or at the floor; and public hearings, which 
can be called by legislators, civil society organizations, unions, and 
associations (Lemos 2010:22). The impeachment of the executive in ensuring 
accountability is supported by the Constitution of Brazil, “The Constitutional 
procedures for oversight in Brazil also include provisions for impeachment of 
the president, vice-president and ministers (Lemos 2010:22). 
 
In the case of Columbia, the Columbian Constitution was approved in 1991 
(Lemos 2010:24).The Constitution allows both Chambers to demand reports 
from the government and to organise private sessions for the cabinet members’ 
oral questions. Lemos (2010:25) indicates that “the same article (Article 135) 
sets the summoning of authorities and its procedure, which introduces a 
parliamentary-based concept: the non-compliance with the interpellation will 
allow Congress to propose a censor motion that can lead to the authority’s 
dismissal-the same as Bolivia”. 
 
The road to a democratic order in Peru was came after an aftermath of self-
coup and indicated by Lemos (2010:26) when citing Cameron (1996) indicates 
that the Peruvian Constitution came in the aftermath of a self-coup in Peru: in 
April 1992, the then President Fujimori dissolved Congress, suspended 
temporarily the 1979 Constitution and ruled by decree until November 1992, 
when a new “democratic elected Congress” drafted the new Constitution. It was 
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ratified by a popular referendum in October 1993, and reformed in 2004 and 
2005. 
 
On the oversight front, the 1993 Constitution grants Congress the power to 
inquiry written information from ministers and a number of executive authorities 
at the three government levels (national, regional and local).According to 
Lemos (2010:26) “Congress also has question time-every Member can make 
one question to the government once a month and can summon authorities, 
especially cabinet members, to testimony before Congress by approving a 
resolution with one fourth of the total votes”. 
In the case of Venezuelan, the Constitution gives Congress the power to 
oversee and control the national public administration. According to Lemos 
(2010:29) the “classic” oversight tools are also set in the Constitution: the 
questions, interpellations or summoning, and investigations. The 1999 
Venezuelan Constitution does not set procedure for impeachment of the 
President and other authorities. It just establishes that the Supreme Court of 
Justice will judge the President and other authorities in the case of abuses. It is 
different from the United States of America’s model as applied elsewhere in all 
other countries, except Bolivia, in which generally the lower chamber accuses 
and the upper chamber judges the President and vice-President (Lemos 
2010:30) 
 
Lemos (2010:30) further state that “the Assembly statute empowers all the 
permanent committees to conduct oversight of the administration in their 
jurisdiction, and to initiate investigations, but also sets up one committee with 
exclusive oversight rights, which is responsible for overseeing the use of public 
resources in all sectors and government levels”. It easy to notice the similarities 
in the oversight design of the six countries compared referred to above. Even 
though these countries often find themselves under manipulative Presidents or 
in the process of moving from dictatorial rule towards liberal democracy, often 
not in a straightforward manner, the oversight design indicates that even though 
the Presidents might be powerful, some legislative capacity to oversee the 
executive in order to ensure accountability does exists. Even though capacity 
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to oversee the executive and ensure accountability exists, the following 
question arises: How effective are the oversight mechanisms that are put in 
place? The problem is that sometimes the capacity and legislative mechanisms 
may be in place, but that does not mean they are implemented effectively. This 
is supported by Lemos (2010:33) when citing Palanza (2005) when he indicates 
that, although there might be reasonable level of potential oversight, the few 
empirical works on effectiveness of oversight in the region suggest flaws, such 
as lack of implementation of rights, poor records of activities, and the use of 
oversight mechanisms, as mere formalities 
2.4.8 Parliament cameral structure on oversight and accountability 
 
A Parliament can be a unicameral legislature, which refers to countries with one 
Chamber of Parliament or bicameral legislatures with two Chambers of 
Parliament. South Africa can be classified as a bicameral Parliament, consisting 
of the NA and NCOP. Variation exists among the selected international 
legislatures with respect to the structure of their legislatures. Some Countries 
like Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Peru, Venezuela are typical unicameral. One 
of the observations is that a number of unicameral legislatures have weak to 
non-existent oversight and accountability methods and tools. For example, in 
Botswana, the Constitution allows the President to act in his own deliberate 
judgement. Malawian Parliament is composed of the President as the Head of 
state and the NA. The Presidential nature of Malawi political regime makes it 
difficult if not impossible for Parliamentary to effectively oversee the executive 
and ensure accountability by the executive and the President.  
 
However, some of the unicameral legislatures have strong or noticeable 
oversight functions mandated by their Constitutions. In this way, the Zambian 
Parliamentary democracy can oversee the executive. The bicameral 
legislatures, such as UK, Poland, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia, in 
turn usually have strong oversight functions; expect Ireland, which even with 
two houses has week monitoring of government due to strong partisanship and 
fear of party discipline. Brazil’s national congress again has the prerogative of 
overseeing the executive, which may include impeachment of the President. 
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In the case of South African, both houses are expected by the Constitution to 
ensure accountability and each play a different role in ensuring that the 
executive accounts to Parliament. It is important that coordination takes place 
between the two houses, which serves as a method of strengthening their 
oversight function. This function is further strengthened by also forming a Joint 
committee on oversight and government assurance. From the literature on the 
comparative study, it becomes evident that transparency is necessary but not 
sufficient for accountability, as is the importance of having a political culture to 
conduct oversight whether in unicameral or bicameral Parliament is important. 
 
2.5 Summary and deductions 
 
Based on the literature review, it is evident that oversight and accountability are 
cornerstones of democracy. The theoretical context and rationale for oversight 
and accountability that was discussed was followed by an international 
comparison in order to give a clear perspective on how oversight and 
accountability, lead to an enhancement of democracy and how weak 
implementation of oversight and accountability fails democracy. The ability of 
Parliament to exert its constitutional mandate to oversee the executive is an 
important feature of any if not all, democratic legislatures. It becomes clear that 
putting in place procedures and practices for Parliamentary oversight is not 
enough but also a culture and appetite to ensure that the executive is 
accountable to Parliament should exist and be implemented. In all, measures 
to maximize the value of oversight and accountability should be daily explored. 
The doctrine of separation of powers in South Africa is also discussed in order 
to give a clear understanding on how another arm of state is empowered to 
ensure accountability. The international Parliaments were also studied 
according to their structure i.e. whether they are unicameral or bicameral 
legislatures and the literature strongly indicates that the structure of formation 
of a countries Parliament has less influence on how strong it ensures oversight 
and thus accountability by the executive. The literature tends to indicate that 
the more a Parliament develops priorities for oversight and has a strong focus 
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on overseeing the executive, the greater the accountability from the executive. 
Parliaments with strong partisanship tend to be weak on emphasising and 
ensuring that executive accountability is prioritised.  
 
The UK to ensure executive accountability even passed a resolution on minister 
accountability to Parliament that the government formally incorporated to the 
ministerial code. The international comparison highlights that for effective 
oversight and accountability to be realised, the Constitution of a country should 
be able to define and state the power relations between the legislature and the 
executive, in order to avoid dominance of one by another. It is also evident that 
countries with strong Presidential powers tend to be weak on matters of 
oversight and accountability such as in Ireland, Botswana, Malawi and 
Venezuela to some extent. 
 
Now that the concepts of oversight and accountability were discussed by 
considering their theoretical foundation and the rationale underlying them, the 
next chapter seeks to provide an overview of oversight and accountability within 
the South African sphere of legislative governance and specifically by 
emphasising their application in the national Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa. Consequential to the deductions made in this chapter, the 
following chapter focuses on the composition and mandates of the Parliament 
of the Republic of South Africa, institutional and legislative context of oversight 
and accountability in South Africa, Chapter 9 Institutions role in oversight and 
accountability, and the role of the party system and oversight by the opposition. 
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CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE AND 
POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Democracy in South Africa, since its birth in 1994, has been guided by the 
principles of accountability, accessibility and transparency. There is more focus 
on these accountability principles than ever before in South Africa’s modern 
political history. The question becomes whether these ideals operate at the 
level of constitutional principles and the political and the political office bearers 
still adhere to them and provide them with a more concrete institutional 
manifestation. The functions assigned by the Constitution and the mandate 
provided by the people of South Africa during election, provide the legal 
imperatives for a vision for Parliament. The oversight vision will respond to this 
call of the people by being a responsive Parliament. The vision of the fourth 
Parliament was as follows: “To build an effective people’s Parliament that is 
responsive to the needs of the people and that is driven by the ideal of realising 
a better quality of life for all the people of South Africa’’. 
 
The vision calls for a people’s Parliament to transform the entire society. A 
Parliament that is able to establish a society based on democratic values, 
fundamental human rights, and social justice. It aimed to be a peoples 
Parliament, able to scrutinise and oversee the actions of the executive, as it 
sought to improve the quality of life of all South Africans in order to build united 
and democratic South Africa and create a better life for all. The vision put the 
people at the centre of Parliament’s oversight function, thereby promoting a 
human rights based, participatory democracy. 
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The idea of a “People’s Parliament” lies at the core of the political vision of the 
fourth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. One of the key roles of 
Parliament is to conduct oversight over the executive. The function of oversight 
and accountability is to ensure that the executive implements laws as expected 
by Parliament and instructed by the Constitution. Oversight and accountability 
enable Parliament to keep control over the legislation it passes and to enhance 
the constitutional values of accountability. Through oversight, Parliament is able 
to ensure that the executive is carrying out its mandates, monitor the 
implementation of its legislative policy, and draw on these experiences for 
future law- making. The proper implementation of oversight practices ensures 
effective governance, as the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the 
implementation of policy may in fact enhance the overall performance of 
government. 
 
Those tasked with employing oversight are generally afforded the luxury of 
hindsight and are essentially separated from the responsibility for failure. 
Parliament is to employ an oversight regime based less on institutional or 
political “confrontation”. The Parliament’s oversight role is exercised in pursuit 
of good government, which leads to Parliament also bearing some 
responsibility for overall government performance. 
 
3.2  Composition and mandates of the Parliament of the Republic of     
South Africa 
 
The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa is composed of two houses, 
namely the NA and the NCOP. On the one hand, according to Parliament 
(2009:11) “Section 42(3) of the Constitution provides that the NA is elected to 
represent the people and to ensure government by the people under the 
Constitution”. It does this by choosing the President, by providing a national 
forum for public consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by 
scrutinising and overseeing executive action (Parliament 2009:11). According 
to Parliament (2009:11) “The NA is required by section 55(2) of the Constitution 
to provide mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of state in the 
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national sphere of government are accountable to it; and to maintain oversight 
of the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of 
legislation and any organ of state”.  
 
On the other hand the NCOP represents the provinces to ensure that the 
provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government 
as stated in section 42(4) of the Constitution. The NCOP does this by 
participating in the national legislative process and by providing a national 
forum for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces. The NCOP role 
is to exercise oversight over national aspects of provincial and local 
government. It contributes to effective government by ensuring that provincial 
and local concerns are recognised in national policymaking, and that provincial, 
local, and national governments work together effectively. The Constitution 
requires Parliament to develop mechanisms for oversight (Parliament 2009:11) 
 
3.3 Institutional and legislative context of oversight and accountability in                             
South Africa 
 
In order to investigate the institutional and legislative context of oversight and 
accountability in South Africa, the South African model of oversight and 
accountability, legislative and policy framework for oversight and accountability 
in South Africa and the mechanisms for conducting oversight and accountability 
in the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa will be discussed in detail 
below. 
 
3.3.1 The South African model of oversight and accountability 
 
During the first democratic Parliament (1994-1999) and the second Parliament 
(1999-2004) the main focus of Parliament was to repeal apartheid legislation 
and passing new laws in line with the imperatives of a democratic institution 
(Parliament,2009:5). According to Parliament (2009:5) “The focus especially 
from 2009 changed from passing legislation to oversight, which included the 
impact of the laws passed since 1994.The oversight model has been developed 
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to equip us with an improved standard operating procedure to enhance the 
capacity of Parliament to discharge its duties”. 
 
It is then against this backdrop, and in the context of sections 42(3) and 55(2) 
of the Constitution, as well as various provisions that imply oversight functions 
of the National Council of Provinces, that Parliament through the joint rules 
Committee established a task team on oversight and accountability. This task 
team consisted of members from both houses of Parliament and studied the 
mandates relating to oversight emanating from the Constitution (Parliament, 
2009:10). According to Parliament (2009:10) “the task team established three 
focus groups, that of, the projects focus group, the budget and the committees. 
The objective was to develop an oversight model for Parliament in line with the 
Constitution and Parliament’s new strategic vision, together with the 
realignment of resources to fulfil its mandate with great efficiency”. 
 
The oversight and accountability model highlight the following constitutional 
provisions that refer directly and indirectly to oversight and accountability 
(Parliament, 2009:19). 
 
Table 3.1: Constitutional provisions that refer directly and indirectly to oversight 
and accountability  
Section 55(2) The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms- 
(a) To ensure that all executive organs of state in the 
national sphere of government are accountable 
to it; and  
(b) To maintain oversight of- 
I. The exercise of national executive authority, 
including the implementation of legislation; 
and 
II. Any organ of state. 
Section 56 The national assembly or any of its Committees may- 
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(a) Summon any person to appear before it to give 
evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce 
documents; 
(b) Require any person or institution to report to it; 
(c) Compel, in terms of national legislation or the 
rules and orders, any person or institution to 
comply with a summons or requirement in terms 
of paragraph (a) or (b);and 
(d) Receive petitions, representations or 
submissions from any interested persons or 
institutions. 
Section 66(2) The National Council of Provinces may require a 
Cabinet Member, a Deputy Minister or an official in the 
national executive or a provincial executive to attend a 
meeting of the Council or a Committee of the Council. 
Section 69 The National Council of Provinces or any of its 
Committees may- 
(a) Summon any person to appear before it to give 
evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce 
documents; 
(b) Require any person or institution to report to it; 
(c) Compel, in terms of national legislation or the 
rules and orders, any person or institution to 
comply with a summons or requirement in terms 
of paragraph (a) or (b);and 
(d) Receive petitions, representations or 
submissions from any interested persons or 
institutions. 
Section 89 (1) The National Assembly, by a resolution adopted 
with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its 
Members, may remove the President from office 
only on the grounds of – 
(a) A serious violation of the Constitution or the law; 
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(b) Serious misconduct; or 
(c) Inability to perform the function of office. 
(2) Anyone who has been removed from the office of 
President in terms of subsection (1) (a) or (b) may 
not receive any benefits of that office, and may not 
serve in any public office. 
Section 92 (2)Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively 
and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their 
powers and the performance of their functions. 
(3) Members of the Cabinet must provide Parliament 
with full and regular reports concerning matters under 
their control. 
Section 93(2) Deputy Ministers are accountable to Parliament for the 
exercise of their powers and the performance of their 
functions. 
Section 100(2) If the national executive intervenes in a province by 
assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation which 
that province cannot or does not fulfil, the national 
executive must submit a written notice of the 
intervention to the National Council of Provinces within 
14 days after the intervention began. The intervention 
must end if the Council disapproves the intervention 
within 180 days after the intervention began or by the 
end of that period has not approved the intervention. 
The Council must, while the intervention continues, 
review the intervention regularly and may make any 
appropriate recommendations to the national executive. 
Section 102 (1) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a 
majority of its Members, passes a motion of no 
confidence in the Cabinet excluding the President, 
the President must reconstitute the Cabinet. 
(2) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a 
majority of its Members, passes a motion of no 
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confidence in the President, the President and the 
other Members of the Cabinet and any Deputy 
Ministers must resign. 
(Source: Parliament, 2009:19)  
Having identified the constitutional provisions listed by the oversight and 
accountability model that expresses powers and functions of Parliament on 
oversight and accountability, the model further provides the primary objectives 
that describe how Parliament conducts oversight and thus being able to hold 
the executive accountable. According to Parliament (2009:10) “the rationale for 
the oversight and accountability model was to scrutinise existing practices 
and/or mechanisms used as a prototype, something to be measured or 
standardised, and thereafter interrogate and offer alternatives that could be 
utilised in the future”. It is therefore important for an oversight and accountability 
model to therefore comprise features, which include the following: 
 
 The values and principles by which Parliament conducts oversight; 
 The mechanism or framework to conduct oversight; and  
 The processes and resources required for conducting oversight. 
 
Source: Parliament 2009 
Figure 3.1 Framework of the oversight model 
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The numerous provisions on table 3.1 provide adequate powers for oversight 
and the enforcement of accountability as they provide powers to committees’ 
e.g. to summon any person to appear before the committee and provide 
evidence under oath. They further provide power to remove the President 
through a resolution adopted with a support vote of at least two thirds of 
Members. The model also provides detailed processes that Parliament should 
undertake to achieve its constitutional mandate on oversight and accountability. 
The mechanisms established by the model to fulfil Parliaments oversight and 
accountability mandate will be discussed in detail under section: 3.2.3 when the 
mechanisms for Parliamentary oversight and accountability are discussed. It is 
important to mention that the mechanisms provided by the model on oversight 
and accountability are established in terms of the Constitution and under the 
rules developed by the NA and/or the NCOP as houses of Parliament. 
According to Parliament (2009:38) “the model splits the mechanisms for 
oversight and accountability into four categories: Category 1 lists tools of 
established legislation and long-term plans; Category 2 contains tools relating 
to annual, monthly and weekly activities; Category 3 lists financial instruments; 
and Category 4 relates to issues arising from institutions supporting 
Constitutional democracy. 
 
Table 3.2: Categories of oversight and accountability mechanisms 
Category 1: 
 
 Constitution of the Republic 
 Legislation 
 Government Programme of Action [5-year plan] 
Category 2: 
 
 State-of-the-Nation Address 
 Questions (Written and oral) 
 President 
 Deputy President 
 Ministers 
 Members’ statements 
 Ministerial statements 
 Debates in the House 
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 Matters from constituency work 
 Private Member’s bills 
 Individual Member’s oversight 
 Committee reports on legislation and oversight activities 
 Committee reports on international agreements 
 Departmental strategic plans 
 Departmental current and past annual performance plans 
 Annual reports (including annual financial statements, 
statements on programme performance and human 
resource information) 
 Performance contracts 
 Departmental compliance with parliamentary Committee 
recommendations. 
Category 3: 
 
 Budget Speech 
 Estimates of National Expenditure (ENE) 
 Division of Revenue Bill 
 Estimates of National Revenue 
 Budget Review 
 Ministers’ budget vote speeches 
 Departmental budget votes 
 Treasury Regulations relating to strategic planning 
 Reports of the Auditor-General (including performance 
reports) 
 Treasury reports (monthly and quarterly reports) 
 Audit Reports (Scopa) 
 Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) 
 Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure 
 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations report 
 Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
 Financial statements (monthly financial reports and 
quarterly performance reports) 
 Statistics South Africa reports. 
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Category 4: 
 
 Reports on investigated matters of relevance by institutions 
supporting constitutional democracy (ISDs) and other 
statutory institutions supporting democracy for 
consideration by Parliament’. 
The following discussions will consider the legislative and policy framework for 
oversight and accountability in the South African Parliament. This chapter will 
conclude by considering the mechanisms and processes (mechanisms for 
Parliamentary to ensure oversight and accountability) adopted by the South 
African fourth Parliament, in order to fulfil its constitutional mandate of ensuring 
that oversight and accountability by the executive is realised. 
 
3.3.2 Legislative and policy framework for oversight and accountability 
in South Africa 
 
The legislative and policy framework for the implementation of oversight and 
accountability in the national Parliament in South Africa is derived from the 
Constitution (1996).The role of Parliament on accountability and oversight is 
therefore backed and protected by the Constitution, by it unambiguously 
indicating the institution’s powers and responsibilities of oversight and 
accountability. Oversight and accountability are entrenched in the Constitution 
in a number of sections (section 55(2), 56, 69, 66(2), 89, 92 and 100 of the 
Constitution. Related provisions in the Constitution (sections 17, 59, 70, 72, 
115, 118) set the tone for public involvement and participation in the Parliament 
legislative process (Constitution, 1996).  
 
All these provisions are meant to build accountability, openness and 
transparency, which together with public participation ensure that the executive 
arm of government is accountable, transparent and open while empowered to 
govern after each election. Certain functions that the Constitution mandates to 
Parliament act as policy guidelines to ensure that oversight and accountability 
are realised. For example, section 55(2) of the Constitution requires the NA to 
provide for mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of state in the 
national sphere of government are accountable to it and maintain oversight of 
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the national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation and 
oversight over any organ of state (Parliament, 2007:8). 
 
According to Parliament (2007:8) “in terms of sections 92(2) of the Constitution, 
members of cabinet are collectively and individually accountable to Parliament”. 
It is therefore the expectation for cabinet ministers and the executive at large to 
conduct them in accordance with the Constitution to provide Parliament with full 
and regular reports on matters under their respective departments and 
portfolio’s. 
 
Since Parliament works closely with the nine Provincial Legislatures, an 
Oversight Guide for Committee Staff has been developed by the Committee 
Staff Forum which is a forum that is established by the Committee Staff of 
Parliament and all nine Legislatures (South African Legislative Sector, 2008). It 
provides guidelines on how to best assist the members of Parliament as they 
plan and implement oversight and accountability within the South African 
legislative Sector. The document indicates the legislative sector’s policy 
position through a number of policy principles, for example the strategic goal of 
“Deepening and entrenching people-centred democracy in South Africa”. This 
strategic goal is linked to the strategic objective related to strengthening the 
oversight function, namely “overseeing and scrutinizing executive action 
(oversight)”. 
 
The Parliament oversight model (2009) and the oversight model of the South 
African Legislative Sector (2011) has been adopted as working documents for 
the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa in order provide a policy guide 
for conducting oversight and accountability planning and implementation. 
 
3.3.3 Mechanisms for conducting oversight and accountability in the 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa has put in place mechanism that 
ensures that it fulfils its constitutional obligation on oversight and accountability. 
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These mechanisms are established in terms of the Constitution and under the 
joint rules of both Houses (NA and the NCOP) but also through individual rules 
of each House (Parliament, 2009:28).The Constitution mandates Parliament to 
establish mechanisms, rules and procedures that enables it to conduct 
oversight and accountability. Section 55 (2) of the Constitution indicates that 
the NA must provide for mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of state 
in the national sphere of government are accountable to it, and to maintain 
oversight of the national executive authority (Constitution, 1996) 
 
The Parliamentary mechanisms employed include Plenary debates, questions 
to the executive, motions without notice, notice of motion, budget votes, 
members statements, statements by cabinet members, petitions, approval of 
annual budgets and strategic plans and committees role on oversight and 
accountability. These will be discussed in detail below. 
 
3.3.3.1 Plenary debates 
 
The concerns of MP’s constituents regarding specific government programmes 
and legislation including improvements on service delivery are able to be 
brought to the attention of the executive through plenary debates (Parliament, 
2009:33). 
 
Parliamentary debates are oral exchanges of opinions in general that are 
intended to facilitate the chamber’s collective decision-making on certain issues 
(Yamamoto,2007:62).The debates can be on issues chosen by Parliament or 
be specifically on a report or work conducted by a Parliamentary committee 
(see 3.2.3.4).The rules of the NA and those of the NCOP on debates give 
guidance to MP’s and the houses in general on how to express their views but 
at the same time allowing members to bring a particular matter to the “floor”. 
 
3.3.3.1.1 Questions to the Executive 
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One of the mechanisms utilised by Parliament to enhance its capacity to ensure 
that the executive is accountable is that of questions to the President, Deputy 
President and Ministers. Questions are a vital oversight tool. The questions put 
to the executive can be in a form of oral or written reply on matters for which 
individual ministers are responsible .According to Yamamoto (2007:49) “a 
Parliamentary question is, by definition, a request for information”. Question 
time allows MP’s not only to question the executive on matters of policy, but 
also on policies implemented or even drafted and other actions of the executive 
as they daily conduct themselves in government. It is an information seeking 
tool for Parliamentarians as they seek to fulfil their oversight role especially 
when utilising written-questions which are more effective. The executive is 
obliged to provide answers and these questions also benefit the rest of the 
Parliamentary Chamber or House by having replies publicly provided. The 
object of questions is not only to obtain information but also to press for action 
(Parliament: 2004). 
 
In the NA of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, questions may not: 
 
 Express an opinion or seek the expression of one;  
 Contain arguments, inferences or imputations;  
 Contain unnecessary epithets;  
 Contain rhetorical, controversial, ironical or offensive expressions; or 
  Contain extracts from newspapers or books, or paraphrases or questions 
from speeches.  
 
In the NCOP question time takes a different approach than it does in the NA, 
as the House is a House of provinces, Members of the NCOP are delegates 
from Provinces ensuring that many government programmes are implemented 
by provinces working hand in hand with the national government. Question time 
in the NCOP is provincial based than party based in that question time in the 
NCOP could be used by provinces to understand the way in which the national 
government is fulfilling its part on these shared responsibilities.  
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Delegates to the NCOP utilise question time as an opportunity to ask a national 
minister why a particular policy in an area of concurrent jurisdiction is not 
implemented, when it will be implanted or why the implementation is slow. The 
engagement mainly entails provinces engaging with the executive rather than 
individual members influenced by a certain party policy line engaging with the 
national executive. The reason behind this difference is that the oversight role 
of the NCOP is to draw provincial and local experiences into the national debate 
when matters that affect those levels or spheres of government are considered. 
 
3.3.3.1.2 Motions without notice 
 
According to Parliament (2004:114) a motion which would otherwise require 
notice, may be moved without notice provided not a single member present 
objects. It is common practice, but not required for political parties to consult 
before the House sits when seeking to move a motion without notice and inform 
the Presiding Officer of the intention to do so, thus avoiding any “ambush”.  
 
The motions without notice are moved when the Presiding Officer calls for any 
formal motions, usually at the commencement of the day’s sitting. If there is any 
objection, the motion is not moved but converted to a notice of motion 
(Parliament, 2004:114). 
 
3.3.3.1.3 Notices of motion 
 
Notices of motion are one of the mechanisms of oversight in order to bring 
issues to Parliament for plenary debate or decision. A notice must be given of 
every motion (exceptions exist),since in principle the House must be informed 
in advance of any substantive motion, to give members and political parties 
time to prepare to debate it (Parliament,2004:115). 
 
Giving notice of a motion can only be dispensed with, provided each member 
present in the House agrees. Therefore, if a member wishes to move a motion 
without notice, the party whip should consult with other parties in advance to 
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obtain their consent. If this in not done, members are unlikely to agree to a 
motion to be proceeded with, where no notice has been given. Exceptions exist 
when the motion: 
 
 Is by way of amendment to a draft resolution;  
 Raising a point of order or a question of privilege;  
 For the postponement or discharge of, or giving precedence to, an order of 
the day;  
 Referring a bill to a committee;  
 By the member in charge, proposing a draft resolution on the report of a 
Committee immediately after the debate on the report has been concluded; 
or  
 In regard to which notice is dispensed with by the unanimous concurrence 
of all the Members present.  
 
Notices of motion are therefore a vital tool mechanism to bring matters of 
political and general importance before Parliament for debate and or decision. 
 
3.3.3.1.4 Budget votes 
 
According to Parliament (2009:32), budget votes take place when the minister 
of finance announces the budget projections for the following financial year, as 
well as the departmental budget votes of each minister. The reason for 
presenting the budget in Parliament is to seek approval of the budget from 
Parliament, but before that can happen (approval of budget), each 
Parliamentary committee hold hearings with the government department over 
which that committee exercises oversight and check whether the department 
kept the promises of the previous financial year when it spent its budget. The 
budget votes are debated in the NA and the NCOP once committees have 
finished discussing the different budget votes (Parliament, 2009:32). 
The budget votes also provide an opportunity for government to indicate where 
they will get the money to spend, i.e. how the citizens will be taxed and how 
much will be borrowed. Democracy then requires that the government must 
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spent money approved by the people, which in this case is approved by their 
representatives in Parliament. The power to approve the government budget 
gives Parliament an oversight power to check if they are doing what they 
promised to do with the state money. It is important to note that if Parliament 
rejects the budget, the current government is expected to resign and a call for 
election of a new government must be made. 
 
3.3.3.1.5 Members statements 
 
Member’s statements are also a mechanism to conduct oversight over the 
government and hold it to account. MP’s are afforded the opportunity to make 
statements on any matter or subject that a member wishes to raise relevant to 
the national sphere of government, including topical international and national 
issues and constituents’ matters in the House (Parliament, 2009:33). 
 
Even though cabinet member’s, are also members of Parliament except the 
President, members statements are made by members who are not members 
of the executive. Provision is also made for executive members to respond to 
statements directed to them or made in respect of their portfolios. The 
opportunity for ministers to respond will follow the expiry of members’ time. In 
the absence of a particular minister, the relevant deputy minister or minister 
from the same cabinet cluster may, in that order, be given an opportunity to 
respond. 
 
3.3.3.1.6 Statements by Cabinet Members 
 
A cabinet member may make a “factual or policy” statement relating to 
government policy, any executive action or other similar matter of which the 
Assembly should be informed. The cabinet minister in question asks the 
Presiding Officer for an opportunity to make such a statement, which should not 
be longer than 20 minutes. The rules of the NA provide that whenever possible, 
a copy of the statement should be provided to the leader of each party when or 
before the statement is delivered (Parliament, 2004:128). 
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With regard to the above-mentioned, it is important to note that the words 
“factual or policy statement” signify that such a statement is not used for party-
political purposes (Parliament, 2004:128). Following the statement by the 
cabinet member each party may respond. 
 
3.3.3.2 Petitions 
 
According to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996 “section 56 
(d) and 69 (d) of the Constitution provides for the NA and the NCOP of 
Provinces to receive petitions, representations or submissions from any 
interested persons or institutions”. A petition refers to a formal request (to 
Parliament) for its intervention in a matter. These petitions can be about lack of 
service delivery by a government department. Parliament then intervenes on 
behalf of the institution or individual that is aggrieved and ensures that the 
executive accounts for such none delivery of public services. 
 
According to section 17 of the Constitution (1996), “Everyone has the right, 
peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present 
petitions”. Petitions in the NA must be supported by an MP in order for petitions 
to be considered. The NCOP does not require an MP’s support for a petition, 
but the petition should be in a form prescribed by the Chairperson. Parliament 
therefore utilises petitions to conduct oversight over the executive. 
 
3.3.3.3 Committees role as a mechanism of Parliamentary oversight 
 
In 1997, South Africa moved from a single budget year to a multi budget 
framework that is known as the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). 
The MTEF is an integrated planning and budget formulation process in terms 
of which the executive’s administration, government departments and provincial 
administrations develop credible outputs, projects and programmes for 
allocating resources to achieve strategic priorities. These are then tabled to 
Parliament committees and the details of the specific targets that the institutions 
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will aim to achieve in the budget year and the succeeding years of the MTEF. 
When conducting oversight, Parliament always ensures that government plans 
and performance are in line with the priorities as expressed in the strategic 
plans and the MTEF. 
 
The Budged Office was put in place during the fourth Parliament in order to 
accept, amend or reject the budget proposals of the executive. Its existence 
emanates from the Money Bills Procedure and Related Matters Act, but it is not 
limited to the budget. Instead, it also has bearings on all other money bills, 
monitoring and synthesising matters and reports tabled and adopted in a house 
with budgetary implications, including committee reports. The Budget Office is 
expected to keep abreast of policy debates and development in key expenditure 
and revenue areas. 
 
According to Obiyo (2006:53) “ one of the most profound changes that have 
overtaken South Africa’s system of government since 1994 is the new, powerful 
role the Constitution has accorded to the parliamentary committee system, 
which during the first session of Parliament, became in many ways as influential 
as that of the United States Congress”. Obiyo (2006:55) further indicate that 
under the apartheid government there were only 13 committees, their hearings 
were held in secret, they had very limited powers, and they existed essentially 
to rubber-stamp legislation put forward by the National Party (NP) government. 
One other difference is that the parliamentary committees are open to the public 
and the press, under the democratic dispensation, compared to their hearings 
held in secret during the apartheid era. 
 
According to Kyle and Peacey (2002:2) “the very term committee has a potential 
for confusion, whereas it is to mean a collective group, panel or body of 
members delegated to perform a particular function, each member of such a 
group was then designated a committee”. There are a number of mandates that 
committees are expected to fulfil. These are not only limited to the role of 
oversight over the executive but also scrutiny of legislation and interaction with 
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the public and external factors. Membership to a committee or representation 
is informed by proportional representation of parties in Parliament. 
 
The mandates of committees in the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
are provided for in the rules of each house and the joint rules (Parliament, 
2009:29). Apart from the mentioned mandates of committees, their work also 
include study visits where they physically visit sites to gain first-hand 
information, the subpoenaing of individual to appear before the committee, the  
assessment of the impact of service delivery, and the writing of reports for 
adoption by the committee with recommendations to be considered by the 
respective houses. Even though committees provide a platform in which 
proposed bills, laws, and other matters affecting the state are studied in detail 
by MP’s, they also play the role of being an oversight agency for the Parliament. 
They are oversight agencies for Parliament as they oversee the functioning, 
structure, and policy of the different government departments for which they are 
responsible. Their oversight function includes making recommendations about 
any aspect of the government departments. 
 
In the NA, the portfolio committees typically oversee a parallel government 
department, ministries or executive agencies. In the NCOP, the select 
committees are clustered according to specific area of responsibility of the 
departments. This means that the select committees oversee the work of more 
than one national government department. The reason is that only 54 of the 90 
NCOP are permanent delegates while in the NA there are 400 members of the 
assembly (Parliament, 2008:34).This study is focusing on committees that play 
an oversight role with regard to government departments and not internal 
committees, which mainly concern themselves with internal organizational and 
management matters including matters of rules within the two houses. 
According to Parliament (2009:31) “the two houses of Parliament may establish 
joint committees that are established in terms of the joint rules and have similar 
powers to Portfolio Committees (PC) and Select Committees (SC), except that 
they have specific mandates relating to transversal issues, such as women, 
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youth, children and disability”. The reports presented to the Houses by the 
Committees include: 
 
 Legislation (in terms of section 74,75,76 or 77 of the Constitution); 
 Study tours; 
 Oversight activities of committees, including responses to annual reports 
and financial statements of departments; 
 International agreements;  
 Private member’s legislative proposals; 
 Budget votes petitions; 
 Statutory provisions (for example the filling of vacancies in a statutory body); 
 Annual reports of committee activities and performance against their 
strategic plans; and 
 Any matter referred to committees for consideration and report in terms of 
NA Rule 137 and NCOP Rule 102 (Parliament, 2009:30-31). 
 
According to Parliament (2009:31) “once a report has been adopted by the 
house, the Speaker communicates the recommendations of the house to the 
relevant minister and copies the relevant house Chairperson, PC Chairperson 
and Director-General. The Speaker also requests the minister to direct his or 
her responses to the Speaker for formal tabling”. The office of the President is 
informed via the office of the Secretary to Parliament who communicates all 
resolutions to the Director-General in the Presidency. 
 
The above discussion indicates the constitutional powers of the NA committees. 
Some scholars are of the view that the Constitution does not grant the NCOP 
committees explicit powers to undertake oversight over the executive. 
However, section 92 (2) of the Constitution (1996) demands that “cabinet 
members collective and individual should be kept accountable to Parliament for 
the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions”. Obiyo 
(2006:62) indicates that the NCOP’s approval and regular reviewal are 
required, both in the event of national intervention in provincial administration 
(should a province not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of legislation or the 
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Constitution) and provincial intervention in local government (when a 
municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation required by 
legislation). Furthermore, Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau (1999:10) indicate that 
“in light of the fact that cabinet is collectively and individually responsible to 
Parliament, and that the Council is granted extensive powers in instances 
relating to interventions in terms of provisions like section 92,100 and 139, it 
appears that the Council is also mandated with an oversight function”. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the NCOP has an oversight role to protect the spheres 
of government under section 125 (4) and deal with the disputes regarding the 
administration capacity of provinces, which the NCOP is expected to resolve. 
 
According to Obiyo (2006:64) “the  actual powers committees have in law-
making and the oversight process is essentially about matching formal powers 
with the capacity to utilise such powers”. These actual powers committees have 
contribute to effective oversight within the portfolio and select committees of 
Parliament and thus leading to the committees being called the “engines of 
Parliament”, but for these engines to run smoothly a certain combination of 
conditions should prevail in order for the committees to gain effective power. 
According to Ahmed (2011:55),citing Rockman, indicates that “among such 
factors the most important one which in one way or another affects the 
Parliamentary committees overseeing role are; the legal authority to compel 
change, the committee relations with the executive and its official as well as the 
programs and policies, the resources such as the staff of the committee, the 
roles of the individual in the committee, the party system and the composition 
of the committee, and the structure, prestige, and leadership of the committee”. 
From the above discussion one cannot help but to think that in the case of a 
Parliament like South Africa’s with two houses, in the form of the NA and 
NCOP that it would be important, within the rules that committees are  
clustered for oversight purposes. This should be done to enable joint reporting 
on matters and thus such cluster reports should compelling the legal authority 
to enforce change, which is then easily achievable. 
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One noticeable difference between the third Parliament and the fourth 
Parliament is that a number of new committees were set up in the fourth 
Parliament. This was done in order to ensure that Parliament exercise oversight 
over the executive. The additional committees include the PC and SC on 
women, children and People with disabilities and also the PC and SC on 
Economic Development. 
 
In line with the changes in government departments, committees dealing with 
agriculture, water, tourism, minerals, education, energy and environmental 
affairs were reconstructed and their oversight portfolios changed to 
accommodate the department’s structures. Committees created during the 
fourth Parliament include the Standing and Select Committees on Finance and 
Appropriations in order to conform to the Money Bills Amendment Procedure 
and Related Matters act. The Department of Performance Monitoring and 
Evaluation and the National Youth Development Agency are overseen by the 
Standing Committee on Finance. According to the Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group (2014:10) “one Committee that has not been formed, despite ongoing 
requests from the IFP, is an oversight Committee over the Presidency”. This 
means that the Presidency’s budget is presented to the NA without MPs having 
an opportunity to question how, where and what amount are spent by the 
Presidency as part MPs oversight Constitutional mandate. 
 
One other matter noticed is the need to review the Reserve Bank Act (Act No.90 
of 1998) in comparison with section 223-225 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa for purposes of aligning the Act with the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa so that Parliament may exercise oversight over it. 
Section 37 of the Reserve Bank Act requires that the Minister of Finance 
ensures compliance with the Act by giving notice of the non-compliance to the 
board of directors of the Reserve Bank and require compliance within a specific 
period. Furthermore, in the event of persistent non-compliance, the Minister 
may apply to the High Court to compel compliance. The South African Reserve 
Act need to be reviewed so Parliament may exercise oversight, and not the 
High Court, especially by mandating the Reserve Bank through its Governor to 
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report to the Portfolio Committee on finance about implementation of monetary 
policy, submit audit report and audited financial statements. 
 
3.3.3.4 Fiscal oversight 
 
The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act came into 
effect in April 2009. It gives Parliament powers to amend the budget and other 
money bills before Parliament. In terms of the Act, Parliament is generally 
involved in four processes that have a direct bearing on state finances, namely 
the tabling of the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), the 
processing of the Main Budget which starts in February and ends around June, 
the Budgetary Review and Recommendation Reports (BRRR) season which 
takes place in the period between the passing of the Budget and tabling of the 
MTBPS, and the tabling of Adjustments Appropriation Bill which takes place at 
the same time as the processing of the MTBPS. 
 
Parliamentary committees have had to participate in all these processes, but 
the lack of technical capacity was identified as a concern. In order to assist with 
these technical capacity challenges, section 15 of the Act established a 
Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) with the objective to provide independent, 
objective, and professional analysis and advice to Parliament and its 
committees on matters related to budget and Money Bills. Prior to the 
enactment of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 
of 2009 (Act 9 of 2009), Parliament’s function in respect of the budget could be 
defined as that of a budget-approving Parliament. This was the case because 
following its tabling in the NA, the Budget would be referred to the finance 
committee, which would conduct public hearings on it. The committee would 
then report to the NA, which would pass the Budget and transmit it to the NCOP.  
 
Once transmitted to the NCOP, the select committee on finance would process 
it and report it without amendments. The Constitution in section 77(3) provides 
that an Act of Parliament must provide for a procedure to amend Money Bills 
before Parliament and thus the promulgation of the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure and Related Matters Act. In the fourth Parliament, the expectation 
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was then that the Parliament would move from being a budget-approving 
legislature or budget-influencing legislature into a budget-making Parliament in 
that it utilised both the legal authority and the technical capacity to amend or 
reject the executive’s budget proposal and to substitute with a budget of its own. 
 
During the fourth Parliament through the PBO, it was then expected that 
Parliament would be able to review government budget documents, such as 
the budget Strategy Paper, Budget Outlook Paper and Economic Survey, and 
prepare budget briefs for members of Parliament. The activities in Parliament 
would grow to include policy analysis of the budget speech and identification of 
issues for debate, including policy analysis of revenue measures proposed in 
the budget.  
 
The activities introduced by the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and 
Related Matters Act, include providing analysis of Finance Bill for implications 
of proposed tax measures and review of Appropriation Bill figures for 
consistency with budget votes already passed. The PBO also ensure fiscal 
oversight over the Executive by providing analytical backup for Committees on 
various issues which include:  
 
 Backup when bills are referred to them;  
 Responses to request from individual legislators, Committees and 
caucuses;  
 Preparation of budget briefs/newsletters for Parliament; and  
 Analysis of various reports, such as quarterly reports. 
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Figure: 3.2: Planning, budgeting and reporting cycle 
  
Policy development 
Strategic  
Planning
End-year 
reporting 
INSTITUTION 
National department 
Provincial department 
Municipality 
Public entity  
Municipal entity 
Operational 
planning and 
budgeting 
Implementation and 
in-year reporting 
Oversight 
By Parliament, provincial legislature or municipal 
council 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 65 
 
 
The planning, budgeting and reporting cycle describes the relationship between 
these process and emphasises that the executive is accountable to the relevant 
elected body for the entire process (National Treasury, 2007:4) 
                                             
According to Lienert (2010:1), “there has been a concerted effort in South Africa 
to build a more transparent, accountable and participatory system of fiscal 
governance. The 1996 Constitution recognizes parliament and civil society as 
key players in democratic budgeting processes. The legislature’s active 
engagement in the Budget process is crucial for good governance and fiscal 
transparency”. Lienert (2010:1) is supported by Verwey (2009:4) who states 
that “Most research has shown that genuine public participation and 
parliamentary oversight over budget do not only increase the social ownership 
of the budget, but also the effectiveness of allocation, minimizing waste and 
reduces social conflicts over the Budget”.  
 
This study agrees with Lienert (2010:1) and Verwey (2009:4) as they articulate 
the notion of “democratizing the budget process”. The involvement of 
Parliament in the budget process not only encourage fiscal discipline but also 
leads to prudent fiscal management by reducing government deficit and 
increasing transparency through an increase in accountability. This study firmly 
suggests that increased accountability promotes good governance and 
anticorruption. The evidence of a PBO is not a benchmark for democracy. 
According to Wehner (2004:2) “Many democracies, such as Germany and 
France, do not have PBOs, but their Parliaments still play strong Budgetary 
oversight roles. These countries have generally strong Parliamentary 
committees, such as Public Accounts and Budget Committees, which play 
active oversight role”. 
   
Strong democracies exist due to effective Parliaments. According to Carrillo-
Florez and Petri (2010:14) “the capacity of Parliaments to actively intervene in 
the Budget process, not only in its adoption, but also in its elaboration and in 
monitoring spending is an indication of its effectiveness”. The key becomes how 
each Parliament assumes its oversight role as even established democracies, 
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such as the United Kingdom, Parliamentary oversight over the Budget has also 
progressively declined (Davey, 2000).  
 
Non-performing and ineffective Parliaments exist in both in developed and 
developing democracies due to institutional weakness, resources and 
organizational capacity. This contention is supported by Diamond (1997:31) 
when he indicates that “if legislatures are to become meaningful areas for 
injecting the interests and concerns of their constituencies into the policy 
process, they must have sufficiently elaborated and resourceful organizational 
structures so they can engage, challenge, and check executive officials and 
state bureaucracies”. The fourth Parliament through its fiscal oversight and 
having powers to amend the budget could exert its constitutional mandate of 
overseeing the executive. 
 
3.4 Chapter 9 Institutions role on oversight and accountability 
 
In addition to the oversight and accountability mechanisms discussed under 
3.3.3 that are utilised by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa to fulfil 
its mandate of oversight and accountability, chapter 9 of the Constitution 
creates a number of institutions to support democracy. The institutions 
supporting democracy (ISD) are seven independent institutions. Expected to be 
impartial, subject only to the Constitution and law, they report at least once a 
year on their functions to the NA and on their budget expenditure.  
 
The institutions supporting and strengthening democracy as mandated by the 
Constitution are as follows: 
 
 Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) 
 Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) 
 Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Commission) 
 Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 
 Public Protector (PP) 
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 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) 
 Independent Communication Authority of South Africa (ICASA) 
 
According to the report of the independent panel assessment of Parliament, the 
institutions supporting democracy have a unique role to play with regard to 
oversight, as they conduct extensive research, possess technical expertise, 
and exercise specialised functions such as the auditing of public accounts 
Parliament (2009:44). 
 
According to Hlekiso (2012) “they are constitutionally enabled to monitor, 
regulate, advise and assist the legislatures in conducting oversight”. Because 
these institutions have different mandates and unique styles of operating, they 
then also take different forms of interacting with Parliament. The report of the 
independent panel assessment of Parliament indicates that two key roles of 
institutions supporting democracy in relation to Parliament; firstly together with 
Parliament, the institutions supporting democracy act as “watch-dog” bodies 
over the government and organs of state, and secondly, they support and aid 
Parliament in its oversight function by providing it with information that is not 
derived from the executive Parliament (2009:43). As indicated earlier, the 
institutions supporting democracy must annually engage with the NA on their 
respective activities and according to the report of the independent panel 
assessment of Parliament (2009:44) “some of the institutions, particularly those 
concerned with human rights matters, may submit substantive reports to the 
National Assembly for consideration and action”. An example is that section 
184(3) of the Constitution, the South African Human Rights Commission each 
year must require relevant organs of state to provide the Commission with 
information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of the 
rights in the Bill of Rights, concerning housing, health care, food, water, social 
security, education and the environment (Section 184(3) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa). These reports according to the report of the 
independent panel assessment of Parliament (2009:44) are an important 
source of information and can enhance Parliament’s oversight of government 
departments considerably. 
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3.4.1 Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) 
 
The AGSA is the independent Supreme Audit Institution of South Africa and 
has a constitutional mandate to carry out audits of government accounts and to 
strengthen the country’s democracy by enabling oversight and accountability in 
the public sector through auditing in order to determine whether the executive 
did in fact implement the budget as appropriated by Parliament. The AGSA 
reports to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and accounts 
to the standing committee on AGSA as a committee of the NA. Its powers and 
functions are further prescribed by the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 (PAA).  
 
According to Hlekiso (2012), the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 provide guiding 
principles to the AGSA and gives effect to the provisions of the Constitution by 
establishing the oversight mechanism, which is the Standing Committee on 
Auditor-General (SCoAG) to oversee the AG. Section 10(3) of the PAA 
prescribes that SCoAG must protect and assist the AGSA in order to protect its 
dignity, impartiality, independence and effectiveness (Hlekiso, 2012). The 
AGSA applies a stringent, national and internationally accredited audit directive 
in performing its audit functions and this ensures that the audit opinion of the 
AGSA provides an accurate and fair assessment of an auditee, thus enabling 
the legislatures to perform effective oversight (Hlekiso: 2012). 
 
Table 3.4: General findings in Audit Outcomes           
No General Findings in Audit Outcomes 
1. Shortcomings on internal controls that limit the government in 
achieving clean audits relate to reporting on predetermined service 
delivery objectives and compliance with laws and regulations. 
2. Lack of oversight by the leadership in the provincial and local 
government spheres. 
3. Lack of capacity to manage financial and performance information and 
compliance with laws and regulations which is further eroded by 
shortcomings in human resource management in some auditees and 
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the lack of information technology (IT) governance frameworks in 
some auditees. 
4. Repeated receipt of qualified audit opinions without any visible 
improvement in a number of auditees. 
Source: Hlekiso, (2012) 
 
The table above speaks to most of the AGSA findings that leads to qualified 
audit report and triggers the need for Parliament to scrutinise the government 
functions and any institution that is authorised in terms of any law to receive 
money for public purpose and thus assist Parliament with its oversight mandate. 
  
3.4.2 Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) 
 
The CGE derives its mandate from section 187 of the Constitution, from the 
CGE Act and from the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (Parliament, 2012:19).The core business of the CGE is to 
ensure the existence of gender equality and the inherent right to dignity on the 
basis of one’s gender. This is confirmed by Cetywayo (2014:2) when she 
indicates that the “CGE’s complementary oversight mandate in the context of 
this democracy is focused on gender equality”. The CGE role in supporting the 
NA to fulfil its oversight constitutional obligation on the executive and other state 
implementation agencies is realised when the commission in its planning 
(strategic and annual performance plans) focuses on how education, health, 
rural development, access to work and crime impact on gender rights and 
issues. The constitutional expectation is that the commission will advise and 
give inputs in the form of recommendations to Parliament especially relevant 
committees that are considering any legal issue that may have an effect on 
gender equality. The powers of this commission are regulated by the 
Commission on Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996 (CGE Act).These powers 
include that the commission should: 
 
 Monitor all organs of society to ensure that gender equality is safeguarded 
and promoted; 
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  Assess all legislation from a gender perspective;  
 Research and make recommendations to Parliament and other authorities;  
 Educate and inform the public on gender issues; 
 Investigate complaints on gender-related issues;  
 Monitor South Africa’s progress towards gender equality in relation to 
international norms.  
 
According Hlekiso (2012) “the Commission for Gender Equality co-operates 
with other ISDs to promote human rights and democracy, including the South 
African Human Rights Commission and the Public Protector”. 
 
3.4.3 Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Commission) 
 
The CRL is established in terms of Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 
19 of 2002. The Commission is expected in terms of the Act to develop peace, 
tolerance, friendship, and national unity among and within cultural, religious and 
linguistic communities, based on of equality, non-discrimination and free 
association. The rationale behind the establishment of the commission is that if 
one looks at the historical divides in South Africa, those divisions of the past 
need healing in order for the country to move forward and develop. The function 
of the commission is to give advice to NA Portfolio Committees on matters and 
legislations that might have an impact on achieving and establishing non-racial 
and non-sexist society, which are based on democratic values that promote the 
basic human right and unity in our diversity. 
 
3.4.4 Electoral Commission (IEC) 
 
The functions of the IEC are set out in terms of Section 190(1) of the 
Constitution. It is a commission established by the Constitution to promote and 
safeguard democracy in South Africa. It promotes and safeguard democracy 
by ensuring that free and fair elections are possible. The commission is 
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accountable to the NA and is independent of the government in terms political 
influence. The IEC report to the NA on matters of importance such as 
preparations for elections thus enabling the NA to intervene on matters that 
affect the countries governance and hold the executive accountable where 
necessary e.g. failure of the treasury to allocate sufficient funding for free and 
fair elections or the department of home affairs not issuing identity documents. 
 
3.4.5 Public Protector (PP) 
 
Provisions of section 181(1) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa establishes the PP. Its main responsibility is to ensure government 
accountability and, once maladministration is identified, be able to provide 
remedies to stop the abuse of authority. The Public Protector Act of 1994 
indicates that the mandate of the PP include strengthening Constitutional 
democracy by investigating and redressing improper and prejudicial conduct, 
maladministration and abuse of power in state affairs (Public Protector Act 23 
of 1994). According to the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 the PP must resolve 
administrative disputes or rectify any act or omission in administrative conduct 
through mediation, conciliation or negotiation. 
 
According to Hlekiso (2012), the PP advises on appropriate remedies or 
employs any other expedient means. The PP report and make 
recommendations on findings. Hlekiso (1994) indicates that the PP has  
jurisdiction over all organs of state, any institution in which the state is the 
majority controlling shareholder and public entity as defined in section 1 of the 
Public Finance Management Act of 1999 (PFMA). The PP is accountable to the 
NA and reports annually on its activities, performance and budget expenditure. 
It is through the reports that the PP submit to the NA that Parliament is able to 
conduct its oversight mandate over the executive. According to Hlekiso (2012) 
“although the Public Protector is entrusted with the above constitutional 
responsibilities and producing information and knowledge that is critical to the 
exercise of oversight over the executive, it is one of the ISDs that the 
legislatures are not making full use of to facilitate effective oversight”. 
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3.4.6 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) 
 
The SAHRC is mainly focused on Human Rights as Human beings in the face 
of the earth and these rights are protected in the Constitution on chapter two, 
as they are referred as the bill of rights. The SAHRC is established by section 
181(1) of the Constitution and the Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994. 
According to the Constitution (1996) the functions of the Human Rights 
Commission as outlined in section 184 are “to promote respect for human rights 
and a culture of human rights; promote the protection, development and 
attainment of human rights; and monitor and assess the observance of human 
rights in South Africa”. Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 regulate the 
powers of the Human Rights Commission in that they must investigate and 
report on the observance of human rights; take steps to secure appropriate 
redress where human rights have been violated; carryout research and 
educate; each year the Human Rights Commission must require relevant 
organs of state to provide the commission with information on the measures 
that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights 
concerning housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the 
environment; develop an awareness of human rights among the people of 
South Africa; make recommendations to the state to improve the carrying out 
of human rights; undertake studies and report to Parliament on matters relating 
to human rights; and investigate complaints of violation of human rights and 
seek appropriate relief. 
 
The act clearly indicates the functions of the Human Rights Commission in 
relation not only to government but also Parliament. Hlekiso (2012) indicates 
that even though valuable information and knowledge that is critical to oversight 
of the executive have been produced by the commission, it has not been fully 
utilised by the legislatures to facilitate proactive and effective oversight. As 
indicated above, the commission is accountable in Parliament to the NA and 
reports to the PC on justice and constitutional development on its annual 
activities and budget spending. Its reports are to be used by Parliament to serve 
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as impetus for debate on matters of national interests surrounding issue of 
Human Rights. 
 
3.4.7 Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) 
 
Section 192 of the Constitution (1996) demands that a “National legislation 
must establish an independent authority to regulate broadcasting in public 
interest, and to ensure fairness and diversity of views broadly representing 
South African society”. According to Hlekiso (2012), “although not specifically 
dealt with under Chapter nine of the Constitution, the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) is an important role player 
in the advancement of our Constitutional Democracy”. 
 
ICASA is established by the Independent Communications Authority Act of 
South Africa. The ICASA amendment Act 3 of 2006 (ICASA Act) includes the 
Postal Services, which was previously regulated by the Postal Authority Act 22 
of 2002. According to Hlekiso (2012), “ICASA is a licensing body, a regulator 
and a quasi-judicial body because it licenses, regulates, adjudicates and issues 
sanctions”. Section 34 of the Constitution gives powers to ICASA to adjudicate 
and issue sanctions, as it prescribes that everyone has the right to have any 
dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum (Hlekiso, 2012). The main focus and responsibility of ICASA 
is ensuring that free and open airwaves while protecting democracy.  
 
ICASA is accountable to the NA and appears before the PC on Communication 
on average twice a year to report on its activities and budget expenditure. 
According to the ICASA Act, the Authority must present the Minister of 
Communication with its annual report, which the Minister then tables in 
Parliament. The confusion that this can create is the perception that ICASA is 
not independence to the executive. According to Hlekiso (2012), “ICASA would 
be of assistance to Parliament as it possesses technical and litigation expertise 
which help to produce a very important information and knowledge that 
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Parliament may make full use of if it is to facilitate proactive and effective 
oversight”. Frequent meetings took place the during the fourth Parliament 
between ICASA and the PC on Communication and the information gained from 
ICASA was utilised by the Committee in its oversight function while considering 
ICASA’s Performance Management System as adopted by the National 
Assembly on 1 March 2012 (Parliament,2012). 
 
3.5 The role of the party system and oversight by the opposition 
 
According to Dahl (1966: xiii - xiv) “by its nature a Parliament is not a monolithic 
and homogeneous institution, but a representative assembly, where the basic 
idea is that different interests and ideas should be represented, and where there 
will always be differences of opinion and always a distinction between the 
majority and one or more opposing minorities”. In modern Parliaments, this is 
organised along political party lines, with the basic distinction running between 
the governing party or parties and the opposition parties that are represented 
in Parliament (Ahmed, 2011:64). This study is in agreement with Dahl (1966: 
xiii-xiv) because democracy is an inclusive process in which all political forces 
take part in representing all citizens. 
 
According to Schmitz (1988:2), “what has not changed, however, in our modern 
liberal-democratic society is the hallowed principle that government must rest 
on the consent of the governed which means, inter alia, that the minority 
accepts the right of the majority to make decisions, provided that there is 
reciprocal respect for the minority’s right to dissent from these decisions and 
promote alternative policies”. In a Parliamentary democracy system, decisions 
are taken by the majority through, for example, a voting system, the executive 
usually have the support of the majority, though not all the times. In a positive 
Parliamentarism, the executive has explicit support of the majority and, in a 
negative Parliamentarism, the executive government can sit, as long as it does 
not have the explicit distrust of the majority, as expressed in a vote of no 
confidence. If one or more of the opposition parties vote for the executive within 
a positive Parliamentarism, a minority government can occur. 
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The opposition constitute a small number of Parliamentary seats and do not 
have the power to make decisions as they cannot govern with their small 
number of seats. It functions by offering an alternative political government 
while at the same time protecting the interests of its constituencies (voters). The 
opposition further offer alternatives to decisions taken or proposed by the 
government and its majority Parliamentary representatives, debates issues 
emanating from infamous decisions taken, scrutinises and exercise oversight 
on the activities and budgetary proposals of the government/executive, and 
enhance stability, accountability and transparency in decision-making and 
implementation within the Parliament processes and other available 
constitutional platforms. 
 
According to Ahmed (2011:65) “some opposition parties may choose to present 
alternative proposals to those of the government, while others choose to 
support it. Some conduct strict scrutiny of government actions, while other do 
not”. Even where the opposition lacks the power to block or prevent executive 
decisions from being effected, it still acts as a source of initiatives, raises issues 
for debate and ensures that the executive account for its policies. In ensuring 
that the opposition is recognised by the voters as alternative government, they 
make use of Parliamentary mechanisms of oversight such as committee 
inquiries, departmental budget reviews, plenary question time and debates. 
According to da Rocha, Jardim and Calderia (2009:6), “[of course] the provision 
of Parliamentary opposition to review may vary depending on other factors as 
the degree of competitiveness of the system and switching possibilities in the 
short and medium term, the degree of polarization between government and 
opposition, the level of popularity and government approval, the size [,] and 
level of cohesion of the opposition against the coalition”. 
 
According to the IPU (1999:2), “Parliament is the institution that embodies 
society in the diversity of its composition and its opinions and which relays and 
channels this diversity in the political process. Its vocation is to regulate 
tensions and maintain equilibrium between the competing claims of diversity 
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and uniformity, individuality and collectivity, in order to enhance social cohesion 
and solidarity. Its role is to legislate, inter alia, by allocating financial resources, 
and oversee the action of the Executive”. 
 
In conducting its oversight function, the opposition contributes in the promotion 
and protection of human rights and thus assisting in ensuring that democracy 
functions. Opposition party MPs must be able to denounce the irregularities 
they have noticed freely in Parliament or which were forwarded to them by their 
constituencies and bring suggestions on how to remedy the situation. 
Opposition parties bring success through effective and responsible opposition. 
 
The Constitution (1996) does not mandate the opposition parties to conduct 
oversight and ensure accountability, but this is the responsibility of the 
parliamentary institution and all political parties represented in the assembly or 
council. The Constitution can be interpreted as calling all MPs to understand 
and appreciate the rationale and justification behind the constitutional oversight 
role of Parliament. According to Ahmed (2011:71), oversight and accountability 
must be considered as a key element of good governance and prevalence of 
constitutionalism and accountability, both by the ruling and opposition party. 
 
Opposition parties during the fourth Parliament did not enjoy any extra ordinary 
or different mechanisms devised by the rules and procedures of Parliament 
compared to members of the majority party to exercise oversight over the 
executive. This is the case, while according to Ahmed (2011:71), “In most 
parliamentary forms of government, there are different mechanisms devised by 
the rules and procedure of parliament to assist the oppositions, strengthen the 
systems that the oppositions use to perform the oversight functions and table 
the issues for debate before the floor of the parliament. In many western 
parliaments such as UK, Germany and Canada, there is an ‘opposition’s day’, 
the day which is left and set aside by the oppositions to choose the issues for 
debate and table. However, the opposition do not use these opportunities for 
the tabling of issues for debate but simply spend the day by criticizing and 
divulging the government’s fault and maladministration”. 
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3.6 Summary and deductions 
 
The description of the institutional and legislative context of oversight and 
accountability in South Africa reveals a desire to transform the society through 
ensuring that the executive is accountable to Parliament. The South African 
model of oversight and accountability highlights the constitutional provisions 
that refer directly and indirectly to oversight and accountability, and the 
legislative and policy framework. Parliament, assisted by the Constitution, 
employed certain “internal” and “external” mechanisms for conducting oversight 
and accountability in the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. The 
potential risks associated with the “internal” mechanisms such as committees 
is according to Webb and Roberts (2014:4) “a weak mandate that may be 
subject to political whims, a lack of human rights expertise among the Members, 
Partisanship, compartmentalisation of human rights within a single-mandate 
committee, reduced political influence from a single-mandate committee where 
human rights are not prioritised in the Parliament, and perceived usurpation of 
the judicial role and resulting tension between the legislature and judicial 
branches”. 
 
It has been discussed that the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related 
Matters Act 2009 gave the fourth Parliament powers and a mandate for 
Parliament to influence budgets of the executive thus being able to conduct 
fiscal oversight and influence social policy. This is realised when Parliament 
has the autonomy to assess whether expenditure is being used to meet the 
state’s development objective of South Africa. The Act further provides 
Parliament with the power to amend the fiscal framework, the division of 
revenue and tax policy. This power demands that the executive and 
government departments must defend their budget policies. Parliament has the 
power to amend these budgets if deficits or surplus are found to be problematic. 
 The Constitution also establishes institutions, which play a major role in 
oversight and accountability, and at the same time ensures their independence 
from the executive power. It is evident that for oversight and accountability to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 78 
 
 
be achieved, the Chapter 9 institutions need to be effective. Mechanisms 
should be put in place to determine whether they are in fact effective. Each 
institution should ensure that it understands its goal(s) as mandated by the 
Constitution, which ensures its legitimacy, thus enabling the institution to meet 
the needs of its constituencies, which in this case are the people of the Republic 
of South Africa. Ensuring that oversight and accountability are implemented is 
not the sole role of the opposition political parties. Instead, it is an institutional 
responsibility, although the party system sometimes hinders the 
accomplishment of effective oversight and accountability. It is also important to 
note that oversight and accountability become institutional matters, as expertise 
on oversight and accountability among members of Parliament including the 
need for training, affect quality on how oversight and accountability are 
conducted. There should always be an emphasis on non-partisanship in the 
composition of the oversight institutions and an emphasis to strive for a high 
level of independence from the executive and a high degree of commitment to 
oversight and accountability by all members of Parliament. 
 
Now that a discussion has taken place, on the institutional and legislative 
context of oversight and accountability in the South African context, the next 
chapter provides the research methodology applied in evaluating and 
assessing how the fourth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa understood 
its responsibility, role and mandate when it comes to oversight and 
accountability.   
 
The next chapter through an evaluation analysis identifies strengths and gaps 
in the oversight and accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth 
Parliament. This objective is achieved by implementing a research design 
process that acts as a strategic framework for action or a procedure in 
unpacking and providing a solution to the research questions and thus enabling 
to achieve the final results of the study. The research approach or methodology 
in the collection of the data will also be discussed in the next chapter by 
exploring also data capturing and editing, data analysis and interpretation. The 
next chapter concludes by discussing the limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
The study seeks to evaluate and assess the oversight and accountability 
mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
This Chapter, in particular, provides an in-depth description of the research 
design and methodology employed in order to evaluate the oversight and 
accountability activities of the fourth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
A quantitative research method was employed by utilising a semi-structured 
questionnaires.  
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The chapter is structured into eight sub-categories: 
1) Introduction, 
2) Research design, 
3) Research methodology, 
4) Limitations of the study, 
5) Summary and deductions. 
 
4.2 Research Design 
 
In order to explain the research design utilised to conduct the study, the 
hypothesis, conceptualisation and key variables will be discussed below, 
followed by issues of measurement and sample the sample design and 
methods followed will be explained. 
 
4.2.1 Hypothesis, conceptualisation and key variables 
 
The hypothesis of the study is that the oversight and accountability mechanisms 
employed by the fourth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa were 
ineffective, and that MPs did not understand their role, function, and mandate 
in overseeing the executive and thus holding the executive accountable for its 
actions and lack of action. 
 
Bless and Higson-Smith (2002:156) indicates that the research design “is a set 
of procedures, which guide the researcher in the process of verifying a 
particular hypothesis and excluding all other possible hypotheses or 
explanations”. Therefore, it can be referred to as a blueprint to allow the 
researcher to test the validity of a hypothesis or to provide solution to the 
research questions, all the time being mindful of factors that might affect the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
 
The study utilised an evaluation research design type, utilising quantitative 
methods to describe and evaluate the performance of oversight and 
accountability in the fourth Parliament. The evaluation research design focused 
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on the process of implementation. The advantages of the evaluation research 
design were that rapport and trust with the respondents was achieved, high 
validity of results was achieved and an insider perspective into the 
implementation of the oversight and accountability mechanisms were attained 
(Burger, 2014). 
 
The study can be classified as being empirical, textual, numeric, hybrid and of 
medium control (Mouton, 2001:146). The study is empirical as the researcher 
does not know beforehand if the theory and hypothesis will be proven correctly, 
textual since information sourced will be from documentary sources, numeric in 
that the data from the semi-structured questionnaires will be quantified, hybrid 
since existing documented information and newly sourced data will be 
combined to present findings, recommendations and conclusions to the study. 
 
A quantitative research design was utilised during the study to ensure accuracy, 
maximize objectivity and generalisability of findings, and ensure thoroughness. 
The researcher sought to play an objective role and ensure that involvement 
with the phenomena under study was limited to the demands of obtaining the 
necessary data. Furthermore, the researcher utilised semi-structured 
questionnaires with open-ended and closed-ended questions, which were 
computed and graphically analysed. The rationale for this research design was 
to plan and structure the research project in such a way that the eventual validity 
of the research findings could be maximised through either minimising or, 
where possible, eliminating potential error. 
 
4.2.2 Issues of measurement 
 
The nature of the research topic could have led to a high level of subjective 
inputs from individual responses. To counter this probability, certain questions 
in the semi-structured questionnaire were restricted by a rating system, e.g. 
very good, good, adequate, poor and very poor, and complemented by 
evaluative questions to extract opinions and proposals for addressing 
challenges. The semi-structured questionnaires can be found in Annexure 1 
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and Annexure 2. The semi-structured questionnaires did not obtain biographical 
details such as age and educational qualifications, typical behaviour, opinion, 
beliefs, convictions. 
 
4.2.3 Sample design and methods 
 
A probability sample in the form of a simple random sampling technique was 
used. From the total list of MPs (490 members) who were members of the fourth 
Parliament (400 NA members and 90 seats in the NCOP of which 54 were 
NCOP permanent delegates), a representative sample was drawn. According 
to Welman, Kruger & Mitchell (2007:55), in order for the results to be 
generalisable, the sample must be representative. Sampling means taking a 
portion or a smaller number of units of a population as representative or having 
particular characteristics of that population (De Vos et al. 2011:223). The 
sample is considered representative and thus allows generalisability, as the 
findings of the study, or what was observed in the sample, can also be observed 
in any other group of subjects from the same population. 
 
The researcher assigned a random number to each of the 490 MPs and then 
used the random number sheet to select the representative sample, which is 
twenty percent of the total population (98 members were sampled as 
respondents) 70 completed questionnaires were received from the MPs. The 
same sampling methodology was used to draw a representative sample of the 
managers that dealt with oversight and accountability. Representativeness is 
the underlying epistemic criterion of a “valid”, i.e. unbiased, sample (Mouton, 
2001:110). During the fourth Parliament 13 managers were responsible for 
issues related to oversight and accountability, four managers were sampled 
and all of them completed the questionnaire.  Two questionnaires were 
administered to these respondents as some of the key questions spoke to their 
different roles and tasks as MP’s and Managers. It was important to carefully 
consider and administer two questionnaires in order that the results provide 
meaningful data. 
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4.3 Research Methodology 
 
In order to systematically solve the research problem, a research methodology 
was followed that involved various steps in solving the research problem. Below 
the data collection methods utilised, data capturing and editing and data 
analysis and interpretation are discussed and explained in order to provide a 
step by step methodology followed during the research study. 
 
4.3.1 Data collection methods  
 
Research methodology refers to the methods of data collection. The 
methodology demands a thorough reflection on the planning, structuring and 
execution of the research for the sake of satisfying the desire for truth, 
objectivity and validity. The researcher’s process of data collection included the 
sourcing of literature from documentary sources such as journal articles, 
Parliament internal documents, academic books, reports, newspapers and web 
references (Mouton, 2001:99). These document sources were the base of 
preparing the literature review discussed in chapter two and helped to secure a 
sense of what is oversight and accountability are and their application entailed 
nationally and universally. 
 
Self-reporting (Mouton, 2001:99) in the form of a semi -structured questionnaire 
was employed. The semi-structured questionnaire was constructed and piloted 
before it was administered to the sample of respondents (Mouton, 2001:104). 
The aim of the pre-test was to identify questions that did not make sense so 
that they could be reviewed and improved. According to de Vos et al 
(2011:195), “in all cases it is essential that newly constructed questionnaires, 
those in their semi-final form, be thoroughly pilot tested before being utilised in 
the main investigation”. Respondent’s contact details were requested so that 
the researcher could follow up on questions or feedback that needs clarifying. 
An electronic survey in the form of semi-structured questionnaires was 
accordingly designed in order to collect primary data. The semi-structured 
questionnaires were constructed as a formal, written set of close-ended and 
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open-ended questions, aimed at every respondent in the study. The close-
ended and open-ended questions enabled the respondents to express their 
views and opinions fully, thus allowing them to give precise and detailed 
information. The semi-structured questionnaires were piloted (Welman and 
Kruger, 2001:141) with fifteen MPs and the representative sample of the 
Managers that dealt with oversight and accountability during the fourth 
Parliament. 
 
4.3.2 Data capturing and editing 
 
The data that was collected was captured by converting the textual data into 
electronic format for capturing the written responses from the semi-structured 
questionnaires that were administered. The researcher took measures to 
minimize errors by record-keeping and kept an electronic backup of the 
completed questionnaires’ responses as well as the questionnaire’s 
themselves. 
 
4.3.3 Data analysis and interpretation 
 
Welman et al (2007:210) indicates that “data analysis is a paramount procedure 
in the research process”. Data analysis seeks to provide feedback on the 
tenability or attainability of the originally formulated hypothesis and, 
consequently, on the theory, if deduced; is either provisionally refuted or 
confirmed. In the study statistical and interpretative methods of data analysis 
were employed. These assisted the researcher in determining the frequency of 
a particular experience or experiences against the responses provided. 
 
The data analysis was done in such a way that it was practical and 
understandable. The quantitative data analysis was done to make sense of the 
numbers in order to permit meaningful interpretation. Quantitative data analysis 
involved the organising of the data collected, doing the calculations, interpreting 
the information. In the quantitative data analysis, content analysis was 
employed. This particular method of quantitative content analysis attempts to 
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characterize the meaning in a given body of discourse in a systematic and 
quantitative fashion (Franzosi, 2004:21). The unit of analysis was the fourth 
Parliament of the Republic of the South Africa. The interpretative method was 
used to summarise quantitative data. All the information was summarised, 
analysed, filtered and arranged in order to produce a research report that was 
scientifically logical and easy to comprehend. 
 
4.4 Limitations of the study 
 
One of the limitations of the study was the “social desirability effect” (Mouton, 
2001:106) where the subject may portray a situation in a more positive or 
negative light given the personal perspective that may be the reality. The 
deductive approach (Mouton, 2001:117) was accordingly employed in the 
study. In terms of this approach, certain recommendations were made or 
conclusions were reached, based on the statements or views of various authors 
and respondents. The concepts that are critical to the study were identified and 
defined based mainly on the literature study. The definitions of certain relevant 
concepts are fixed, yet others such as the broad theme of oversight, 
accountability and democracy presented a number of different perspectives and 
thus varied definitions. The study was also conducted after the term of the fourth 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa and thus certain members of the 
fourth Parliament who might be disgruntled for not being re-nominated for the 
5th Parliament may have been subjective in their responses. The questionnaires 
results may reflect a measure of subjectivity given that each responded was 
responding from a professional and practical experience, which could have 
varied significantly in content, time and scope amongst respondents. 
 
The study only focused on the national Parliament and not on all nine Provincial 
Legislatures and did not gain an overall view of the South African legislative 
sector. 
 
4.5 Summary and deductions 
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The research aim and methodology to achieve this aim were discussed above. 
This study aims to be simplistic and clear while ensuring the accuracy of its 
results. The limitations of the study were not a major risk in that they would not 
have put a stop to the study. The research design and methodology used were 
elaborately discussed in this chapter.  In addition, the set procedure in the form 
of the research design was chosen, which enabled the researcher to 
scientifically verify the hypothesis and thus being able to exclude all other 
hypotheses.  
 
A quantitative research design was chosen and influenced by the desire to 
produce an accurate research outcome while being able to maximise 
objectivity. To counter subjective inputs from individual responses, a rating 
system complemented these by evaluative questions to extract opinion. The 
simple random sampling technique was utilised and the data collection included 
the sourcing of literature and responses from the semi-structured 
questionnaires. The data that was collected was captured by converting the 
textual data into electronic format. A quantitative data analysis was then 
employed to make sense of the numbers in order to permit meaningful 
interpretation. In the next chapter the findings are presented and analysed in 
order to make sense of the captured and edited data. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE STATE OF OVERSIGHT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE FOURTH PARLIAMENT 
 
5.1     Introduction 
 
The concepts of oversight and accountability are universal and regarded as 
essential in the enhancing democracy in order to realise the dream of a better 
life for all citizens. The absence of effective oversight and accountability hinders 
the achievement of development goals and creates an atmosphere that easily 
accepts underperformance and corruption.  According to Bapela (2010) “before 
1994, accountability of government departments and public access to 
Parliament were as good as non-existent. From 1994 to 2004, Parliament’s 
focus was primarily on repealing and amending apartheid legislation, and a 
Parliament representing all ethnic groups instead of a white minority. In the third 
Parliament, from 2004, Parliament’s focus was drawn more to the institution’s 
other constitutionally mandated role of overseeing the executive (national and 
provincial cabinet ministers, their departments and organs of state). The current 
fourth Parliament, established in 2009, is meant to spend 60 percent of its time 
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on oversight-monitoring the performance of government and holding the latter 
answerable for how taxpayer’s money is spent and to make government 
operations more transparent to the public”. 
 
The fourth Parliament vision was “To build an effective people’s Parliament that 
is responsive to the needs of the people and that is driven by the ideal of 
realising a better quality of life for all the people of South Africa” (Parliament, 
2010). One cannot help but be convinced that at the centre of this vision is a 
peoples’ Parliament that is able to scrutinise and oversee the executive action, 
in order to improve the quality of life of all the people of South Africa, thus 
creating a better life for all. 
 
In order to provide scientific evidence to test the hypothesis of the study that 
the oversight and accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa during its term were ineffective and 
weak, and that MPs did not understand their role, function and mandate in 
overseeing the executive and thus holding the executive accountable for its 
actions and lack of action, an investigation was conducted into the state of 
oversight and accountability during the fourth Parliament. Two semi-structured 
questionnaires (Annexure 1 & Annexure 2) were employed, covering a number 
of key oversight and accountability elements and key variables. The first 
questionnaire was administered electronically to members of Parliament who 
were also members of Parliament during the fourth Parliament in August 2015 
and September 2015.  
 
The second questionnaire was administered electronically to managers in 
Parliament who were also managers that dealt with oversight and accountability 
during the fourth Parliament in August 2015. Two separate groups of 
respondents were sort in order to investigate their areas of responsibility on 
oversight and accountability during the fourth Parliament. The data was 
captured and then a comparative format exercise was done to obtain a 
complete understanding of how the fourth Parliament dealt with oversight and 
accountability. 
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The basis for the findings on the various elements and variables of oversight 
and accountability were furnished by the data set, as conveyed in this chapter. 
It should be noted that the findings are structured in such a way that they cover 
the main operational, constitutional and strategic aspects relating to the 
constitutional mandate of oversight and accountability.  
 
These aspects included: 
 
 The Parliamentary mandate;  
 Constitutional, legislative, policy and strategic framework;  
 Institutional arrangements, systems and process;  
 The Technology and systems to conduct oversight; and  
 Monitoring and evaluation.  
The Parliamentary mandate covers the question of when does the 
Parliamentary mandate begin and end. It also covers the Parliamentary 
programme and oversight function. The Parliamentary mandate further 
addresses issues of immunity and code of conduct.  
 
The Constitutional, legislative, policy and strategic framework questions the 
oversight and accountability function. Under the topic of the Institutional 
arrangements, systems and process, the institutional arrangements, i.e. 
structure, systems, processes and resources, including executive compliance, 
are questioned. Under the topic of the technology and systems to conduct 
oversight, the development of the budget vote tool is explored. The last section 
seeks to understand the issues of monitoring and evaluation of oversight and 
accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament. 
 
The research hypothesis is supported by clear scientific evidence through the 
diagnoses of a number challenges and a trend of weaknesses’ pertaining to the 
fourth Parliament execution of oversight and accountability in the Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa. 
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5.2  Fourth Parliament Approach on Oversight and Accountability -  
Findings and Analysis 
 
The Parliamentary mandate; constitutional, legislative, policy, and strategic 
framework; institutional arrangements, systems and process; technology and 
systems to conduct oversight, implementation activities (practices); and 
monitoring and evaluation are the key main strategic, legislative, institutional 
and operational aspects relating to the function and responsibility of 
Parliamentary oversight and executive accountability that were utilised as the 
basis for the findings. 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Parliamentary Mandate 
 
The Parliamentary mandate is covered by questioning the beginning and end 
of the Parliamentary mandate; Parliamentary programme and oversight 
function and immunity and code of conduct. 
 
5.2.1.1 Beginning and end of Parliamentary mandate 
 
Findings 
Responding to the question about the beginning of the Parliamentary mandate 
of the fourth Parliament, eighty percent of respondents (members) indicated 
that once they were sworn in as members of the fourth Parliament, their 
mandate commenced. Sixty percent responded by indicating that the outgoing 
members’ mandate ended on the day of the new elections (on the eve of 
elections) with five percent indicating that the outgoing members’ mandate 
ended on the first seating of the chamber (first seating of the new members). 
Thirty five percent in turn believed the mandate of the outgoing members end 
after new member’s mandates are validated. 
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Seventy five percent of the managers indicated that the primary responsibility 
for ensuring that oversight and accountability takes place in the legislative 
process was with the institution of Parliament. Twenty percent believed that it 
lays with the members of Parliament individually and five percent indicated that 
the political parties had the primary responsibility. 
 
The responses to the question on whether Parliament did have a budget for 
oversight and accountability indicated that there was a budget and that the 
budget was appropriated as follows: 
 
Table 5.1: Parliament budget for oversight and accountability from 2009 - 2014 
Programme 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 
Legislation 
& Oversight 
R347,450 R315,892 R298,000 R300,068 R202,009 
 
Analysis 
From the findings, an analysis can be drawn that high level of understanding 
and respect for the constitutional mandate for members of the fourth Parliament 
was in place and supported democratic principles such as freedom of speech 
by providing members of the fourth Parliament with immunity from prosecution 
or detention while in the chamber. The existence of a budget created means 
that could capacitate the practical realisation and achievement of the 
constitutional imperative through financial resourcing of the activities and 
functions of oversight and executive accountability. Table 5.1 indicates a 
substantial increase in funds made available for oversight but less compared to 
the amounts allocated for passing legislation. Genuine oversight can be 
realised once a three way commitment is achieved from the members of 
Parliament, “willingness” on the part of the executive and a skilled, committed 
administrative support that is able to draft a budget that is adequate for effective 
oversight.  
  
According to William (2014:14) such “willingness” on the part of the executive 
is the first problem. A few examples in the Fourth Parliament come to mind. The 
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(then) Chief Whip of the ANC asserted in March 2010 that the ruling party gave 
uncompromising support to the concept of the executive accountability to all 
parliamentary committees “including SCOPA”, yet later accused SCOPA (after 
the Minister of Defence was called to appear before it, precisely because 
departmental officials were not providing answers) of wanting to “parade and 
embarrass ministers”, whose primary responsibilities were to “run the country” 
rather than subject themselves to oversight”. William (2014:14) further indicated 
that the Speaker ended up reprimanding that committee and the committee 
chairperson was soon dismissed. The challenge then is that even though great 
resources are put in place and the constitutional mandate is articulated, without 
the political “willingness” then, the whole exercise is subject to substandard 
results or finds itself undermined on all levels. Political “willingness” must be 
portrayed equally by the MPs and the executive. The challenge in South Africa 
is to find that political “willingness” that will ensure that political and 
administrative individual commitment and by-in which will in turn will strengthen 
the democratic character of our country (Scott, 2009:63). 
 
5.2.1.2 Parliamentary programme and oversight function 
 
Findings 
All respondents that dealt with oversight and accountability during the fourth 
Parliament responded by indicating that Parliament did have a Parliamentary 
programme that encouraged oversight and accountability. Seventy five percent 
of the managers responded that the Parliamentary programme did not align 
itself with the established fixed time frames for certain processes of the Money 
Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. Twenty- five percent said 
there was an alignment between the Parliamentary programme and established 
fixed time frames of certain processes of the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure and Related Matters Act. 
 
Analysis 
All respondents indicated that the programme of the fourth Parliament 
encouraged oversight and accountability as another indicator of the high value 
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placed on this constitutional imperative, but seventy- five percent indicated it 
did not align with the established fixed time frames for certain processes of the 
Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. The constitutional 
imperative of oversight and accountability is a core function of Parliament that 
has been overshadowed by emphasis on law-making during the first, second 
and third Parliaments.  
 
In support of the above, William (2014:1) states that “the main focus of the First 
and Second Parliament was to change apartheid legacy through the passing of 
hundreds of laws at rapid pace”. The third Parliament had then to ensure the 
start of implementation of the laws passed. The fourth Parliament emphasised 
the implementation of the laws through strengthening the oversight function 
(William, 2014:2). 
5.2.1.3 Immunity and code of conduct 
 
Findings 
All responses to the question about immunity and code of conduct indicated 
that Parliamentarians enjoyed immunity from prosecution or detention while in 
the chamber. The responses further indicated that a code of conduct was in 
place during the fourth Parliament for Members of Parliament, which also 
applied to members of the executive who had no separate code of conduct. 
 
Analysis 
Even though members of the fourth Parliament enjoyed immunity from 
prosecution and detention while in the chamber, all respondents indicated that 
a code of conduct applied to MPs as much as to the members of the executive. 
This environment was conducive to a strong commitment to execute the 
constitutional imperatives of overseeing the executive and holding it 
accountable to Parliament.  
 
5.2.2 Constitutional, legislative, policy and strategic framework 
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The constitutional, legislative, policy and strategic framework are addressed 
below under oversight and accountability function; legislative, policy and 
strategic framework. 
 
5.2.2.1 Oversight and accountability function 
 
Findings 
All respondents (MPs) indicated that the function of oversight and accountability 
was important to the fourth Parliament. The respondents indicated that the 
fourth Parliament based its oversight and accountability function on its 
constitutional mandate. All respondents (MPs) stated that Parliament had 
powers to summon senior government officials, members of the executive and 
Chapter 9 institutions. All respondents indicated that Parliament did not have 
powers to approve key executive appointments. Forty- two percent of 
respondents (MPs) indicated that the primary responsibility for ensuring that 
oversight and accountability take place in the legislative process was that of 
individual members of Parliament. Twenty-three percent indicated that the 
responsibility lays with political parties, fifteen percent chose the Presiding 
Officers as primary responsible, and twenty percent indicated that the mixture 
of them all, including Parliament administration, had the primary responsibility. 
 
All respondents stated that the elements of the Parliament oversight and 
accountability programme included hearings in committees, oral and written 
questions to the executive, budgetary oversight, and debates on departmental 
reports. Responding on the number of questions to the executive, the 
respondents (MPs) stated that during the fourth Parliament the questions to the 
executive were as follows: 
 
Table 5.2: Number of Questions to the executive during the fourth Parliament. 
Number of Questions to the executive during the fourth Parliament 2009-2014 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Oral Questions 
NA 280 281 355 472 338 38 
NCOP 84 80 111 159 201 39 
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Oral Replies 
NA 258 NSR NSR 472 NSR NSR 
NCOP 84 80 111 157 201 39 
Written Questions 
NA 2361 3573 3870 3439 3207 382 
NCOP 199 521 682 686 458 55 
Written Replies 
NA 2261 NSR NSR NSR NSR NSR 
NCOP 179 486 636 674 451 48 
Key: NSR=No statistical records available  
 
Sixty-eight percent of respondents (MPs) stated that the Parliamentary 
programme did not align itself with the established fixed time-frames for certain 
processes of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, 
e.g. Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), the processing of the 
Division of Revenue Bill (DoRB) and the Main Appropriation Bill. While thirty- 
two percent said there was an alignment by the programme to fixed time-frames 
for certain processes of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related 
Matters Act. All respondents indicated that the programme of Parliament and 
that of the executive where not aligned with each other where possible. Sixty- 
eight percent of respondents indicated that the programme of committees was 
not drafted in such a way as to accommodate the provisions of the Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. While thirty-two percent 
indicated that the programme of committees was drafted in such a way as to 
accommodate the provisions of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and 
Related Matters Act.  
 
All respondents stated that the programme of Parliament Houses (NA&NCOP) 
did not create more time for consideration of committee reports as well as 
private Member’s business (e.g. motions). Other programme alignment matters 
raised by a minority of respondents included that the programme of Parliament 
did not provide adequate time for constituency work to allow sharper focus on 
oversight matters, through an expanded public participation in Parliamentary 
activities. 
 
Analysis 
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The lack of certainty and clear understanding of responsibilities, including 
functions, could be identified in that MPs did not understand exactly where the 
primary responsibility for ensuring that oversight and accountability take place 
lied. It was further shocking that no statistical records were available on the 
number of oral replies in the NA from 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014. No statistical 
records were available for the number of written replies from 2010 until 2014 in 
the NA.  
 
In analysing the findings, the weak coordination and alignment of the 
Parliamentary programme with established fixed time-frames for certain 
processes of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 
was identified. The programme of the houses (NA&NCOP), that of the 
committees, and the alignment of the programme of Parliament and that of the 
executive where possible need attention. 
 
5.2.2.2 Legislative, policy and strategic framework 
 
Findings 
All respondents indicated that even though oversight and accountability were 
an integral aspect of Parliament’s strategic plan, no policy existed relating to 
oversight and accountability and also no long-term oversight and accountability 
strategy and implementation plan existed in the fourth Parliament. All 
respondent’s indicated that the fourth Parliament did not compile an annual 
business plan for oversight and accountability linked with specific 
implementation activities. 
 
Analysis 
The Constitutional provisions that are referred to directly and indirectly, as 
discussed and tabled under 3.2.1 in chapter 3 when discussing the South 
African model of oversight and accountability, are clear on what is expected. 
They clearly indicate the responsibilities and the requirement for a strong 
platform for Parliament to execute its constitutional mandate of oversight and 
accountability. 
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All thirty-one constitutional provisions do not clearly indicate and define the 
framework and there are even restrictions on conducting oversight and 
accountability. It becomes the responsibility of Parliament to provide or develop 
the guiding principles and direction that should be the foundation and driving 
force in executing its constitutional mandate of oversight and accountability. 
The best approach would be to develop an oversight and accountability policy 
and strategy.  
 
The policy document should be responsible for giving a principle approach that 
should be adopted on the constitutional imperative and further provide a 
detailed direction with unambiguous terms that are legally sound and binding to 
those that are expected to play a role in executing their oversight and 
accountability function. In analysing the findings one can see that the fourth 
Parliament lacked such a guiding policy on oversight and accountability that 
would have been a provider of a focused direction.  
 
Even though the number one strategic objection of the fourth Parliament was 
to build a quality process of scrutinising and overseeing government action, 
making oversight and accountability an integral aspect of Parliament’s strategic 
plan, no long-term oversight and accountability strategy and implementation 
plan existed in the fourth Parliament.  
 
The lack of an oversight and a strategic framework particularly focusing on 
oversight and accountability meant a lack of a focused strategic vision and a 
clear mission for executing oversight and accountability. The lack of policy 
creates an environment where there is a lack of certainty and knowledge about 
what the basic expected outcomes are when conducting oversight and ensuring 
accountability by the executive. The constitutional mandate might be clear, but 
minimum standards should be clearly reflected in a strategic framework and the 
informing policy on oversight and accountability. 
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Defining the constitutional mandate in clearly defined policy objectives that are 
encompassed in a specific oversight and accountability policy and strategy also 
ensures or to a certain extend minimises the above-mentioned technical 
misalignments that have a negative effect on attaining the constitutional 
mandate of oversight and accountability. 
 
5.2.3 Institutional arrangements, systems and process 
 
The institutional arrangements, systems and process were investigated through 
evaluating the institutional arrangements – structure; institutional arrangements 
– processes; systems, processes and resources; and executive compliance. 
These aspects are discussed below in order to provide a better understanding 
of the employed institutional arrangements, systems and process. 
 
5.2.3.1 Institutional arrangements – structure 
 
Findings 
Since the fourth Parliament operated in a political environment, ultimate political 
responsibility for oversight and accountability during the fourth Parliament 
needed to be vested in some office in order to ensure that internal processes 
are followed. In responding to the question on who took ultimate political 
responsibility for oversight and accountability during the fourth Parliament, four 
percent of the responded managers indicated that the Presiding Officers 
(Speaker of the NA and Chairperson of the NCOP) took the ultimate 
responsibility. Five percent indicated that the various committee chairpersons 
too the ultimate responsibility, sixty-six percent who choose “other” mention 
Parliament, and twenty-five percent indicated that the political parties took the 
ultimate political responsibility.  
 
Seventy percent when asked in which office the programme on oversight and 
accountability is located indicated that it was located in the houses or chambers 
of Parliament. However, ten percent responded that the office of the Speaker. 
Another ten percent responded that it was in the office of the Chairperson, and 
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yet another ten percent indicated that they did not know where the programme 
on oversight and accountability was located. 
 
All managers unanimously responded that there was a political structure in 
place to deal with oversight and accountability matters. Forty-five percent of the 
managers indicated that the political structure was the Chief Whips Forum 
where political consensus is sought on issues, e.g. the programme of the 
house. Fifty-five percent responded by indicating that the committees were the 
political structure in place during the fourth Parliament that had to deal with 
oversight and accountability implementation. The role of the structure, as 
indicated by managers, included providing political leadership and direction and 
seeking the attention of the Speaker of the NA and Chairperson of the NCOP 
on matters that needed to be discussed and clarified with the executive on 
oversight and accountability. 
 
All respondents who were managers indicated that there was no specific 
administrative unit in place to carry out oversight and accountability 
implementation plans and provide delegated support to the Chief Whips Forum 
and committees in terms of oversight and accountability matters (as indicated 
by the oversight model). When responding where the role of this unit in terms 
of oversight and accountability is placed (as indicated by the oversight model), 
all managers indicated that the role is placed in various divisions within 
Parliament e.g. Committees, NA, NCOP, legal and the budget office. Some of 
the roles are performed within Parliament houses and others at Parliamentary 
administrative level, which is the sole responsibility of the Secretary to 
Parliament. The roles that were under the houses included questions unit in 
both houses, statements unit in both houses, table unit in both houses, and then 
Committees, research and budget office falling under administration. 
 
When asked if special training in the following areas were provided, 
respondents confirmed that they were trained on: 
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 Oversight and accountability or relevant areas such as legislation and 
oversight, Committees, legislation and proceedings, parliamentary 
questions; 
 Research; 
 Procedural services; 
 Money bills amendment procedure and related matters and budget and 
provincial and municipal governance; and 
 Mechanism to deal with delegated legislation. 
 
All respondents who were managers indicated that since the absence of an 
oversight unit, the different portfolio committees and select committees dealt 
with oversight and accountability separately and so did the two houses of 
Parliament (NA & NCOP). The committees also then dealt with matters referred 
to them from the houses of Parliament differently. 
 
Twenty-seven percent of respondents (managers) indicated that the structure 
(political and administrative) was working well for effective oversight and 
accountability, while seventy-seven percent indicated that the structure 
(political and administrative) was not working well for effective oversight and 
accountability. All those who indicated that the structure did not work well for 
effective oversight and accountability did not indicate what structural changes 
they suggested for greater effectiveness even though asked to do so. It should 
be noted that the MPs were not asked to respond on the institutional 
arrangements on structure as these are mainly done at the administrative level. 
 
Analysis 
That sixty-six percent indicated that the political parties took the ultimate 
political responsibility for oversight and accountability during the fourth 
Parliament was a surprise, as political parties in a parliamentary environment 
cannot be expected to champion the responsible for providing a political 
direction and commitment to oversight and accountability but rather the 
institution through it members supported by the administration. It could perhaps 
occur from the opposition benches but certainly not from the ruling party. The 
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reason for this conclusion is that it is not in the ruling party’s interest to 
embarrass their colleagues by exposing their weaknesses with regard to how 
they govern. It was also disconcerting that only four percent of the respondents 
(MPs) indicated that the Presiding Officers took the ultimate responsibility, as 
one would have expected them to be the political champions that gave political 
direction and commitment on oversight and accountability, as they are the 
leaders in the institution and high ranking figures in their own party structures. 
 
The Constitution does not require a political structure to be put in place to deal 
with oversight and accountability matters in Parliament. However, at the same 
time, a political structure could assist by ensuring that a high level of adherence 
to oversight and accountability initiatives. This could be achieved by ensuring 
that the structure creates a platform where political interaction among senior 
members of Parliament takes place. Structures such as the Chief Whips Forum 
are not adequate, as they only focus on matters that talks to the NA and not the 
NCOP, which has only one Chief Whip responsible for the whole NCOP house 
and not for a certain political party. Furthermore, the Chief Whips Forum is 
mainly occupied with dealing with the programme of the house before it is 
presented to the programming committee and also issues around members’ 
behaviour in the house sittings. 
 
The location of the oversight and accountability office is of major importance. 
The majority of respondents at seventy percent indicated that the programme 
on oversight and accountability was located in the houses or chambers of 
Parliament during the fourth Parliament. What is of concern is that the staff in 
the houses should have been focussing on matters related to procedures during 
the house sittings. The reason could be that this arrangement provides the 
Speaker of the NA and the Chairperson of the NCOP the opportunity to take 
ultimate political responsibility for oversight and accountability, thus enabling 
them to interact optimally with the executive. 
 
What is of concern is the lack of a specific administrative oversight and 
accountability unit to carry out oversight and accountability implementation 
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plans and providing delegated support to the houses of Parliament, Chief Whips 
Forum and Committees. During the fourth Parliament, the oversight roles were 
scattered all over the institution. It makes it difficult for the Speaker of the NA 
and the Chairperson of the NCOP to take political responsibility for oversight 
and accountability. Since the secretary to Parliament is accountable to the 
Presiding Officers (Speaker of the NA & Chairperson of the NCOP acting jointly) 
for implementation and daily operations of Parliament strategy and 
performance, all structures responsible for oversight and accountability could 
report directly and indirectly to the Secretary, and thus removing the 
administrative implementation burden on the Speaker of the NA & Chairperson 
of the NCOP. The arrangement could then ensure that administration of 
oversight and accountability methods are removed from the uncertainty and 
instability associated with the nature of politically based offices of the Presiding 
Officers. 
 
Even though the political structure and administrative structure work closely to 
enhance the implementation of oversight and accountability, but for the interest 
of smooth operations, it becomes important that the lines of responsibility and 
parameters of decision-making to be clearly demarcated. This would allow 
Parliament to avoid the fourth Parliament situation where some of the 
responsibilities where seating in the administrative structure even though they 
had political implications e.g. budget office. 
 
The lack of standardisation with regard to the structure and function of oversight 
is evident through the manager’s responses that since the absence of an 
oversight unit, the different portfolio committees and select committees dealt 
with oversight and accountability separately and so did the two houses of 
Parliament. The structure (political and administrative) was considered by 
seventy percent of mangers as not working well for effective oversight and 
accountability. 
 
5.2.3.2 Institutional arrangements – processes 
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Findings 
The questions were posed to elicit “Yes” or “No” answers about how members 
of the fourth Parliament understood and dealt with institutional arrangements 
on processes implemented to ensure effective oversight and accountability. All 
respondents (MPs) indicated that no sub-project was developed to pursue the 
review of the Reserve Bank Act for purposes of aligning the Act with the 
Constitution in order for Parliament to exercise oversight over the bank. All 
respondents indicated that no operational plan existed that outlined the 
processes and resources required for conducting oversight and seventy-five 
percent indicated that there was no adequate support to members of Parliament 
to enable them to perform their mandates. Twenty-five percent in turn said there 
was adequate institutional support. 
 
All respondents indicated that the fourth Parliament did develop guidelines for 
the interaction and engagement of members of Parliament with ministers on 
issues of public concern. All respondents indicated that the fourth Parliament 
did not consider traditional South African mediums such as Lekgotla, 
Bosberaad and Imbizo for deliberation, debates and engagement on broader 
and complex issues, so as to fulfil its oversight function over the executive. 
Fifteen percent of MPs that responded indicated that the procedure followed 
during the fourth Parliament on processing of reports from sectoral Parliaments 
included debating them in the house and also referring them to committees. 
Seventy-five percent of respondents said there was no procedure during the 
fourth Parliament for the processing of reports from sectoral Parliaments. 
 
All responses by MPs indicated that the sectoral Parliaments were not 
recognised by the rules of Parliament. Furthermore, all responses indicated that 
the rules of the respective houses of Parliament did not provide the executive 
report on negotiations, prior to signing of international agreements that require 
approval of the houses. Further questions on institutional arranged processes 
included whether the fourth Parliament had mechanisms in place to oversee 
compliance with international agreements and all respondents indicated “No”. 
All respondents indicated that the general petitions, representations and 
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submissions as specified in section 56 and 69 of the Constitution were not 
adequately addressed through institutionalised mechanisms. 
 
Analysis 
Although section 224(2) of the Constitution provides that the Reserve Bank of 
South Africa must perform its functions “independently and without fear, favour 
or prejudice, but in terms of section 55 and 69, it must be able to report to 
Parliament on the implementation of monetary policy and submit audited 
financial statements including the audit report on those statements to 
Parliament. During the fourth Parliament the Reserve Bank was still not 
accountable to Parliament. The oversight of the Reserve Bank, as prescribed 
by the South African Reserve Bank Act (Act No.90 of 1989), requires that the 
Minister of Finance ensures compliance with the Act by giving notice of non-
compliance to the board of directors of the Reserve Bank and require 
compliance within a specific period. The only other remedy for the Minister of 
Finance is to apply to the High Court to compel compliance. This undermines 
section 55(a) and 69(b) of the Constitution, which states that Parliament has 
power to summon any person to appear before it, which includes the Governor 
of the Reserve Bank of South Africa. 
 
The lack of an operational plan that outlined the processes and resources 
required for conducting oversight is alarming, as this might have a potential of 
hindering effective exercise of oversight on the executive actions by Parliament 
due to lack of clear process flow and direction of resources when conducting 
oversight. It is thus not surprising that seventy-five percent of MPs indicated 
that there was not adequate institutional support to members of Parliament 
provided to enable them to perform their mandate to oversee the executive. 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa bestows on Parliament the 
responsibility to exercise oversight over the executive and to hold the executive 
to account. The guidelines for interaction and engagement of members of 
Parliament with Ministers on issues of public concern include the power to 
scrutinise and oversee executive actions by obtaining regular reports from 
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Ministers. According to section 56 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa “the National Assembly or any of its Committees may: 
 
(a) Summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or 
affirmation, or to produce documents; 
(b) Require any person or institution to report to it; 
(c) Compel, in terms of the national legislation or the rules and orders, any 
person or institution to comply with a summons or requirement in terms of 
paragraph (a) or (b); and 
(d) Receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested 
persons or institutions”. 
 
That seventy five percent of respondents indicated that there was no procedure 
during the fourth Parliament on processing of reports from sectoral Parliaments, 
is an indication as previously indicated that the fourth Parliament did not 
consider traditional South African mediums such as Lekgotla, Bosberaad and 
Imbizo for deliberations, debates and engagement on broader and complex 
issues in order to fulfil its oversight function over the executive. If provisions 
were made for their procedure, it would have assisted in the formalisation of 
recommendations to be submitted to the relevant committees or house of 
Parliament for consideration. 
 
The respondents indicated that the rules of the respective houses of Parliament 
did not, provide for the executive to report on negotiations prior to signing 
international agreements that require approval of the Houses. All respondents 
further indicated that there were no mechanisms in place to check compliance 
with internal agreements. In terms of section 231 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa: 
 
(a) Negotiation and signing of international agreements are the prerogative of 
the national executive; 
(b) Parliament has the power to approve or not approve international 
agreements forwarded by the national executive; 
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(c) Subject to the concurrence of the national executive, Parliament may 
approve an international agreement with reservation; 
(d) Parliament can request or insist that the national executive include a 
reservation in respect of an international agreement or refer an agreement 
back to the Executive; 
(e) Parliament has the ultimate power to approve an international agreement. 
From the above-mentioned, it becomes evident that a mechanism should have 
been established to ensure that Parliament could engage with stakeholders 
involved in the negotiation team and further put mechanisms in place to oversee 
compliance with international agreements. 
 
According to section 56 and 69 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Parliament or its committee are required to accept petitions, 
representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions. The 
mechanism would have facilitated the processing, referral and guidance on 
attending to petitions, representations and submissions. According to the 
respondents, this Constitutional demand was not adequately addressed 
through institutionalised mechanisms. 
 
5.2.3.3 Systems, processes and resources 
 
Findings 
All managers responded by indicating that in terms of systems, processes and 
resources, Parliament did not have electronic (software) or manual systems in 
place for oversight and accountability. There was no database management 
system, project management and planning system, tracking system e.g. 
resolution tracking system, monitoring and evaluation system and also no 
communication system on oversight and accountability. 
 
All managers responded by indicated that a standard process was in place 
pertaining to each Committee (NA and NCOP) to conduct oversight and 
accountability. When further asked to describe the process for committee to 
conduct oversight and ensure accountability, the respondents indicated that a 
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guideline on accountability cycle priorities explained the typical committee 
process that should be followed in conducting oversight and accountability. 
 
 
 
Analysis 
The fourth Parliament did not have in place a standard management process 
specifically focusing on the planning and execution of oversight and 
accountability. The findings indicate that during the fourth Parliament there was 
no database management system, either manual or electronic, no project 
management and planning in place for oversight and accountability. The lack 
of project management and planning could be linked to the non-existence of 
tracking, monitoring and evaluations systems. The responses from the 
managers indicated that there was a lack of communication systems by the 
fourth Parliament on matters concerning oversight and accountability. The 
fourth Parliament could have invested more on its television and radio 
programmes, i.e. broadcasting matters that relate to oversight and 
accountability  as much as it does to issues that relate to public participation 
and law making. 
 
The standards process in place to each committee (NA and NCOP) to conduct 
oversight and accountability spoke to guidelines and steps in the accountability 
cycle, but it was not revealed if all committees adhered to these processes 
when conducting oversight. The guidelines and steps of the processes were 
generic and could be adapted to reflect the specific needs and situation of 
committees. 
 
5.2.3.4 Executive compliance 
 
Findings 
All Members responded by indicating that no rules of Parliament were put in 
place during the fourth Parliament to assist in sanctioning members of the 
executive for non-compliance after all established existing avenues and 
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protocols have been exhausted. When asked what mechanisms were in place 
to ensure that there was reporting on responses by the executive on resolutions 
adopted by the fourth Parliament, sixty six percent of respondents indicated that 
it was the NA rule 117, NA rule 115(3) and NCOP rule 249. Twenty-four percent 
indicated that there were no mechanisms and ten percent said they did not 
know. 
 
On the question as to whether the fourth Parliament employed a tracking and 
monitoring mechanism with regard to the executive’s compliance as part of its 
continuous oversight function, all respondent’s indicated that there was no such 
mechanism. When asked if a Joint Parliamentary Oversight and Governance 
Assurance Committee was appointed to consider and report on all assurances, 
commitments and undertakings given by members of the executive in either 
houses or committees of a house, the response by all respondents was that no 
such committee was appointed. 
 
Eighty-four percent of respondents, when asked if they think that in order to 
enforce compliance with question for written reply, the review of NA rule 117 
and NCOP rule 249 would have been necessary to change the period for 
responding in writing by the executive from ten days, indicated that the change 
would not had been necessary to enforce compliance. Sixteen percent 
responded that it would have been necessary. When requested to explain their 
view, the explanation from the eighty- four percent was that even though NA 
rule 115(3) provides that a question for written reply may not stand over more 
than once when such instances exists, there are no sanctions against the 
executive in this regard. The sixteen percent indicated that it was necessary in 
order to extend time frame for the executive to respond to a question for written 
reply. 
 
Sixty-three percent of respondents when asked if the rules of Parliament 
allowed for joint reporting by committees on transversal matters and the house 
to adopt such cluster reporting indicated that only NA rules allow for such joint 
reporting. Thirteen percent indicated that no such rules existed during the fourth 
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Parliament. Twenty-four percent indicated that NCOP rules do not allow for 
such cluster reporting while NA rules do allow. 
 
All respondents indicated that they think joint reporting by committees on 
transversal matters would have benefited Parliament in that committees would 
be able to avoid a situation where two or more committees go and conduct 
oversight visit in the same area and on the same matters of concern and then 
come back to Parliament and produce different reports. 
 
Analysis 
From the findings it is evident that no rules were in place during the fourth 
Parliament to assist the institution further in sanctioning members of the 
executive for non-compliance, when all established existing avenues and 
protocols have been exhausted. The responses indicate that the fourth 
Parliament had no procedure for executive compliance.  
 
NA rule 117 and NCOP rule 249 only provide that should the responsible 
executive member fail to provide an executive reply to a question for written 
reply, upon request of the member of Parliament in whose name the question 
was submitted, the question stands and can now be put to the executive 
member in the house for oral reply on the relevant question day. A problem 
arises when a question stands over more than once as these rules are silent in 
that regard.  
 
Oversight and ensuring accountability becomes difficult if not impossible where 
there are no clear mechanisms in place to ensure that there is reporting on 
responses by the executive on resolutions adopted by the fourth Parliament. 
Furthermore, the situation becomes more difficult if mechanisms for tracking 
and monitoring do not exist. The Joint Parliamentary Oversight and 
Governance Assurance Committee would have assisted in this case to 
implement effective measures to ensure compliance by the executive in 
circumstances where all existing avenues of eliciting a response from the 
executive have been exhausted, especially when it relates to responses 
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required on resolutions adopted by the fourth Parliament and responses to 
questions for written reply’s. 
 
The lack of rules to allow joint reporting by committees on transversal matters 
and the lack of rules on the house to adopt such cluster reports were signs of 
weakness, as Parliament failed to joint resources and expertise from different 
cluster committees in fulfilling its mandate of exercising oversight over the 
executive. 
 
5.2.4 Technology and systems to conduct oversight 
 
In order to evaluate the technology and systems to conduct oversight during 
the fourth Parliament, an evaluation of the budget tool implemented was 
conducted and below is the findings and analysis. The analysis of the budget 
tool and its development is important to enhance the oversight work of 
committees in dealing with the departmental budgets presented before the 
committees. 
 
5.2.4.1 Development of budget vote tool 
 
Findings 
Seventy percent of members of Parliament that responded indicated that no 
budget tool existed to assist members of Parliament in carrying out their 
oversight function. Eight percent indicated that a budget tool existed and 
twenty- two percent did not provide an answer. Eight percent of the respondents 
indicated that the budget tool considered the implications of developments 
around budget oversight work, emanating from the passing of Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. Among issues raised when 
asked to explain were the scrutiny of the fiscal framework and the actual 
amendment of money bills, including the budget. 
 
All respondents did not answer on how the budget tool embraced the values 
and principles by which Parliament conducts oversight, e.g. transparency and 
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accountability. When the question about whether the fourth Parliament put in 
place an information and technology (IT) system for purposes of budget 
oversight, seventy percent responded by indicating that the fourth Parliament 
did not put in place an IT system for the purposes of budget oversight, Eight 
percent said the fourth Parliament did put an IT system in place, while twenty- 
two percent did not provide an answer. 
 
All respondents indicated that a budget tool is necessary to detect and prevent 
poor financial planning and mismanagement of public funds, as well as improve 
accountability of government and public agencies. When asked to explain if 
they believe that a budget tool would assist in detecting waste within the 
machinery of government and public agencies in order to enable Parliament to 
improve the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of government operations, 
all respondents indicated that the budget tool would assist by detecting and 
preventing poor financial planning and mismanagement of public funds and 
improve accountability of the government and public agencies. They also 
indicated that the budget tool ensure delivery on government policies and 
priorities through Parliament budget oversight. 
 
All respondents indicated that they believe that a budget tool can assist 
Parliament to coordinate its activities effectively and deliver on its mandate, 
particularly on its new and extended role in the budget process. All respondents 
indicated that the fourth Parliament did not create a budget information matrix 
for departments to assist in serving as an induction manual containing as much 
information as possible about a department for new members joining a 
Parliamentary committee. 
 
All respondents indicated that the fourth Parliament did not reposition its 
oversight mechanisms to align them with the new extended role of Parliament 
in the budget process. Furthermore, all respondents stated that systems were 
not in place to create appropriate links with the executive, South African 
Revenue Services, South African Reserve Bank and other relevant 
organisations. 
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Analysis 
It is alarming that seventy percent of respondents indicated that no budget tool 
existed and only eight percent acknowledged an existence of a budget tool 
while twenty percent did not answer. Even if a budget tool existed, seventy 
percent definitely did not utilise the budget tool. That only eight percent of the 
respondents confirmed its existence means that it was not a popularly utilised 
tool. In April 2009, Parliament passed the Money Bills Amendment Procedure 
and Related Matters Act, No.9 of 2009 to ensure Parliament is able to exercise 
its constitutional function of amending money bills. The role of Parliament after 
the passing of the act includes the scrutiny of the fiscal framework and the 
actual amendment of money bills, including the budget. This goes beyond 
authorising revenues and expenditures, including monitoring the 
implementation of the national budget. 
 
A budget tool would then assist members of Parliament in carrying out their 
oversight function by ensuring that, for instance, that the budget data including 
changes in the budget vote allocation is made available to members of 
Parliament. The budget tool would assist members of Parliament to get 
simplified information to assist new members of Parliament in conducting their 
oversight function.  The budget tool would assist in detecting waste within the 
machinery of government and public agencies in order to enable Parliament to 
improve the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of government operations. 
The establishment of the Budget Office is a constitutional function of amending 
money bills. The new extended role of Parliament in the budget process i.e. 
scrutiny of fiscal framework and the actual amendment of money bills, including 
the budget, necessitated that the fourth Parliament reposition its oversight 
mechanisms for this extended role. One of the weaknesses of the fourth 
Parliament budgetary oversight function relates to lack of systems to create 
appropriate links with the executive, South African Revenue Services, South 
African Reserve Bank and other relevant organisations.  
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5.2.5 Implementation activities (Practices) 
 
The oversight and accountability implementation activities (practices) to be 
discussed below include mechanisms such as the plenary debates which can 
take the form of questions to the executive, motions without notice, notices of 
motion, budget votes, member’s statements and statements by cabinet 
members. Other mechanisms to be discussed below include petitions; approval 
of annual budget and strategic plans; committee’s role in Parliamentary 
oversight; fiscal oversight; chapter 9 institutions role; and the role of opposition 
on oversight. 
  
5.2.5.1 Plenary debates 
 
The plenary debates as indicated under 3.2.3.1in chapter three are a major 
mechanism through which the concerns of MPs constituents regarding specific 
government programmes and legislation, including improvements on service 
delivery, can be brought to the attention of the executive through plenary 
debates (Parliament, 2009:33). The following methods were employed during 
the fourth Parliament debates, questions to the executive, motions without 
notice, notice of motion, budget votes, members’ statements and statements 
by the cabinet members. 
 
Findings 
Sixty-four percent of respondents claimed that the task of controlling a debate 
in the house was left to the Presiding Officer, six percent indicated that this was 
sometimes the case, twenty-percent choose most of the time, while ten percent 
choose “other”. When asked to specify, they indicated that the task of controlling 
a debate in the house was left to the Chief Whips of political parties and each 
political party leader in the house. 
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Sixty-three percent of respondents believed that during the fourth Parliament, 
subjects of immediate importance were debated in time, with thirty-seven 
percent saying the fourth Parliament did not debate subjects of immediate 
importance in time. Thirty-two percent of respondents indicated that the 
programme of Parliament allowed enough time for debates, while sixty-eight 
percent said it did not allow enough time. Six percent indicated that the smaller 
parties were allocated adequate time during debates and an overwhelming 
ninety-four percent confirmed that smaller parties were not allocated adequate 
time during debates. 
 
When the respondents were requested to rate the standard of debate during 
the fourth Parliament, the responses were as follows: very good – forty-two 
percent; good – six percent; adequate – two percent; poor – fifty percent; and 
very poor –zero percent. 
 
Analysis 
It is evident from the above findings that the fourth Parliament, while it did not 
debate every matter of popularity immediately in the public media, a number of 
subjects of immediate importance were debated. The importance of having the 
Presiding Officer controlling such debates was also not left behind, as indicated 
by sixty-four percent of respondents. 
 
What is concerning is the claim by the respondents that the programme of 
Parliament did not allow enough time for debates, as claimed by sixty-eight 
percent of respondents. Furthermore, it is alarming that the claim by an 
overwhelming ninety-four percent that during the fourth Parliament smaller 
parties were not allocated adequate time during debates. When analysing the 
findings, one wonders how the smaller parties were expected to make 
meaningful contribution during the debates. Fifty percent of respondents 
indicated that the standard of debates during the fourth Parliament was poor 
and forty-two claimed that it was very good. 
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Debates that were of national importance and highly covered by the media 
included the use of the South African Air Force base Waterkloof by the Gupta 
family, relevance of the National Key Points Act in a democratic South Africa 
and the centenary of the 1913 Natives Land Act. 
5.2.5.1.1 Questions to the executive 
 
Findings 
A convincing eight-four percent of respondents were of the opinion that the 
standard of questions and replies during the fourth Parliament were poor. 
However, eight percent indicated that the standard was good, two percent said 
it was very good, and six percent indicated that the standard was adequate.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Standard of questions and replies 
 
When the respondents were asked about the availability of Ministers to reply to 
questions during the fourth Parliament, twenty percent indicated that Ministers 
were always available, twenty two percent said they were mostly available, fifty-
five percent indicated that sometimes they were available, and three percent 
said they were never available to reply to questions. 
 
It was alarming to find that all respondents indicated that no sanctions were put 
in place during the fourth Parliament according to the rules if a question stood 
over more than once. The respondents further indicated that no process was in 
place to deal with unsatisfactory, inadequate or flippant replies. While all 
respondents claimed that supplementary or follow-up questions were allowed, 
it is difficult to understand how they would benefit the fourth Parliament when 
ministers were not frequently available to answer the initial questions posed to 
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84%
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the executive and no sanctions imposed for having questions not answered for 
more than one session.  
 
All respondents indicated that the questions to the President were not treated 
the same as those to the ministers. When asked to specify, the respondents 
were of the opinion that the President is only required to answer questions four 
times and that the questions to the President were first vetted by the Presiding 
Officers while it is not the case on the questions to the ministers. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Ministers availability to reply to questions 
 
Analysis 
According to Yamamoto (2007:49) “a Parliamentary question is, by definition, a 
request for information”. If eighty-four percent of questions and replies during 
the fourth Parliament, as claimed by the respondents, were of poor standard, 
then getting proper and accurate information should have been difficult. Without 
proper and accurate information, decision-making becomes difficult for 
members of Parliament. 
 
Having to deal with a poor standard of questions and replies is already 
problematic, but when also ministers do not avail themselves to reply to 
questions, the constitutional mandate to oversee the executive is compromised. 
The result is an executive that accounts to itself, which is not what the writers 
of the Constitution intended. The lack of rules to deal with unsatisfactory, 
inadequate or flippant replies does not help, as ministers could provide, at their 
own will, vague responses that were inadequate and did not address the 
substance of the question posed to them.  
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Even though all respondents indicated that supplementary or follow-up 
questions were allowed during the fourth Parliament, the availability of ministers 
to reply to questions compromised the oversight and accountability process. 
The President was only required to appear to reply to questions four times a 
year, replying to six questions once per term. In contrast, the Deputy President 
generally replied to questions once every two weeks. 
 
5.2.5.1.2 Motions without notice 
 
Findings 
On the question as to whether motions without notice were technically 
challenging during the fourth Parliament, the statistics revealed that ninety 
percent of respondents were of the opinion that the motions without notice were 
technically challenging. However, ten percent differed from this view. When 
asked to specify those who indicated motions without notice were challenging 
indicated that members repeated what was already adopted by the houses of 
Parliament. Members of Parliament also tend to use the motions without notice 
as an opportunity to give positive exposure to the political party that moves the 
motion without notice. 
 
All respondents indicated that motions without notice needed to be cleared with 
all parties prior to a sitting of the houses. All respondents also pointed that the 
fourth Parliament dealt with congratulatory or general condolence motions 
before the houses. 
 
Analysis 
The motions without notice are a mechanism that members utilise to inform the 
house to deal with a certain matter or to take notice of a particular matter. The 
findings revel that members repeat matters already adopted by the respective 
houses and thus deal with issues that could be dealt with in members’ 
statements, thus prolonging their motions without notice to become speeches. 
The difficulty of that situation is that the houses may find themselves with a 
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motion without notice that goes beyond the constitutional mandate of the 
houses by, for example, instructing the executive to take a certain action, thus 
undermining the separation of power doctrine. 
Parties needed to consult if a member wishing to move a motion without notice 
so that consent could be obtained in advance. The notice to other political 
parties was also to avoid an “ambush” of others in the houses and to ensure 
that the motion without notice was constitutionally and procedurally in order. It 
was the practice of the fourth Parliament to move motions without notice as 
congratulatory or general condolence motions. 
 
5.2.5.1.3 Notices of motion 
 
Findings 
All respondents indicated that Members of the fourth Parliament were allowed 
to bring matters before the Houses for debate through a motion. When 
respondents were asked to indicate the types of motions utilised by the 
members, they identified two types of motions: 
 
 The subject for discussion, which they indicated as a motion that provides 
an opportunity for the houses to debate a particular topic or matter without 
expecting the houses to take a decision at the end of such a debate;  
 The draft resolution, which is a motion that aims for the houses to take a 
decision on a particular matter.  
 
When asked what issues to consider when drafting a motion, the respondents 
mentioned that a motion must: 
 
 Consist of a clear and concise proposed resolution of the House; 
 Deal with a matter within the competence of the house;  
 Deal only  with one matter; 
 Cannot issue instructions to the executive; and  
 Cannot contain statements, quotations or other matters not strictly 
necessary to make the proposed resolution or order intelligible. 
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 All respondents indicated that notices of motion were subject to debate in the 
house. When asked to specify the respondents indicated that all motions were 
subject to the rules of debate of the houses, including the rule on the use of 
offensive or unbecoming language and the sub judice rule. 
 
Analysis 
The fourth Parliament allowed members to bring matters before the houses for 
debate though utilising such mechanisms as notice of motion. Members of the 
fourth Parliament were able to bring matters for debate without the house 
expected to take a decision. They were also afforded an opportunity to bring a 
matter for debate with the expectation to take a decision on a matter. The notice 
of motion was also subjected to the rules of debate of the house, which provides 
guidance on the language acceptable in the houses and how to deal with 
matters that are under the sub judice rule. 
 
5.2.5.1.4 Budget votes 
 
Findings 
Eight-five percent of respondents thought that budget votes are an effective tool 
to oversee the executive actions and planning, while fifteen percent thought the 
opposite. All respondents indicated that no budget was ever rejected by the 
fourth Parliament. All respondents indicated that the consequences of 
Parliament rejecting a budget would be that the current government would be 
expected to resign and would have to call for election of a new government. 
 
Analysis 
Budget votes are a great tool to be utilised for executive oversight in that they 
assist Parliament to improve budget management. During the fourth 
Parliament, no budget was rejected, as this would have led to new elections 
being called. The issue here could also be the lack of capacity to reject the 
budget for fear of initiating the fall of government. The fear to reject the budget 
may also emanate from the reluctance to delay the implementation of policy. 
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5.2.5.1.5 Members statements 
 
Findings 
All respondents indicated that the fourth Parliament utilised member’s 
statements to conduct oversight. All respondents also indicated that members 
of the cabinet were not allowed to make members statements. Furthermore, all 
respondents said that the opportunity to respond to statements directed to them 
or their portfolio was at the expiry of members’ time. This way the executive is 
made to account to Parliament. 
 
Analysis 
Members’ statements are another tool to oversee the executive and ensure that 
members of the executive respond to the brief statements on any matter raised. 
The response to the statement can also be undertaken by the relevant Deputy 
Minister or Minister in the same cabinet cluster. 
 
5.2.5.1.6 Statements by cabinet members 
 
Findings 
Ninety-seven percent of respondents, when asked what kind of statements 
were allowed to be made by cabinet ministers, mention that it should be a policy 
statement related to the government policy and actions of the executive that the 
houses should be made aware of. Three percent of the respondents did not 
provide an answer. When the participants were asked whether they feel that 
members of the cabinet were provided more time compared to members of 
Parliament to make statements, sixty-three percent said yes, while thirty-four 
percent said no, and three percent did not respond. 
 
Analysis 
Statements by cabinet members provide an opportunity for a cabinet minister 
to make “factual or policy” statements relating to government policy that they 
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wish the houses of Parliament should be informed of. The statements by the 
cabinet member is not to be used for party-political purpose (Parliament, 
2004:128) 
 
5.2.5.2 Petitions 
 
Findings 
The handling of the petitions aspect of oversight and accountability was not 
formalised into Parliament oversight process. Two percent of respondents 
stated that the fourth Parliament had have rules that indicate the procedure for 
dealing with petitions of general nature or unsolicited submission, while ninety-
eight percent said there were no such rules. All respondents indicated that the 
committee on Private Members Legislative Proposals and Special Petitions did 
not report to the NA on its activities. In addition all respondents indicated that 
no time frames existed for processing petitions from the date of referral of a 
petition. All respondents chose the written petition as the standard format that 
existed in the fourth Parliament for the public to submit petitions. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Formats for the public to submit Petitions 
 
All respondents indicated that no Petition Act existed during the fourth 
Parliament. When asked how Parliament encourage the public to submit 
petitions, all respondents referred to public education initiatives and in the 
sectoral Parliaments. When asked what happen to the public submissions that 
were received, twenty percent said they were always summarised, eight 
percent said they were passed on to the relevant committee as is, two percent 
said it depends on the specific committee and seventy percent choose “other”. 
100%
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The latter indicated that the rules of the NA were silent on how to process 
unsolicited public submissions, memorandums and representations which were 
at times called “petitions”.  
 
They further indicated that no formal mechanism existed in the NA for the 
processing of the submissions. They further stated that the NCOP did not 
differentiate between the unsolicited submissions and special petitions, as both 
were referred for consideration by the Members Legislative Proposals and 
Petitions Committee. 
 
Analysis 
The Constitution (1996), in terms of section 56 (d) and 69 (d) provides for the 
NA and NCOP to receive petitions. However, the fourth Parliament did not have 
rules in order to indicate the procedure for dealing with petitions of general 
nature or unsolicited submission. It is unfortunate that it should be note that the 
fourth Parliament did not a have a formalised petitions process, either through 
an act of Parliament or its own rules.  
 
In order to ensure that NCOP fulfils its constitutional mandate, it just did not 
distinguish between unsolicited petitions and special petitions, and, as a result, 
referred both for consideration by the Committee on Members Legislative 
Proposals and Petitions. The lack of a petition act causes a lot of confusion on 
how to legally and procedurally process submitted petitions whether they are 
unsolicited public petitions or special petitions. 
 
5.2.5.3 Approval of annual budget and strategic plans 
 
Findings 
During the fourth Parliament, the executive priorities expressed in the MTEF 
were taken into consideration and ensured their alignment with government’s 
plans and performance. In order to ensure that institutional mechanisms are 
effectively undertaken, a Parliamentary Oversight Cycle prescribed the 
Parliamentary process of ensuring that government plans and performance are 
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in line with priorities expressed in the MTEF. All respondents indicated that the 
fourth Parliament always ensured that government plans and performance are 
in line with priorities expressed in the MTEF. 
 
All respondents confirmed that the fourth Parliament had a Parliamentary 
oversight cycle. All respondents also further indicated that the oversight cycle 
took into cognisance the MTEF. The respondents further mentioned that other 
important issues that the oversight cycle took into cognisance, other than the 
MTEF, included the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement; the annual 
Appropriation Bill, the Division of Revenue Act, and legislation relating to and 
guiding the raising of national revenue. 
 
All respondents mentioned that the fourth Parliament did not have a tool in place 
to optimise Parliament’s role in the budget stages. This is important, as the tool 
could have provided means through which the fourth Parliament could have 
monitored the executive delivery over a long period of time, instead of focusing 
on the annual commitments and planning. 
 
Analysis 
The budget cycle is an important tool of oversee the executive with regard to its 
management and expenditure of revenue. The executive accountability cycle 
commences with the initiation of a three year strategic plan that is consistent 
with the MTEF. The budget accountability cycle incorporates a number of 
activities, which informs the oversight process of Parliament. Parliament 
engages the executive departments in a strategic micro-prioritisation process, 
budget process, quarterly report process, annual report process, and the 
strategic oversight intervention processes (SALSA, 2008:17) 
 
5.2.5.4 Committees role in Parliamentary Oversight 
 
Findings 
Committees in a Parliamentary setting are engine rooms of Parliament. They 
claim their existence from the powers provided in terms of the Constitution, 
rules of the NA, rules of the NCOP, the Joint rules of Parliament and resolutions 
taken in the houses to oversee the executive. Forty-five percent of respondents 
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agreed that the programme of the fourth Parliament provided adequate time for 
the implementation of the plans of committees, while fifty-five percent felt 
otherwise. 
 
An overwhelming ninety-four percent of respondents said that the budget 
allocated for committees was not adequate, while six percent indicated that it 
was adequate. All respondents indicated that committees of the fourth 
Parliament played a central role in expressing the Parliament oversight 
mandate and thus they contributed a great deal in ensuring that the executive 
accounted to Parliament. The Parliamentary committees of the pre-democracy 
era were not open to the public and press, a situation that stands in stark 
contrast to the fourth Parliament’s committees that were confirmed as being 
open by all respondents. 
 
The committees of the fourth Parliament, as indicated by all respondents did 
not have formal decision-making power. This means that committees cannot 
take decisions on behalf of the houses, but rather consider matters on behalf of 
the houses by investigating a particular issue and then report to the house on 
their findings for formal decision-making. The alarming issue is that forty-seven 
percent of respondents felt that the reports produced by committees were poor 
in quality. Twenty-three percent of respondents said they were good. Twenty- 
seven percent said they were adequate and three percent said they were very 
poor.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Quality of reports produced by committees 
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In response to how committee reports were dealt with by the houses, the 
respondents indicated that the reports produced by the committees were either 
noted or adopted by the houses. Since the respondents already indicated that 
all most fifty percent of the reports generated by the committees were poor, a 
number would then have to be noted and no action could be taken since the 
reports were not adopted by the houses.  This is confirmed by the respondents 
indicating that if the reports were not adopted or noted by the house, the main 
reason would have been that in sixty percent of times, the reports were of poor 
standard. Thirty-four percent of the times, the reports were not approved by 
Committee Members. Two percent of times, reports were not submitted on time. 
Four percent of the times, reports were not drafted. 
 
Eighty percent of respondents indicated that members were trained in the 
responsibilities and limits of the Parliament oversight mandate, while twenty 
percent differed. All respondents further indicated that committees were 
supported by trained and professional staff. Ninety-three percent of 
respondents indicated that committee chairpersons have no influence over the 
executive. Eighty respondents indicated that during the fourth Parliament there 
was no common understanding among members of Parliament on their role 
and powers of committees with regard to oversight. Twenty percent differed on 
this view. All respondents highlighted that committee members had no research 
capacity to deal with policy issues effectively. 
 
Analysis 
In order for committees to be effective in their oversight function, adequate time 
for implementation of the plans devised by committees should be provided. The 
programme of the fourth Parliament, as indicated by a majority of respondents, 
did not provide adequate time in ensuring that committees conduct their 
oversight work thoroughly. An inadequate budget also made it difficult, if not 
impossible, for committees to fulfil their mandates. Committees, in the course 
of executing their duties, undertake oversight visits to investigate matters, and 
conduct study tours, which require that a sufficient budget be put in place. 
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The opening of committees to the public and the media is great for democracy 
and ensures that public participation is promoted. It is alarming to note that the 
quality of reports of committees was identified as poor by a majority of 
respondents. This is of great concern, as the effectiveness of the oversight visits 
undertaken, is linked to the quality and accuracy of reports produced. According 
to Parliament (2009:39) “Parliament is an institution that relies on information, 
and the success of Parliament depends to great extent on the institution’s 
proficiency in gathering, recording, directing and generating information”. 
 
Once reports have been produced or generated by the committees, they are 
tabled in the houses of Parliament. Not all reports tabled in the houses are 
intended for adoption by the houses, but some are tabled to be noted in the 
houses. It then becomes very difficult, if not impossible, for the houses to adopt 
reports if they are of poor quality. This has a negative effect to the oversight 
mandate of Parliament. The reason for the poor quality of reports is difficult to 
pinpoint, as the respondents indicated that the fourth Parliament committees 
were constituted by members who were trained in the responsibilities and limits 
of the Parliament oversight mandate. All respondents were of the view that 
committees were supported by trained and professional staff. 
 
The lack of influence by committee chairpersons over the executive was a great 
disadvantage for effective oversight on the executive. The relationship between 
the committees and the executive could be characterised by political power 
and, in most cases, the members of the executive are highly ranked party 
members compared to the chairpersons of committees. The lack of political 
power by the committee chairperson could have led to an environment where 
they were not listened to and the views of the executive dominate the 
interaction. Challenged by the power relations between the committee 
chairpersons and the executive members, committees still had to deal with the 
lack of common understanding among members of Parliament on their role and 
the powers of committees with regards to oversight. Members of Parliament 
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were further confronted with the lack of research capacity to deal with policy 
issues effectively, which could also greatly hinder effective oversight. 
 
5.2.5.5 Fiscal oversight 
 
Findings 
Parliament plays a very important role in the preparation of the national budget. 
Therefore, the fourth Parliament was consulted in the preparation of the 
national budget. All respondents confirmed the consultation and when asked 
how Parliament exercised fiscal oversight, thirteen percent of respondents said 
through the examination of the finance bill. Seventeen percent chose “reports 
from the finance committee”, Fifteen percent said through the confirmation and 
approval of the finance bill and five percent chose “field visits”. Fifty percent 
chose “other” and when asked to specify they indicated that Parliament 
conducts fiscal oversight by scrutinising government expenditure, government 
borrowings and revenue (tax), and through administrative principle or legal 
regulation. 
When asked what would happen if Parliament failed to adopt a finance bill, fifty- 
five percent said a temporal budget was used, while forty-five percent said the 
previous budget is renewed. The respondents were further asked how 
Parliament exercised oversight over the execution of the budget and the 
response ranged from the review of government budget documents such as the 
budget strategy paper, budget outlook paper and economic survey, to the 
budget briefs for members of Parliament and policy analysis of revenue 
measures proposed in the budget. 
 
The quality of inputs during oversight over the execution of the budget were 
described as very good by nine percent of the respondents, good by sixty-two 
percent of respondents, fifteen percent described them as adequate, poor by 
nine percent and while five percent indicated that they were very poor.  
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Figure 5.5: Quality of inputs during oversight over the execution of the budget 
 
The respondents were asked what they would propose could be done to 
improve quality of inputs during oversight over the execution of the budget. The 
respondents indicated that more public involvement on policy priorities were 
required in the form of research analysis of micro-priorities that should be made 
available to members of Parliament and previous oversight reports on the 
micro-priorities, annual report and departmental budget be collated and made 
available. 
 
Analysis 
This study’s observations would agree with Carrillo-Florez and Petri (2010:14) 
when they argue that Parliaments ability to intervene actively in the budget 
process, not only in its adoption, but also in its elaboration and in monitoring 
spending is an indication of its effectiveness. In the case of the fourth 
Parliament, consultation mechanisms in the preparation of the national budget 
and Parliament with regard to fiscal oversight were implemented. The 
mechanisms for fiscal oversight included the examination of the finance bill, 
reports from finance committee, through confirmation and approval of the 
finance bill. The fourth Parliament scrutinised government expenditure, 
government borrowings, revenue (tax) and regulation. 
 
9%
62%
15%
9%
5%
Quality of inputs during oversight over the execution of 
the budget
Very good Good Adequate Poor Very poor
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The fourth Parliament did not only concern itself with the formulation of the 
budget but also its execution. On the positive side, the respondents felt that the 
quality of inputs during oversight over the execution of the budget were good 
by the majority of the respondents. More public involvement on policy priorities 
and the availability of micro-priorities to members could improve the quality of 
inputs during oversight over the execution of the budget. 
 
5.2.5.6 Chapter 9 institutions role 
 
Findings 
Chapter nine of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa shows 
additional institutions created by the Constitution to assist in the Parliament’s 
oversight role, while independent in their role even though reporting to the NA 
on their annual activities and budget. All respondents indicated that the chapter 
9 institutions that existed during the fourth Parliament for oversight and 
accountability were the following: 
 
 Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA);  
 Commission for Gender Equality (CGE);  
 Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Commission);  
 Independent Electoral Commission (IEC);  
 Public Protector (PP); and  
 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). 
 
The President appoints the Auditor-General, Public Protector and Members of 
the South African Human Rights Commission, Commission for Gender Equality 
and Electoral Commission. This is done based on the recommendations of the 
NA. The respondents indicated that even though the Chapter 9 Institutions were 
constitutional bodies, their relationship with Parliament was that firstly they 
account to the NA by tabling their annual reports, which were then referred to 
the portfolio committees that deal with that particular oversight matter. Such 
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reports are a source information to be utilised by Parliament in enhancing its 
oversight mandate. 
 
When the respondents were asked if the fourth Parliament gave enough value 
and attention to the reports of Chapter 9 Institutions, fourteen percent of the 
respondents said very often, twenty-seven percent said often, fifty-two percent 
said not often, and seven percent said never. Eighty percent of respondents 
indicated that only two-three hours was provided to the Chapter 9 Institutions 
for meaningful engagement with portfolio committees, fourteen percent 
indicated that engagements lasted for three-four hours, while six percent said it 
was for one-two hours. All respondents indicated that the institutions were 
independent from Parliament influences. The respondents indicated that for a 
better working relationship with Chapter 9 Institutions to promote oversight and 
accountability, Parliament would have to include the institution in its 
programming so as to give more time for engagements on tabled reports. 
 
Analysis 
According to section 181(5) of the Constitution, the institutions supporting 
constitutional democracy are accountable to the NA and must report on their 
activities and budget at least once a year. In addition, these institutions are 
expected to be independent, impartial and perform their functions without fear, 
favour or prejudice (South Africa, 1996:108). These institutions, even though 
accountable to Parliament, are independent of Parliamentary influence and only 
subject to the Constitution. 
 
It is through the reports of these institutions that Parliament is able to regulate, 
monitor government performance, and hold it account. It was a serious 
challenge when fifty-two percent of the respondents said that the fourth 
Parliament only often gave enough value and attention to the reports of Chapter 
9 Institutions. The other challenge is that of the time allocated in the 
Parliamentary programme for meaningful engagement with portfolio 
committees. Eighty percent of respondents indicated that only two to three 
hours were provided for annual meetings with the Chapter 9 Institutions. 
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The lack of meaningful engagements between Parliament and the various 
institutions supporting democracy was a result of the lack of programming that 
was supposed to include these institutions in the program of Parliament. 
Parliament cannot afford to ignore such reports as they help with gaining a 
specialised perspective on government performance, thus enabling effective 
oversight by Parliament. 
 
5.2.5.7 The role of opposition on oversight 
 
Findings 
According to Schmitz (1988:1) “the division between government and 
opposition is as old as political democracy itself”. In a democracy, the majority 
has the right to make decisions as much as the minority has a right to advocate 
for alternative policies. In the fourth Parliament, no special powers were 
provided constitutionally to the opposition parties in ensuring executive 
accountability. 
 
All respondents indicated that all members of Parliament are obliged to hold the 
executive accountable. This means that holding the executive to account was 
not only the role of the opposition. Sixty-four percent of respondents indicated 
that the party list electoral system has an influence on the manner in which 
oversight was exercised during the fourth Parliament, while forty-six percent 
differed. When asked to specify, the respondents indicated that in most cases 
ordinary members of Parliament avoided confrontation with their senior party 
leaders in fear of not being included in the party election list in the next 
elections. Seventy-five percent of respondents indicated that a mixture of the 
proportional representation electoral system and the constituency-based 
electoral system would be more effective in overseeing the executive. 
Seventeen percent chose the proportional representation electoral system, 
while eight percent chose the constituency-based electoral system. 
All respondents indicated that the relations between the opposition and the 
ruling party were very important for effective oversight during the fourth 
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Parliament. Sixty-two percent of respondents were of the view that opposition 
parties did not receive adequate time and resources to oversee the executive. 
 
Analysis 
Although the role opposition parties is to propose alternative policy to that of 
the ruling or majority party, but the role of ensuring that the executive accounts 
to Parliament is left to all members of Parliament. The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa accords no special powers to the opposition parties in 
ensuring executive accountability. The findings revealed that even though all 
members of Parliament were expected to hold the executive to account, the 
influence of the party list electoral system influence the manner in which 
oversight was exercised during the fourth Parliament. The reason being that 
backbenchers in the houses avoided to confronting their party leaders and 
seniors for fear of being excluded from the party list on the next election period. 
Sensing the challenges imposed by the party list electoral system, a mixed 
electoral system was proposed as most appropriate electoral system for 
effective oversight and executive accountability.  
 
In order for effective oversight to be realised, the relations between the 
opposition and the ruling party were seen as important during the fourth 
Parliament. The opposition during the fourth Parliament was not provided 
adequate time and resources to oversee the executive according to sixty-two 
percent of respondents. 
 
5.2.6 Monitoring and evaluation 
 
Under this section the mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament for 
monitoring and evaluating the implementation of its oversight and accountability 
Constitutional mandate are discussed, by interpreting the findings and later 
providing an analysis of those findings. 
 
5.2.6.1 Monitoring  
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Findings 
On the question on whether the fourth Parliament had any mechanism in place 
for monitoring and tracking the executive responses, thirty-one percent of 
respondents said no, while sixty-nine percent differed. When asked how the 
function of communicating house resolutions to the relevant minister by the 
Presiding Officers soon after their adoption by the house carried out. The 
respondents indicated that the resolutions that require responses were not 
annotated on the Order Paper until the responses requested by the Presiding 
Officers were received.  
 
All respondents indicated that a mechanism was in place for the Presiding 
Officers to request compliance from the relevant minister. The rules of the fourth 
Parliament did not allow for a minister to be called to account in the house for 
non-compliance, according to seventy-seven percent of the respondents, while 
twenty-three percent differed. All respondents indicated that the fourth 
Parliament did not have mechanisms to avail resolutions and compliance with 
outcomes to the houses. All respondents indicated that a database of all 
stakeholders which is updated on an ongoing basis was not kept by the fourth 
Parliament. 
 
The activities that were employed in the monitoring of resolutions during the 
fourth Parliament, as per the responses received, included a register of 
communications, which included date of adoption of the report and the 
expected date of response, which is updated as the letter is dispatched to the 
recipient’s office. Another mechanism involved generating quarterly reports for 
the Presiding Officers on the resolutions communicated and the responses 
received.  
 
The monitoring of responses was done manually according to all responses 
received. In the case of non-compliance, a process was in place to notify the 
Leader of Government Business. The responses indicated that a link did not 
exist in the fourth Parliament between the Leader of Government Business and 
the Parliamentary Liaison Officer to assist with tracking and monitoring to 
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ensure compliance. Ninety-three percent of respondents felt that the monitoring 
system was not effective, while seven percent differed. When asked to explain, 
they indicated that there was no technological system in place, data was not 
updated regularly, with no tracking mechanisms in place and compliance could 
not be forced on the executive. The system could be improved by developing 
an electronic system to track and monitor resolutions adopted by the houses. 
 
Analysis 
It is evident that the fourth Parliament did not have a formal and standardized 
monitoring system for the tracking and monitoring of resolutions and responses 
provided by the executive in order to create a culture of compliance and thus 
leading effective oversight and executive compliance, which could have led to 
effective oversight and executive compliance. According to the UNDP (2002:6) 
“monitoring is a continuing function that aims primarily to provide managers and 
main stakeholders with regular feedback and early indications of progress or 
lack thereof in the achievement of intended results”. The fourth Parliament 
failed to implement proper monitoring mechanisms in terms of the oversight 
standards and expectations as set out in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa. 
 
5.2.6.2 Evaluation 
 
Findings 
Evaluation involves a process of assessment on the work concluded in order to 
measure the impact - whether positive or negative (Scott, 2009:96). It involves 
the review of the strategic objectives and implementation strategies in order to 
achieve the required standard and outcome. The fourth Parliament failed to 
evaluate oversight and accountability programmes including its failures, 
success, efficiency and effectiveness. The fourth Parliament also failed to have 
a specific unit dealing with the aspect of Monitoring and Evaluation. The impact 
of oversight and accountability was not assessed during the fourth Parliament 
according all respondents. Since no evaluation took place, there were no 
recommendations for improvement and incorporate these recommendations 
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into the institutional processes. The fourth Parliament did not have a specific 
unit to deal with the aspect of monitoring and evaluation. All respondents 
indicated that there were no methods for assessing the impact of oversight and 
accountability. 
 
Analysis 
According to Sera and Beaudry (2007:1) “evaluation is the systematic and 
objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, program, or policy, 
and its design, implementation and results”. The objective of evaluation, as 
stated by Kusek and Rist (2004:12) “the aim of evaluation is to determine the 
relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, provide 
information that is credible and useful, and will enable the incorporation of 
lessons learned into the decision- making process of all parties involved”. When 
analysing the findings it becomes clear that the fourth Parliament ignored the 
monitoring and evaluation aspect of management in order to measure the level 
of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and even the sustainability of 
oversight and accountability. A standardised monitoring and evaluation system 
needs to be implemented in Parliament in order to ensure that the inputs, 
activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts are fully monitored and evaluated in 
order to ensure that Parliament learns from its own actions and improves where 
necessary. This should occur as it fulfils and strengthen its constitutional 
mandate to oversee the Executive and hold the Executive to account for its 
action and performance. 
 
5.3 Summary and deductions on the state of oversight and accountability 
in the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa during the fourth 
Parliament 
 
The state of oversight and accountability in Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa during the fourth Parliament involves a number of areas that need 
improvement and strengthening in order to build an effective Parliament with 
solid oversight and accountability mechanisms. In order to ensure that 
Parliament is able to hold the executive to account, thus building an open 
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society that is responsive to the needs of its own people, these gaps need to 
be attended to, as indicated by means of the recommendations in the next 
chapter. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the policy guideline 
that informs the institutional processes and programmes on oversight and 
accountability. The Parliamentary mandate to oversee the executive was 
understood in Parliament and resourced with a budget. The fourth Parliament 
also had a Parliamentary programme in place but did not align itself with the 
established fixed time frames for certain processes of the Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act.  
 
With regard to immunity and code of conduct, members enjoyed immunity from 
prosecution and detention in the chamber and a code of conduct applied to 
members of Parliament as much as to the members of the executive. 
Constitutional, legislative, policy and strategic frame work matters were 
understood by the fourth Parliament. The Parliamentary programme included 
hearings in committees, oral and written questions to the executive, budgetary 
oversight, and debates on departmental reports. The lack of policy as an 
integral aspect of Parliament’s strategic plan in relation to oversight and 
accountability reflects the gaps in business planning and specific 
implementation activities. In terms of institutional arrangements, systems and 
process the indication is that an institutional structure was in place to ensure 
decision making, but it was surprising when the respondents indicated that the 
ultimate political responsibility was in the hands of political parties. The 
institution lacked an administration unit to carry out oversight and accountability 
implementation plans. 
 
The lack of institutional arrangements in terms of processes to be followed in 
conducting oversight and ensuring accountability were concerning, e.g. 
oversight of the Reserve Bank. There were no processes and guidelines for 
interaction and engagement of members of Parliament with ministers on issues 
of public concern. The fourth Parliament did not consider and exploit traditional 
South African mediums such as Lekgotla, Bosberaad and Imbizo for 
engagement on broader complex issues to fulfil its oversight mandate. 
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Parliament did not have electronic or manual systems in place for oversight and 
accountability. There were no database management system, project 
management and planning system, tracking system, e.g. resolution tracking 
system and monitoring and evaluation system, and no communication system 
on oversight and accountability. In addition, in the area of technology and 
systems to conduct oversight, the fourth Parliament did not develop a budget 
vote tool to detect and prevent poor financial planning and mismanagement of 
public funds.  
 
The practical implementation activities of oversight and accountability involved 
debates, which were rated as being of poor standard and the standard of 
questions and replies were identified as poor. No formal regulations were in 
place to formally process submitted petitions. The major constraint was the lack 
standardised petitions process in the fourth Parliament. The role of committees 
was identified as important in Parliamentary oversight, but the quality of reports 
produced by committees was of concern and contributed negatively to effective 
oversight of the executive. 
 
The role of Parliament in the preparation of the national budget was seen as 
important and the quality of inputs during oversight over the execution of the 
budget was seen as good. Chapter 9 Institutions were an additional mechanism 
to assist Parliament in its oversight role but of concern is that the reports of 
these institutions were not given enough value. Furthermore, the time allocated 
for engagement with the institutions was not adequate. Even though the 
opposition parties were not exclusively obliged to hold the executive 
accountable, their role within the context of a collective oversight responsibility 
cannot be ignored. The electoral system and the party list system were 
identified as major negative contributors to effective oversight. The relations 
between the opposition parties and the majority party were seen as of 
importance for effective oversight during the fourth Parliament. Murray and 
Nijzink (2002:133) state that “the problems that South Africa’s young 
legislatures are facing at present are not unique and are similar to those in other 
countries with similar political systems. The issue of executive dominance, the 
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matter of party discipline, the lack of true deliberative decision-making and 
weak networks between members and the public are common complaints 
around the world”.  
 
The challenges of the fourth Parliament in ensuring that the executive accounts 
to Parliament were both practical, political and also coupled with institutional 
weaknesses. The Constitution is our standard for Parliament and the executive 
and the findings indicate that the challenges affect the implementation of the 
oversight mandate and function. The executive was never meant to be an entity 
that controls the people but a tool for the people through roles of government. 
If such weakness as identified in this chapter exist what is then stopping the 
executive from acting outside the Constitution especially when Parliament fails 
to hold the executive accountable. In order to hold the executive accountable is 
to hold them to the standard of our Constitution.  
 
The Constitutions lays out a Parliament that should always form a bastion of 
defence of the Constitution first and the principles enshrined therein. Parliament 
can’t be involved in the violation of the Constitution through not properly 
implementing its oversight function and ensuring executive accountability by 
putting in place strong mechanisms to ensure accountability by the executive.  
 
The next chapter presents recommendations in order to address the challenges 
and gaps identified in chapter five. The next chapter seeks to present realist 
recommendations that can be implemented by future Parliaments to address 
the challenges identified during the fourth Parliament with regard to oversight 
and accountability. The recommendations seek to build a new bridge that will 
ensure accountability as mandated by the Constitution. The recommendations 
will be presented against each subsection stated in chapter five based on the 
findings and analysis discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY 
FORAWARD FOR OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
AFRICA. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 140 
 
 
 
Oversight is the role of Parliament in monitoring and reviewing the policy 
implementation of the executive and its budget, and evaluating the impact of 
implementation. This chapter seeks to find a holistic and practical approach in 
order to address the challenges and shortcomings of oversight and 
accountability identified in the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa during 
the fourth Parliament. The findings point to the lack of systems, processes, 
policies and strategic framework to ensure that Parliament is able to hold the 
executive to account through implementation of its constitutional mandate of 
oversight. The weaknesses identified relate to the following: 
 
 Aspects of Parliamentary mandate;  
 Constitutional, legislative, policy and strategic framework; 
  Institutional arrangements, systems and processes;  
 Technology and systems to conduct oversight;  
 Implementation activities; and  
 Monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Recommendations will be provided for each subsection discussed in chapter 
five, based on the findings and analysis that were considered. The 
recommendations will indicate if further studies are recommended in terms of 
the results of the findings in chapter five. Included in this chapter will also be 
recommendations on how best future studies could overcome the limitations 
experienced by the present study. The chapter will also include a succinct 
overview of the research that was undertaken and conclude by finding out if the 
aims and objectives of the study, as outlined in chapter one were achieved.  
 
6.2  Conclusion 
 
This study’s main objective was to evaluate and assess the oversight and 
accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa. 
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Chapter 1 of the study gives the technical understand of why and how the study 
would be conducted. Chapter 2 discussed the literature review on oversight and 
accountability by first providing a discussion on oversight and accountability 
and related concepts. The discussion involved both the theories and a 
comparative international study of the implementation using a selected number 
of international Parliaments - considering how their cameral structure influences 
oversight and accountability. 
 
In order to generate evidence to prove the research hypothesis, the current 
mechanisms of oversight and accountability in the South African legislative 
context were discussed and their current state was reviewed. The main 
discussion centred on the South African model of oversight and accountability 
and the mechanisms for conducting oversight and accountability in the 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
Once the mechanisms of oversight and accountability in the fourth Parliament 
were reviewed to find their strengths and weaknesses with regard to their 
practical application, a numbers of findings were drawn from the respondents 
and analysed. These findings clearly indicated the strengths and weakness. 
Once the process of reviewing the mechanism employed by the fourth 
Parliament was identified, it become evident that the challenges or weakness 
were much greater than any strengths identified. 
 
The findings were analysed and the weaknesses identified proved and 
supported the hypothesis of the study, namely that the oversight and 
accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa were ineffective, and that MPs did not understand their role, 
function and mandate in overseeing the executive and being able to hold it to 
account for its actions and or lack of action. Once the findings and analysis 
were concluded, the study continued by proposing a number of 
recommendations in order to rectify and improve on the identified challenges 
as a contribution to ensure that the constitutional mandate and provision on 
oversight and accountability can be achieved. 
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6.3  Recommendations 
 
The recommendations presented below are based on the findings and analysis 
on Parliamentary mandate; Constitutional, legislative, policy and strategic 
framework; institutional arrangements, systems and process; technology and 
systems to conduct oversight; implementation activities (practices); and 
monitoring and evaluation. 
 
6.3.1 Parliamentary mandate 
 
The recommendations presented on Parliamentary mandate include the 
beginning and end of Parliament; Parliamentary programme and oversight 
function; immunity and code of conduct: 
 
6.3.1.1 Beginning and end of Parliament 
a) Members of Parliament and staff should be trained on the mechanisms 
to conduct oversight and accountability at the beginning of each 
Parliament.  
b) The emphasis of the training should be on the responsibilities of each 
Member of Parliament regardless of political party affiliation. 
c) The training should also be on how to utilise Parliamentary budget 
allocation for oversight and accountability. 
6.3.1.2 Parliamentary programme and oversight function 
a) Sharper focus on legislation such the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure and Related Matters Act, which determines fixed timeframes 
for certain processes, is required. 
b) Programme Committees should be mindful of the Medium Term Budget 
Policy Statement (MTBPS), the processing of the Division of Revenue 
Bill (DoRB), and the Main Appropriation Bill, which require a different 
programming approach. 
 
6.3.1.3 Immunity and code of conduct 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 143 
 
 
a) The immunity and code of conduct should separate the privileges 
applied to members of Parliament and those awarded to the members 
of the Executive, as their role and responsibilities differ on matters of 
oversight and accountability. 
 
6.3.2 Legislative, policy and strategic framework 
 
The recommendations aligned to the legislative, policy and strategic framework 
include oversight and accountability function; legislative, policy and strategic 
framework which are presented below: 
 
6.3.2.1 Oversight and accountability function 
a) Alignment of the programme of Parliament with that of the executive. 
 
6.3.2.2 Legislative, policy and strategic framework 
a) Develop an institutional policy on oversight and accountability. 
b) A business plan should be compiled annually for oversight and 
accountability and it must be linked to specific implementation activities. 
c) Separate the legislation mandate of Parliament from the oversight 
mandate in the strategic plan so that the oversight function can be have 
clear programmes in support of the strategic plan. 
d) Set clear strategic outcome-orientated goals for the total term of office. 
6.3.3 Institutional arrangements, systems and process 
 
The institutional arrangements, systems and process findings are presented 
with recommendations on issues of structure; process; systems, processes and 
resources; and executive compliance. 
 
6.3.3.1 Institutional arrangements- structure 
a) A clear indication be provided on political responsibility for oversight and 
accountability with the structure of Parliament. 
b) An oversight advisory unit to facilitate oversight in the houses of 
Parliament and its committees should be established. 
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6.3.3.2 Institutional arrangements-processes 
a) Review the Reserve Bank Act to require the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank to explicitly report to Parliament on the implementation of monetary 
policy and to submit the audited financial statements and the audit report 
on those statements to Parliament. 
b) Review the powers and functions of the Reserve Bank and subject them 
to conditions determined by an act of Parliament. 
c) An operational plan should be developed that will put a formal process 
in place for oversight and accountability implementation activities and it 
should include guidelines on the resources needed for effective 
oversight and accountability. 
d) Consideration is given to the use of traditional South African mediums, 
including Lekgotla, Bosberaad and Imbizo, for deliberation, engagement 
and debates on broader and complex issues affecting oversight and 
accountability. 
e) A process is developed for processing of reports from sectoral 
Parliaments and ensuring that the reports are tabled before the houses 
for consideration and adoption. 
f) Sectoral Parliament should be formally recognised in the rules and that 
provision should be made for their procedures, powers and functions. 
g) In order to oversee compliance with international agreements, rules must 
be drafted to allow Parliamentary committees to report on the 
international engagements by the executive. 
h) The processing of petitions of a general nature or unsolicited 
submissions should be explained in the rules. 
 
6.3.3.3 Systems, processes and resources 
a) Develop a business case implementation plan for the facilitation, 
monitoring and tracking of oversight and accountability resolutions. 
b) The lack of database management system has an adverse effect, so it 
is recommended that Parliament develop a comprehensive electronic 
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project management system, database management system and 
planning system. 
c) A strategic framework for communication should be developed to ensure 
that oversight and accountability activities are shared with the broader 
community. Internal and external communication aspects should be 
included in the strategy and system. 
 
6.3.3.4 Executive compliance 
a) Develop Parliamentary rules to assist Parliament further in sanctioning 
members of the executive for non-compliance after all established 
existing avenues and protocols have been exhausted. 
b) Develop a procedure for the executive compliance in order to improve 
on mechanisms that would ensure that there is reporting on responses 
by the executive on resolutions adopted by Parliament. 
c) NA rule 117 and NCOP rule 249, which provide a time frame for the 
executive to respond to a question for written reply, be amended to 
extend the timeframe for a response to twenty one days. 
d) A Joint Parliamentary Oversight and Government Assurance Committee 
should be established to implement effective measures to ensure 
compliance by the executive in the event that all existing avenues of 
eliciting a response from the executive have been exhausted. Its 
mandate would also be to consider and report on all assurances, 
undertakings and commitments given by members of the national 
executive in either house or in any committee of a house of Parliament. 
e) Notwithstanding the existing rules on conferral, but where committees 
are clustered for oversight, they should be able to report jointly on 
transversal matters and the house should adopt such cluster report. 
There would be a need for the NCOP rules committee to amend rules 
101 and 104 of the NCOP to allow for conferring committees to publish 
a joint report. 
 
6.3.4 Technology and systems to conduct oversight 
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The recommendation on technology and systems to conduct oversight is 
presented below: 
 
6.3.4.1 Development of budget vote tool 
a) Develop a budget tool in order to assist MPs in carrying out their 
oversight function. The tool is to ensure that budget data, such as the 
changes in budget vote allocations and the relative proportion of the 
programmatic allocation, is readily available to both MPs and officials to 
carry out Parliament’s oversight effectively. 
 
6.3.5 Implementation activities (Practices) 
 
Recommendations on the mechanisms and practices to conduct oversight 
include the following: 
 
6.3.5.1 Plenary debates 
a) Parliament to provide training to MPs on public speaking as measure to 
address the noted decline on the quality of debates in Parliament. 
b) MPs must be encouraged to deliver their speeches in their mother 
tongue. 
c) MPs should be encouraged to do research to take steps to improve the 
content and substance of debates. 
d) The programme of Parliament should be structured in such a way that it 
provides enough time for debates. 
 
6.3.5.1.1 Questions to the executive 
a) An appeal mechanism should be developed that will give the Presiding 
Officer the power to insist that a members of the executive responds to 
a question adequately.  
b) Questions to the President should be treated like all other questions and 
thus removing the vetting of questions to the President. 
c) Parliament should introduce four fifteen-minute interpellations per 
question day to ensure robust debates in Parliament. 
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6.3.5.1.2 Motions without notice 
a) Parliament to re-train its members and table staff in houses on motions 
without notice, i.e. procedure and rules regarding motions without 
notice. 
 
6.3.5.1.3 Notices of motion 
a) In order to ensure effective oversight of the executive, the notice of 
motion should be able to give instructions to the executive subject to a 
resolution being taken by the house of Parliament. 
 
6.3.5.1.4 Budget votes 
a) MPs should be trained and capacitated on budget processes to allow 
them to be able to reject a budget and be able to defend the decision. 
 
6.3.5.1.5 Members statements 
a) The programme of Parliament should increase the time allocated for 
member’s statements in the Houses. The response statement should 
only be done by the Minister or Deputy Minister responsible for the 
department being overseen, not by a representative. 
6.3.5.1.6 Statements by Cabinet Members 
a) The programme of Parliament should allocate more time for members 
statements than statements by cabinet members to ensure that it is the 
cabinet that answers questions to Parliament, instead of giving 
statements that can be dealt with at other Parliamentary platforms. 
 
6.3.5.2 Petitions 
a) The processing of special petitions is already covered in the NA rules. 
A decision now needs to be taken about whether a procedure for dealing 
with petitions of a general nature or unsolicited submissions should be 
written into the joint rules of Parliament. 
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b) In the absence of any time frames for the processing of petitions, a 
proposal could be put forward for the committee to report to the NA and 
NCOP within thirty days from the date of referral of a petition. 
c) It is time for Parliament to create an opportunity on its website for the 
public to submit an e-petition. 
d) Parliament should make a decision about whether the constitutional 
provision and the Rules of the houses in regard to petitions are sufficient 
or whether a legislation is required. Whatever decision is taken, the 
constitutional provisions relating to the facilitation of public involvement 
by the houses in the legislative and other processes of the houses and 
their committees must be upheld. 
 
6.3.5.3 Approval of annual budget and strategic plans 
a) Develop a system that enables Parliament to keep of all work that is 
done on the budget and ensure that such information and the strategic 
plans are fully utilised when the next financial year budget is approved. 
 
6.3.5.4 Committees role in Parliament Oversight 
a) Parliament should focus on improving the quality of reports produced by 
committees by providing training on report formulation. 
b) MPs should be trained on the responsibilities and limits of Parliament’s 
oversight mandate in order to reduce or eliminate inappropriate 
recommendations being made in reports. 
c) The issue of power relations between committee chairpersons and the 
executive should be addressed at a political level. 
 
6.3.5.5 Fiscal oversight 
a) Mechanisms should be put in place that requires that Parliament request 
the executive to ensure that there is more public involvement on policy 
priorities. 
 
6.3.5.6 Chapter 9 Institutions role 
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a) Parliament should ensure that the interaction between Parliament and 
chapter 9 institutions is not restricted to annual meetings of about two-
three hours. 
b) Parliament to utilise the reports of Chapter 9 Institutions to full potential 
in order to ensure a higher level of accountability by the executive. 
 
6.3.5.7 The role of opposition on oversight 
a) A mixture of the proportional representation electoral system and the 
constituency-based system should be introduced in order to ensure that 
the country benefits from the positives of the two electoral systems. 
b) Adequate time be provided for the minority voice to be heard. 
 
6.3.6 Monitoring and evaluation 
 
The proposed recommendation on monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of oversight and accountability is presented below: 
 
6.3.6.1 Monitoring and evaluation 
a) The monitoring of executive responses should be done through an 
electronic system. 
b) The system should be able to capture letters that are sent to the 
executive, the responses received, and the time responses were 
received. 
c) The system could be developed to provide a reminder on specific 
functionaries at specific times. 
d) The system could also be set to produce a consolidated monthly report 
on all communications, which will be the basis of the report on 
outstanding responses sent to the Presiding Officers. 
 
The recommendations are not in particular order of importance, but could 
address the challenges pertaining to oversight and accountability. The fifth 
Parliament and subsequent Parliament could improve on how the mandate of 
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oversight and executive accountability was handled by implementing the 
recommendations. 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
Chapter 1 of the study introduced the study by stating the research problem, 
clarify the rationale of the study, and providing research questions. An overview 
of the research design and methodology is provided in this chapter, followed by 
a research report sequence as an outline of the study’s content. In chapter 2, 
the study defined oversight and accountability and the related concepts. A 
theoretical perspective was created in order to bring a global understanding to 
the concepts of oversight and accountability. This was achieved by providing 
an international comparison where a number of selected Parliaments from 
diverse economic and political backgrounds were considered. The key issue 
derived from the literature review was that oversight and accountability were 
linked to a democratic culture and strong commitment by those in power to put 
the interest of the people first. 
 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of oversight and accountability in the South 
African context and how it is implemented the South African legislative context. 
The study discussed the South African model of oversight and accountability, 
specifying the constitutional provisions that refer directly and indirectly to 
oversight and accountability. Furthermore, Chapter 4 considered the policy 
framework for oversight and accountability in South Africa and clarified the 
mechanisms for conducting oversight and accountability in the Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa. 
 
Chapter 4 gave an in-depth discussion and information to the kind of research 
design chosen and the methodology to be followed. The study employed a 
quantitative research approach by utilising a questionnaire, covering aspects of 
and the mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament in conducting oversight 
and ensuring the Executive’s accountability. The study also utilised a literature 
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review based on published sources. The questionnaire was piloted before being 
administered to the rest of the sample 
 
Chapter 5 served as the basis for testing the hypothesis relating to the 
mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament to conduct oversight and 
accountability. An investigative study was conducted on the state of oversight 
and accountability during the fourth Parliament. The findings revealed a number 
of challenges and weaknesses that points to a situation that is not assisting in 
living to the standards that are set in the Constitution. The findings covered the 
main operational, constitutional and strategic aspects relating to the 
constitutional mandate of oversight and accountability. These aspects included 
the Parliamentary mandate; constitutional, legislative, policy and strategic 
framework; institutional arrangements; systems and process; technology and 
systems to conduct oversight; and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
After the findings and analysis were discussed in chapter five, chapter six 
focused on the recommendations related to the mechanisms employed by the 
fourth Parliament in relation to oversight and accountability. 
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      Annexure 1 
 
 
    
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Evaluation of oversight and accountability by the fourth Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa                                   
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To inform the process of data consolidation and assessment, in terms of which 
a gap identification (swot analysis) will be done leading to findings and 
recommendations on implementation of the constitutional provisions on 
oversight and accountability implementation in the Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
2015 Oversight and Accountability Survey 
  (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa) 
 
 
The purpose of the questionnaire itself is to evaluate the extent to which 
oversight and accountability has been implemented during the term of the fourth 
Parliament (2009 -2014). 
 
Kindly answer as accurate and objectively as you can and add additional 
comments should writing space not suffice. 
 
This questionnaire has to be completed by a Member of Parliament during the 
fourth Parliament (2009 -2014) 
 
The questionnaire is expected to take less than one hour to complete.  
 
Please return the questionnaire to Mr L Mbete by e-mail: 
lmbete@parliament.gov.za   or fax to: 086 218 1688 
 
 
       Due date: 28 August 2015 
     
  Contact information 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 164 
 
 
 
Name of respondent (OPTIONAL): __________________________________ 
 
Position (2009 -2014):____________________________________________ 
 
Contact number:  ______________________________________________ 
 
Fax number:   ______________________________________________ 
 
E-mail address (OPTIONAL): ______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Please circle or tick the appropriate answer/s. 
Section 1: Parliamentary Mandate 
Beginning and end of parliamentary mandate 
 
1.1 When did the Parliamentary mandate of the fourth Parliament start for 
Members of the fourth Parliament?   
 When the election results were declared 
 At the first sitting of the chamber 
 When the new Members were sworn in 
 At a fixed date (please specify the date) ____________________ 
 Other (please specify other) _____________________________ 
 
1.2  When did the Parliamentary mandate of outgoing Members end? 
 On the last day of the chamber’s term (including early dissolution 
before expiry of its term) 
 On the day of new elections 
 After the new Members mandates are validated 
 On the first seating of the chamber 
 At a fixed date (please specify the date)____________________ 
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 Other (please specify other)_____________________________ 
 
Immunity and code of conduct 
1.3  Did the Parliamentarians enjoy immunity from prosecution or detention 
while in the chamber?       
         Yes No 
 
1.4 Was a code of conduct in place during the fourth Parliament for Members 
of Parliament?        
        Yes No 
Other (please specify) _______________________________________ 
 
1.5 Did the code of conduct apply to Members of the executive? Yes No 
1.6 Was there a separate code of conduct for Members of the executive?              
Yes No 
Section 2: Constitutional mandate and responsibilities 
Oversight and accountability function 
 
2.1. Was the function of oversight and accountability important to the fourth                         
Parliament? (Debates, Questions, Motions, etc.)    Yes No 
(Please elaborate on your chosen answer) 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
2.2. Did Parliament have powers to summon senior government officials?         
Yes No 
 
 
2.3. Did Parliament have powers to summon Members of the Executive?  
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Yes No 
 
2.4. Did Parliament have powers to summon chapter 9 institutions? Yes  No
    
 
2.5. Did Parliament have powers to approve key Executive appointments?  
Yes No 
 
2.5.1 If yes, were all Executive appointments during the fourth Parliament 
approved by Parliament?      Yes No
      
2.6. How many oral questions were submitted to the Executive from  
2009 - 2014 
 
2009:_____2010:_____2011:______ 2012:______ 2013:___2014:___ 
2.7. How many written questions were submitted to the Executive from  
2009 -2014 
  
2009:_____2010:_____2011:______ 2012:______ 2013:_____ 2014:___ 
 
2.8. How many oral replies were provided by the Executive from  
2009 -2014 
  
2009:_____2010:_____2011:______ 2012:______ 2013:_____ 2014:___ 
 
 
2.9. How many written questions were answered by the Executive from  
2009-2014              
  
2009:_____2010:_____2011:______ 2012:______ 2013:_____ 2014:__ 
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2.10 Who should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that oversight               
and accountability takes place in the legislative process? (Circle your 
choice/s) 
 The Members of Parliament individually 
 Political Parties 
 Parliament administration/Secretary to Parliament 
 Presiding Officers (Speaker/Chairperson) 
 A mixture of all the above 
 
2.11. Who took ultimate political responsibility for oversight and accountability 
during the fourth Parliament? (Circle your choice/s) 
 Presiding Officers (Speaker/Chairperson) 
 Parliament administration /Secretary to Parliament 
 Various Committee Chairpersons 
 Members of Parliament individually 
 Other (Please mention)  
 
2.12. Was there a structure (political and administrative) working well for 
effective oversight and accountability?     Yes     No 
 
If no, what structural changes did you suggest for greater effectiveness? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
2.13. Did Parliament have a budget for oversight and accountability? 
         Yes     No 
 
2.14. If yes, how much was the budget per annum? (Please provide figures 
since 2009) 
2009:_____2010:______2011:_____2012:_____2013:_____2014:_____ 
 
2.15. If there was no budget or an insufficient budget, how were oversight and 
accountability activities financed? (Committee site visits, etc.) 
 Not financed 
 Commercial sponsorship (mention) _______________________ 
 Donor funds (mention) _________________________________ 
 Other (please mention)  ________________________________ 
 
2.16. What did the fourth Parliament’s oversight and accountability 
programme involve or entail? Please provide a short description of all 
the elements of the programme.  
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
2.17. Did the Parliamentary programme align itself with the established fixed 
time- frames for certain processes of the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure and Related Matters Act e.g. Medium Term Budget Policy 
Statement (MTBPS), the processing of the Division of Revenue Bill 
(DoRB) and the Main Appropriation Bill?    Yes No 
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2.18. Was the programme of Parliament and that of the Executive, where 
possible aligned with each other?     Yes No 
 
2.19. Was the programme of Committees drafted in such a way as to 
accommodate the provisions of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure 
and Related Matters Act?      Yes No 
 
2.20. Did the programme of Parliamentary Houses (NA/NCOP) create more 
time for consideration of Committee reports as well as private Member’s 
business (e.g. motions)?       
       Yes No 
 
Section 3: Institutional arrangements, systems and processes 
Institutional arrangements –structure 
 
3.1. Was a sub-project developed to pursue the review of the Reserve Bank 
Act for purposes of aligning the Act with the Constitution in order for 
Parliament to exercise oversight over the bank?   Yes No 
 
3.2. Did an operational plan exist that outlined the processes and resources 
required for conducting oversight?    Yes No 
 
3.3. Do you think that adequate institutional support to Members of 
Parliament was provided to enable them to perform their mandates?
         Yes No 
 
3.4. Did Parliament have facilities in Parliament for office space for Members 
of Parliament?        
        Yes No 
 
3.5. How adequately sized and well-equipped were the Committee rooms in 
the fourth Parliament?      Yes No 
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3.6. Was the parking space adequate enough to accommodate the Members 
of Parliament, Parliamentary Officials, visiting dignitaries, Executive 
Members and the public?       
       Yes No 
 
3.7. Did the fourth Parliament develop guidelines for the interaction and 
engagement of Members of Parliament with Ministers on issues of public 
concern?         
        Yes No 
 
3.8. Did the fourth Parliament consider traditional South African mediums 
such as Lekgotleng, Bosberaad and Imbizo for deliberation, debates and 
engagement on broader and complex issues, so as to fulfil its oversight 
function over the executive?       
        Yes No 
 
3.9. What was the procedure followed during the fourth Parliament on 
processing of reports from sectoral Parliaments? 
 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
3.10. Were the sectoral Parliament e.g. Women’s Parliament, formally 
recognised in the rules of Parliament (in terms of their procedures, 
powers and functions)?      Yes No 
 
3.11. Did the rules of Parliament during the fourth Parliament provide for 
robust and proactive oversight over the Executive signing of international 
agreements that require approval of the Houses?   
       Yes No 
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3.12. Did the rules of the respective Houses of Parliament, provide for the 
Executive to report on negotiations, prior to signing of international 
agreements that require approval of the Houses?  Yes No 
 
3.13. Did the fourth Parliament have mechanisms in place to oversee 
compliance with international agreements?   Yes No 
 
3.14. Were general petitions, representations and submissions as specified in 
section 56 and 69 of the Constitution adequately addressed through 
institutionalised mechanisms?      Yes No 
 
 
Executive compliance 
 
3.15. What rules of Parliament assisted in sanctioning Members of the 
Executive for non-compliance after all established existing avenues and 
protocols have been exhausted? 
 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
   
3.16. What mechanisms were in place to ensure that there is reporting on 
responses by the Executive on resolutions adopted by the fourth 
Parliament? 
 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
3.17. Did the fourth Parliament employ a tracking and monitoring mechanism 
on the Executive compliance as part of its continuous oversight function? 
          
        Yes No 
3.18. Was a Joint Parliamentary Oversight and Government Assurance 
Committee appointed to consider and report on all assurances, 
commitments and undertakings given by Members of the Executive in 
either Houses or Committee of a House?    
         Yes No 
3.19. Do you think that in order to enforce compliance with question for written 
reply, the review of NA rule 117 and NCOP rule 249 would had been 
necessary to change the period for responding in writing by the 
Executive from 10 days? 
 
(Please explain your view):                                                                        
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
3.20. Did the rules of Parliament allow for joint reporting by Committees on 
matters that are transversal and the House to adopt such a cluster 
report?        Yes No 
 
3.21. How do you think joint reporting by Committees on matters that are 
transversal, benefits or does not benefit Parliament in fulfilling its 
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mandate on exercising oversight over the Executive especially during 
the fourth Parliament? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Section 4: Technology and Systems to conduct oversight  
Development of budget vote tool 
    
4.1. Did a budget tool exist to assist Members of Parliament in carrying out 
their oversight function?      Yes No 
 
4.2. If the budget tool existed did it consider the implications of developments 
around budget oversight work emanating from passing of Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act?   
        Yes No  
 
Please explain: 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
4.3. How did the budget tool embrace the values and principles by which 
Parliament conducts oversight, e.g. transparency and accountability? 
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________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
4.4. Did the fourth Parliament put in place an Information and Technology 
(IT) system for the purposes of budget oversight?  Yes No 
 
4.5. Is a budget tool necessary to detect and prevent poor financial planning 
and mismanagement of public funds, as well as improve accountability 
of the government and public agencies?    Yes No 
 
4.6. Please explain if you believe that a budget tool would assist in detecting 
waste within the machinery of government and public agencies in order 
to enable Parliament to improve the efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness of government operations. 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
4.7. Do you believe that a budget tool can assist Parliament to effectively 
coordinate its activities and deliver on its mandate, particularly on its new 
and extended role in the budget process?   Yes No 
 
4.8. Did the fourth Parliament create a budget information matrix for 
departments to assist in serving as an induction manual containing as 
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much information as possible about a department for new Members 
joining a Parliamentary Committee?    Yes No 
 
4.9. Were the oversight tools repositioned during the fourth Parliament to 
align them to the new extended role of Parliament in the budget process? 
           
        Yes No 
 
4.10. Were systems in place to create appropriate links with the Executive, 
South African Revenue Services, South African Reserve Bank and other 
relevant organisations?       
        Yes No 
 
 
Section 5: Monitoring and evaluation 
 
Monitoring and Executive compliance 
 
5.1. Please explain how important was for the fourth Parliament to put in 
place an  oversight advisory section, to support services relating to 
monitoring and tracking of issues between Parliament and the Executive. 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
5.2. Did a subdivision of the oversight advisory section exist to develop 
systems for scrutiny of finances in the executive including, planning 
cycle, budget cycle, estimates cycle and reporting cycle? Yes No 
 
5.3. How was the function communicating adopted Committee 
recommendations to the relevant Minister carried out? 
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________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
5.4. Were resolutions that require responses within a specified period 
annotated on the Order Paper until the responses addressed to the 
Speaker or Chairperson were received?    Yes No 
 
5.5. Were quarterly reports and annual report on resolutions and compliance 
with outcomes made available to the Parliamentary Houses?  
          
      Yes No 
 
5.6. Was the monitoring of responses from the Executive done 
electronically?        Yes No    
  Thank you for completing the questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
         Email or Fax to: Luvuyo Mbete 
                                
                              Email:lmbete@parliament.gov.za 
                                   Fax nr: (086) 615 9555 
 
 
RE: QUESTIONNAIRE ON EVALUATION OF  OVERSIGHT   AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY DURING THE FOURTH PARLIAMENT 2009 - 2014 
 
Kindly email or fax the completed questionnaire to Luvuyo Mbete by 28 
August 2015 
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            Enquiries: Luvuyo Mbete, Tel: 021 – 403 2516, Cell: 082 962 3728 
 
*Parts of the questionnaire are from Scott (2009) “an analysis of public 
participation in the South African legislative sector” have been utilised 
 
 
  
      Annexure 2 
 
 
    
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the oversight and accountability by the fourth Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa                                   
                     
 
 
To inform the process of data consolidation and assessment in terms of which 
a gap identification (swot analysis) will be done leading to findings and 
recommendations on implementation of the constitutional provisions on 
oversight and accountability implementation in the Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa.  
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2015 Oversight and Accountability Survey 
  (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa) 
 
The purpose of the questionnaire itself is to evaluate the extent to which 
oversight and accountability has been implemented during the term of the fourth 
Parliament (2009 -2014). 
 
Kindly answer as accurate and objectively as you can and add additional 
comments should writing space not suffice. 
 
This questionnaire has to be completed by Manager responsible for oversight 
and accountability in the fourth Parliament (2009 -2014).  
Please return the questionnaire to Mr L Mbete by e-mail: 
lmbete@parliament.gov.za  fax to: 086 218 1688 
 
    Due date: 28 August 2015 
     
  Contact information 
 
Name of respondent: _____________________________________________ 
 
Position (2009 -2014):____________________________________________ 
 
Contact number: ________________________________________________ 
 
Fax number: ___________________________________________________ 
 
E-mail address: _________________________________________________ 
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Section 1: General 
   Please circle or tick the appropriate answer/s. 
 
1.1 Did the fourth Parliament have a Parliamentary programme that 
encouraged oversight and accountability?    
         Yes No 
 
1.2 Did the Parliamentary programme align itself with the established fixed 
time frames for certain processes of the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure and Related Matters Act e.g. Medium Term Budget Policy 
Statement (MTBPS), the processing of the Division of Revenue Bill 
(DoRB) and the Main Appropriation Bill?     
         Yes No 
 
1.3 Who should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that oversight 
and accountability takes place in the legislative process? (Circle your 
choice/s) 
 The Members of Parliament individually 
 Political Parties 
 The institution of Parliament/Parliament administration 
 Presiding Officers (Speaker/Chairperson) 
 A mixture of all the above 
 
1.4 Why is oversight and accountability important to Parliament? (debates, 
Questions, Motions, etc) 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
1.5 What is the basis from which you conducted oversight and accountability 
in Parliament? (E.g. Constitution, oversight and accountability strategy 
etc.) 
 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
1.6 Did Parliament have a budget for oversight and accountability? 
          Yes     No 
 
1.7 If yes, how much was the budget per annum? (Please provide figures 
since 2009) 
2009 ____________________________________________________ 
2010 ____________________________________________________ 
2011 ____________________________________________________ 
2012 ____________________________________________________ 
2013 ____________________________________________________ 
2014 _________________________________________________ 
 
1.8 If there was no budget or an insufficient budget, how were oversight and 
accountability activities financed? (Committee site visits, etc.) 
 Not financed 
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 Commercial sponsorship (mention) _______________________ 
 Donor funds (mention) _________________________________ 
 Other (please mention)  ________________________________ 
 
 
 
Section 2: Legislative, policy and strategic framework 
 
2.1 Did a policy exist relating to oversight and accountability?   
          Yes No 
 
2.2 Was oversight and accountability an integral aspect of Parliament’s 
strategic plan?               
         Yes No 
 
2.3 Did a long-term oversight and accountability strategy and 
implementation plan exist in the fourth Parliament?        
          Yes No  
 
2.4 Did the fourth Parliament compile an annual business plan for oversight 
and accountability linked with specific implementation activities?  
     
 Yes No 
 
2.5 What did the fourth Parliament’s oversight and accountability 
programme involve or entail? Please provide a short description of all 
the elements of the programme.  
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 3: Institutional arrangements, systems and processes 
 
Institutional arrangements –structure 
 
3.1 Who took ultimate political responsibility for oversight and accountability 
during the fourth Parliament? (Circle your choice/s) 
 
 Presiding Officers (Speaker/Chairperson) 
 Secretary to Parliament 
 Various Committee Chairpersons 
 Other (Please mention)  
 
3.2 In which office was the programme on oversight and accountability 
located? (E.g. Speaker’s Office, Chairperson’s Office, Secretary’s 
Office, etc.) 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.3 Was there a political structure in place dealing with oversight and 
accountability implementation? If yes, please mention the name. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.4 What was the role of this structure in terms of oversight and 
accountability in the fourth Parliament? 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
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3.5 Was there a specific administrative unit in place to carry out oversight   
and accountability implementation?     
         Yes  No 
3.6 What was the role of this unit in terms of oversight and accountability? 
 
 
 
3.7 Where did this unit fit into the reporting and management structure of the 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa? (Organogram or description) 
 
 
 
3.8 How many staff were employed in the unit? (Mention permanent and 
contract staff) 
 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.9 What were their responsibilities? (Give an overview) 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.10 Have they had special training in the area of oversight and accountability 
or relevant areas such as legislation and oversight, Committees, 
legislation and proceedings, parliamentary questions, research, 
procedural services, money bills amendment procedure and related 
matters and budget and provincial and municipal governance, 
mechanism to deal with delegated legislation etc.? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
3.11 What qualifications did your oversight and accountability staff Members 
generally possess? (E.g. legislation and oversight, Committees, 
legislation and proceedings, parliamentary questions, research, 
procedural services, money bills and budget and provincial and 
municipal governance, etc.? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.12 How well were they coping with the volume of work?  (Circle your 
choice/s) 
 Very well 
 Well 
 Average 
 Barely coping 
 Not coping at all 
 
3.13 When oversight and accountability is conducted, did other units also get 
involved in the process? If yes, please mention them and the role that 
they played in the process.  
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.14 Who was the accounting officer for any expenditure on oversight and 
accountability? 
______________________________________________________________ 
3.15 Where was the oversight and accountability office physically located? 
(Please describe) 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.16 How accessible was the office to ordinary people, civic organisations and 
Members of Parliament?  (Circle your choice/s) 
 Very accessible 
 Fairly accessible 
 Not very accessible 
 Not accessible at all 
Please explain your choice 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.17 How did the oversight and accountability process work in Parliament (per 
activity)?-please describe or draw line diagram. 
 
 Examples 
 All Committees deal with oversight and accountability 
 Oversight and accountability unit carries out wishes of 
Committees /NA/NCOP 
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 Oversight and accountability Committee instructs oversight and 
accountability unit 
 Oversight and accountability unit determines activities 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
3.18 Was the structure (political and administrative) working well for effective 
oversight and accountability? If no, what structural changes did you 
suggest for greater effectiveness? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.19 Was there an adequate number of staff in the oversight and 
accountability unit in order for it to function optimally? If no, what 
additional staff would you have liked to see appointed? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.20 Did staff Members require specific training in order to improve or 
optimise their performance? If yes, please mention type of training 
required. 
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
Systems, processes and resources 
 
3.21 In terms of information and communication technology, did Parliament 
have electronic (software) or manual systems in place for oversight and 
accountability?         
         Yes No 
If yes, please mention whether manual or electronic.  
 Database management - Yes No Manual Electronic 
 Project management & planning –Yes  No  Manual  Electronic 
 Tracking system (e.g. resolutions)-Yes No  Manual Electronic 
 Monitoring & evaluation (performance) Yes  No Manual Electronic 
 Communication system- Yes No Manual Electronic 
 
3.22 Was there a standard process in place pertaining to each 
Committee/NA/NCOP to conduct of oversight and accountability? If yes, 
please describe. 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.23 Was the office environment conducive for oversight and accountability 
staff efficiency and effectiveness? If yes, please mention positives. 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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3.24 Did the staff Members feel that they had the necessary technology 
available to effectively conduct oversight and accountability?  
         Yes No 
If no, what is still required? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Section 4: Implementation activities (Practices) 
 
Plenary debates 
 
4.1 Was the task of controlling a debate in the House left to the Presiding 
Officer? (Circle your choice/s) 
 Always 
 Sometimes 
 Most of the time 
 Never 
 Other (Please specify) _________________________________ 
 
4.2 During the fourth Parliament were subjects of immediate importance 
debated in time?       Yes No 
 
4.3 Did the programme allow enough time for debates?   Yes No 
 
4.4 Were smaller parties allocated adequate time during debates?  
         Yes No 
4.5 How would you rate the standard of debates during the fourth 
Parliament? 
 Very good 
 Good 
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 Adequate 
 Poor 
 Very poor 
 
 
Questions to the executive 
 
4.6   How was the standard of questions and replies during the fourth 
Parliament?                                            
 Very Good 
 Good 
 Adequate 
 Poor 
 Very poor 
4.7 Were ministers available to reply to questions? 
 Always 
 Mostly 
 Sometimes 
 Never 
4.8 Were sanctions in place according to the rules if a question stands over 
more than once?       Yes  No 
 
4.9 Was a process in place to deal with unsatisfactory, inadequate or flippant 
replies?         
        Yes  No 
4.10 Were supplementary or follow-up questions allowed during the fourth 
Parliament?         Yes  No 
4.11 Are the questions to the President treated the same as those to 
ministers?        Yes  No 
(Please specify) 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 190 
 
 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Motions without notice 
 
4.12  Were motion without notice technically challenging during the fourth 
Parliament?        Yes  No 
(Please specify) 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
4.13 Did motions without notice need to be cleared with all parties prior to a 
sitting of the house?      Yes  No 
 
4.14 Did the fourth Parliament deal with congratulatory or general condolence 
motions before the House?     Yes  No  
 
Notice of motion 
 
4.15 Were Members of the fourth Parliament allowed to bring matters before 
the House for debate through a motion?    Yes  No 
4.16 Please kindly indicate the types of motions utilised by the Members 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
4.17 Please indicate what issues to consider when drafting a motion. 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
4.18 Were notices of motion subject to the rules of debate of the House?    
Yes     No    
 (Please specify) 
 ________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Budget votes 
 
4.19  Do you think the budget votes are an effective tool to oversee the 
executive actions and planning?       
Yes      No   
4.20 Was a budget ever rejected by the fourth Parliament?   
Yes      No    
4.21 What are the consequences of Parliament rejecting a budget? 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
Member’s statements 
 
4.22 Did the fourth Parliament utilise Members statements to conduct 
oversight?         
Yes      No    
4.23 Were Members of the cabinet as Members of the House allowed to make 
Members statements?       
       Yes      No    
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4.24 How were Members of the Executive provided with an opportunity to 
respond to Members statements? 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
Statements by Cabinet Members 
 
 4.25 What kind of statements were allowed to be made by Cabinet Ministers? 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
4.26 Did you feel that Members of the cabinet were provided more time 
compared to Members of Parliament to make statements?  
Yes      No   (Specify) 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
  
Petitions   
 
4.27 Did the fourth Parliament have rules that indicate the procedure for 
dealing with petitions of general nature or unsolicited submissions? 
        Yes      No    
 
4.28 Did the Committee on Private Member’s Legislative Proposals and 
Special Petitions report to the National Assembly on its activities? 
        Yes      No    
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4.29 Did any timeframes exist for processing of petitions from the date of 
referral of a petition?      Yes     No   
4.30 Please indicate what standard format existed in the fourth Parliament for 
the public to submit petitions.  (Circle all those that are appropriate) 
 Written petitions 
 Oral petitions 
 E-petition 
 
4.31 Did a Petition Act exist in the fourth Parliament?  Yes     No   
 If yes, mention date passed. 
 
 
4.32 How did the fourth Parliament encourage the public to submit petition? 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
4.33 What happened to the public submissions received? 
 They were always summarised 
 They were always passed on to the relevant Committee as is 
 It depends on the specific Committee 
 Other: ______________________________________________ 
 
Approval of annual budget and strategic plan      
 
4.34 Did the fourth Parliament always ensured that Government plans and 
performance are in line with priorities expressed in the MTEF? 
                                                                                                           Yes   No   
 
4.35 Did the fourth Parliament have a Parliamentary oversight cycle? 
                  Yes     No 
 
4.36 Did the oversight cycle take into cognisance the MTEFW? Yes     No   
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 4.37 What other important issues did it take into cognisance? 
   
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
4.38 Was a tool in place to optimise Parliament role in the budget stages? 
            Yes    No   
 
 
Committee’s role in Parliamentary oversight 
 
4.39  Did the programme of the fourth Parliament provide adequate time for 
implementation of the plans of Committees?   Yes     No   
 
4.40 Was an adequate budget allocated for Committees?  Yes     No   
 
4.41 Did Committees on the fourth Parliament play a central role in 
expressing Parliament oversight mandate?    
         Yes     No 
 
4.42 Were Committee meetings open to the public and press?    Yes     No     
 
4.43 Did Committees have formal decision-making power?  Yes     No   
  
4.44 How was the quality of reports produced by Committees? 
(Please select what applies) 
 Very good 
 Good 
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 Adequate 
 Poor 
 Very poor 
 
4.45 Please indicate how Committee reports were dealt with by the Houses  
 ________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________ 
  
4.46 If reports are not adopted or noted by the House what was the main 
reason? (Please select) 
 Poor standard of reports 
 Reports not being submitted on time 
 Reports not drafted 
 Reports not approved by Committee Members 
4.47 Were Members trained on the responsibilities and limits of Parliament 
oversight mandate?       Yes     No   
 
4.48 Were Committees supported by trained and professional staff?  
Yes     No   
 
4.49 Did Committee chairpersons have to influence the executive?  
Yes     No   
 
4.50 Did a common understanding among Members of Parliament exist on 
the role and powers of Committees, particularly with regards to 
oversight?        Yes     No   
 
4.51 Did Committee Members have the research capacity to deal with policy 
issues effectively?       Yes     No  
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 196 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Oversight 
 
4.52 Was the fourth Parliament consulted in the preparation of the national 
budget?        Yes No 
4.53 How did Parliament exercise fiscal oversight? 
 Examination of the finance bill 
 Reports from the finance Committee 
 Confirmation and approval of the finance bill 
 Field visits 
 Other (Please specify) _________________________________ 
 
4.54 What would happen if Parliament failed to adopt a finance bill? 
 (Please select one response) 
 A temporary budget is used 
 The previous budget is renewed 
 Other (Please specify) _________________________________ 
 
4.55 How did Parliament exercise oversight over the execution of the budget? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
4.56 On average how would you describe the quality of inputs during 
oversight over the execution of the budget? 
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 Very good 
 Good 
 Adequate 
 Poor 
 Very poor 
 
4.57 How do you propose one could ensure improved quality of inputs? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Chapter 9 institutions role 
 
4.58 What external bodies existed during the fourth Parliament for oversight 
and accountability? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
4.59 If they exist, who appoints the external oversight bodies? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
4.60 Please describe the relationship between the external oversight bodies 
and Parliament. 
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________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
4.61 Did the fourth Parliament give enough value and attention to the reports 
of Chapter 9 institutions? 
  
Institution Very often Often Not often Never 
PP     
SAHRC     
CRL Commission     
CGE     
AGSA     
IEC     
 
4.62 How much time (annually) was provided to the commissions for 
meaningful engagement with Portfolio Committees? (Please select) 
 1-2 hours 
 2-3 hours 
 3-4 hours 
 4-5 hours 
 5-6 hours 
 6-7 hours 
 7-8 hours 
 More than 8 hours 
 Other (specify) 
  
4.63 Were the institutions independent from Parliament influence?  
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Yes      No 
 
4.64 How do you propose one could develop a better working relationship 
with Chapter 9 institutions to promote oversight and accountability? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
The role of opposition on oversight and accountability 
 
4.65 Were any special powers constitutionally provided to the opposition 
parties in ensuring executive accountability?    Yes     No 
 
4.66 Were all Members of Parliament obliged to hold the executive 
accountable?        Yes     No 
 
4.67 Do you think the party list electoral system has an influence on the 
manner in which oversight is exercised?    Yes     No 
 (Please specify) 
 ________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________ 
  
4.68 Which electoral system do you think would be more effective in 
overseeing the executive?     (Please choose) 
 Proportional representation electoral system 
 Constituency-based electoral system 
 Mixture of the above two electoral system 
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4.69 How important were relations between the opposition and the ruling 
party for effective oversight during the fourth Parliament? 
 Very important 
 Important 
 Less important 
 Not important 
 
4.70 Did the opposition parties received adequate time and resources (human 
and financial) to oversee the executive?      
       Yes      No 
Section 5: Monitoring and evaluation 
 
Monitoring 
 
5.1 Did the fourth Parliament have any mechanism in place for monitoring 
executive responses?       
        Yes     No 
 
5.2      How was the function of communicating House resolutions to the                               
Minister by the Presiding Officers carried out?    
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________ 
 
5.3   Were resolutions that require responses annotated on the Order Paper       
until the responses addressed by the Presiding Officers are received? 
          Yes No 
5.4   Were mechanisms in place for the Presiding Officers to request 
compliance from the relevant Minister?     
          Yes No 
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5.5 Did the rules of the fourth Parliament allow for a Minister to be called to 
account in the House for non-compliance?    Yes No 
5.6 Did the fourth Parliament have mechanisms to avail resolutions and 
compliance with outcomes to the House?    Yes No 
 
5.7 Did the fourth Parliament have database of all stakeholders (addresses of 
and contact details for ministers and public entities)  Yes No 
 
5.8 Please indicate the activities involved in the monitoring of resolutions during 
the fourth Parliament. 
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________ 
5.9 How was the monitoring of responses done during the fourth Parliament? 
(Please select) 
 Manually done 
 Electronically done 
 
5.10  Was a process in place for the Presiding Officers to notify the Leader of 
Governance Business in the event non-compliance by a Minster?  
Yes No 
5.11 Did a link exist in the fourth Parliament between the Leader of 
Government Business and the Parliamentary Liaison Officer to assist 
with tracking and ensuring compliance?        Yes No 
 
5.12 Did you think the monitoring system was effective?     
         Yes No 
If not, please explain why not. 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
5.13 How can one improve the monitoring system used? 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Evaluation 
 
5.14 How did you evaluate oversight and accountability programmes (failure, 
successes, efficiency and effectiveness) Mention methods used and 
timeframes. 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
5.15 After evaluation, did you produce recommendations for improvement 
and incorporate these into the institutional processes?  Yes No 
 
5.16 Did the fourth Parliament have a specific unit dealing with the aspect of 
Monitoring and Evaluation?      Yes No 
 
5.17 Who did this unit report to and how does this unit operate? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
5.18 Did you have any method of assessing the impact of oversight and 
accountability?        Yes No 
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Thank you for completing the questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
         Email or Fax to: Luvuyo Mbete 
                                
                              Email:lmbete@parliament.gov.za 
                                   Fax nr: (086) 615 9555 
 
 
 
 
 
RE: QUESTIONNAIRE ON EVALUATION OF  OVERSIGHT   AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY DURING THE FOURTH PARLIAMENT 2009 - 2014 
 
Kindly email or fax the completed questionnaire to Luvuyo Mbete by 
 28 August 2015 
 
 
            
           Enquiries: Luvuyo Mbete, Tel: 021 – 403 2516, Cell: 082 962 3728 
 
*Parts of the questionnaire are from Scott (2009) “an analysis of public 
participation in the South African legislative sector” have been utilised 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
